The Journal of Historical Review

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'Holocaust' Controversy

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The Waffen SS

Ranjan Borra
India's War of Liberation

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Yalta and its Aftermath

Book Review
Volkman's 'Legacy of Hate'

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
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From the Editor

We're pleased to present in this issue three of the papers delivered at the IHR's 1982 Chicago Revisionist Conference.

We begin with Dr. Wesserle's "Yalta: Fact or Fate?" which presents a concise characterization of the man we sent to Yalta and an analysis of what he did for his country there when not posing for photographs with Winnie and Uncle Joe.

Next, Dr. Butz takes a fresh look at the evolved Holocaust controversy, assessing its place in the context and perspective of higher history.

Leon Degrelle diverted a grim fate by escaping to Spain in the final days of the Eastern Front's collapse. Picking up the pieces and rebuilding his life, today he is alive, successful and eager to tell his side on the issues of the war, the Waffen SS and NS Germany. The article you will read here is a translation of the videotaped interview General Degrelle gave at his home in Spain recently and which was presented at the Chicago conference in September.

Ranjan Borra heads the Reference Library on India at the Library of Congress and has long been a student of Subhas Bose and his role in India's liberation movement. We're pleased to include Mr. Borra's paper in this issue—presented at the IHR's 1980 Revisionist Conference—and apologize for the tardiness of its appearance in print.

George Orwell observed: "Some people go around smelling after anti-Semitism all the time." It would appear to be true and rather increasingly so since Orwell's day. In this issue L.A. Rollins reviews Ernest Volkman's A Legacy of Hate, the cult of anti-anti-Semitism's latest prognosis of that chronic disease which is only today beginning to be fully misunderstood.

Correspondence

MORE ON THE ROMANIAN JEWS

In the last (Fall 1982) Journal of Historical Review, we ran in these columns a correspondence which attempted to clarify the losses of Romanian Jews during the war. We failed to include in that correspondence a final letter/circular by Dr. Andronescu without which the research data would appear to be inconclusive. Here now is Dr. Andronescu's final reply to those who disputed his claims as published originally in "Romanians and the Holocaust," in the Summer 1982 Journal. —Ed.

In my lecture at the 1981 Revisionist Convention I stated that the real number of Jews who died in Romania in WW II had been estimated at 15,000. In Mr. Weber's opinion I was wrong because, he said, the real number was 209,214. Both figures are mentioned in a study authored by two scholars, Dr. Manuila and Dr. Filderman (one Romanian and one Jewish) and published in Rome, Italy in 1957. It is the only study underwritten by the two parties involved in the events that took place in Romania during the war, the Jews and the Romanians. All the other reports on the same situation, showing figures ranging from 200,000 to 500,000 are underwritten by the Jews alone and are therefore partial. It is therefore important to have an accurate understanding of the Manuila/Filderman paper, the only authoritative document in the field.

The document contains among judicious remarks and conclusions a confusing sentence—and this particular confusing sentence has been chosen by Mr. Weber to construe his theory. I will reproduce here two paragraphs of the Manuila/Filderman paper relating to the two figures mentioned above; it is my belief that the concerned reader understands

easily which one is true and which one is misleading.

1. (page 7 of the Manuila/Filderman paper): "The losses incurred as a direct result of the war have been estimated at 15,000 souls by the Jewish organizations of Romania under the leadership of Dr. Filderman. This figure includes the loss of some 3,000 lives suffered during the brief administration of the Iron Guard, and 3,000-4,000 (exact number not known) victims of the military reprisals at Iasi. It also includes the losses suffered by the population deported to Transnistria . . . Dr. Filderman gives the total of deaths on Romanian territory or during the deportation as close to 15,000."

2. (pages 11 and 12 of same paper): "For the territories of Romania as they were in 1939, Jewish losses (deaths and missing) are estimated at a

total of 209,214."

Of both statements, Mark Weber likes the second one and reproves me for adopting the first. I have adopted it because it is clear and explicit, whereas the second is confusing. The year used in the second statement, 1939, misleads the reader and creates a false understanding of the whole situation however true it seems to be. Here is why. Whatever happened to the Jews living in Romania did not occur in 1939 but during a period of four years immediately following 1940 when the population in Romania was much smaller than in 1939. It also occured on a Romanian territory which was much smaller than in 1939. Before 1940 and after 1944 nothing unusual happened to Jews living in Romania and therefore any discussion relating to the "Holocaust" but referring to a period other than 1940-1944 is false; it is a substitution of premises made with the purpose of arriving at a wrong conclusion, even though the figures used in such a substitution are true. Such substitution of premises is characteristic of the confusing manner of expression used sometimes by the stipendiary mass media to give the reader a doctored image of the reality based however on real data. In logic, it is called "fallacy of ambiguity." Mark Weber fell prey to this kind of fallacy and

adopted the figure 209,214 instead of 15,000.

In fact, nothing wrong happened to Jews living in Romania in 1939 or before that year. It is therefore nonsensical to discuss the Jewish losses for the territories of Romania as they were in 1939. I repeat, whatever happened to the "Romanian" Jews occured only after 1939, in a period from 1940 to 1944, when the situation of Romania was quite different of the situation of 1939. In 1940, the Romanian territory and population (Jewish population included) decreased considerably when sizable parts of Romania were occupied by Hungarians, Soviets, and Bulgrians. As a result, about 400,000 Jews who could be called "Romanian" in 1939 and lived in the occupied Romanian territories changed their allegiance and automatically became "Hungarian," "Soviet," or "Bulgarian" Jews. From 1940 on, these Jews shared the fate of their Hungarian, Soviet or Belgarian coreligionists and were counted as such. Only those Jews who remained in nationalist Romania of 1940-1944 could legally be called "Romanian." Their number was about 350,000. These must be the people referred to as "Romanian" Iews in various reports on the so called Holocaust. The other were included in whatever happened to "Hungarian," "Soviet," or "Bulgarian" Jews. To include the latter in the number of the former would be tantamout to artificially doubling their number by counting them once as "Romanian" and then once again as "Hungarian," "Soviet," or "Bulgarian." This point of view had been observed by the two parties who drew up the document of 1957 and especially the paragraph quoted by me under 1. on the previous page. It was not a matter of preference or opinion, it was a matter of arithmetic.

Another misguiding interpretation of the same situation appears when we consider some of the "Hungarian" Jews "Romanian" because Northern Transylvania came back to Romania after the war. We should be aware that this change of administration happened only after the war and, again, whatever happened to "Hungarian" Jews during the war should not be included in whatever happened to "Romanian" Jews during the same period of time, otherwise we artificially double the

number of the same people.

On the other hand, many Jews of Northern Transylvania who lived through the war have always considered themselves "Hungarian" and I don't see any reason to call them "Romanian" now. It is not correct to

Yalta: Fact or Fate? A Brief Characterization

DR. A.R. WESSERLE

(Presented at the IHR's 1982 Revisionist Conference)

President Francois Mitterand of France, in a message at the start of 1982, rightly and roundly condemned the Conference of Yalta. France, excluded from the tete-a-tete of the Big Three World Conquerors on 4-12 February 1945, thus once again has challenged the Western nations not to recognize the judgments and the boundaries there agreed upon—particularly in Eastern Europe—as inexorable fate. Facts make fate the world over and prejudices and hatreds that had been draped with the mantle of sacred truths in 1945 will no longer be so recognized two generations later.

America has a tendency either to worship or to damn her chiefs of state. The vainglorious emotions presently associated with the centenary of Franklin D. Roosevelt's birth—and that not just in the United States—might be used easily to gloss over some of the most glaring errors committed by this man and his advisors at Yalta, and before at Teheran, and handed down to his successor, Truman at the Conference of Potsdam.

Tellingly, today's Soviet press speaks of FDR in glowing terms. The spring, 1982, issues of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* applaud his sense of vision, first, in recognizing the USSR diplomatically but, above all, in his wartime relationship to the rulers of the Kremlin which laid the foundations for "international stability and security." President Reagan's foreign policy, on the other hand, is excoriated as the very antithesis of Roosevelt's "rationality."

No wonder. FDR and his most intimate advisors made sweeping global concessions to the Soviet totalitarians which drastically altered the face of the earth and substantially impeded the work of his successors. Briefly, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presence at Yalta had consequences in the Far East, the Mid East, central and westen Europe and, of course, in the world at large.

PARTI

In exchange for a vague promise to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the end of the European war—a promise kept only on 8 August 1945, after the first atomic bomb already had been dropped—Stalin's "sphere of influence," via the Manchurian railways, was extended to northern and southern Manchuria including the commercial harbor of Dairen and the naval base of Port Arthur, his "status quo" domination over Outer Mongolia was acknowledged, and he was allowed to annex outright the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin which had been Japanese since 1875 and 1905. Thus, with Roosevelt's encouragement, Stalin continued his policy of imperialist Red expansion in the footsteps of the Tsars. The results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 which once had given rise to the Russian revolts of the same year and, ultimately, to the Revolutions of 1917, were expunged. In a move that should seem particularly ironic to Americans, Franklin Roosevelt destroyed the outcome of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, arranged through the good offices of his cousin, President Theodore Roosevelt, and celebrated by a front-page cartoon in the Harper's Weekly of 24 June of that year which shows a solemn President urging a glowering Tsar and a proud Mikado to "Let us Have Peace." 1

Note that, true to ancient imperial tradition, the legally constituted Government of China, engaged in a life-and-death struggle, was not apprised of those generous gifts of its sovereignty and its territory to a powerful neighbor until too late. The following weighty conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin—otherwise attended only by Molotov, Harriman and two translators—held toward 4 p.m. of Saturday, 10 February 1945, decides the fate of the largest nation on earth:

Roosevelt: "... Naturally, our agreement about Port Arthur and the railroads needs China's approval. Would you like to inform T.V. Soong (the Foreign and Prime Minister of China)...? Or should I treat the matter with Chiang-Kai-Skek?" Stalin: "It would be better if you approached him." Roosevelt: "Good...I'll send an officer to Chungking (China's wartime capital)." ²

Without success Harriman tried to persuade the President to have at least Port Arthur declared a free port under international supervision. At the Conference of Cairo, in November, 1943, FDR had promised Chiang-Kai-Shek the complete return of Manchukuo or Manchuria to China.

In East Asia, therefore, Yalta opened the door to Soviet expansion and to the 'communization' of heavily industrial, formerly Japanese-dominated Manchuria, of northern China and Mongolia and, ultimately, of most of that huge continent north and east of Iran, India, Burma and Thailand. Without FDR America's costly land wars in Korea and Indochina would have been less inevitable.

In the Middle East, Churchill and Roosevelt had permitted the USSR to occupy the former Tsarist Sphere of Influence in the north of Iran which included the volatile regions and provinces of Kurdistan, Azerbeijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan and Khorasan. Britain swallowed the rest. These developments took place on and after 25 August 1941, while the ink was not yet dry on the paper of the Atlantic Charter in which Roosevelt and Churchill had proclaimed the inviolability of the independence, the territories and the boundaries of nations.

In the meantime, from 1941 to 1945, the Soviet Union increased her pressure on Turkey and Iraq, nations which were similar to Iran in that they were neutral but traditionally had been in the crossfire of British, Russian and French power interests. Soviet plans included territorial and economic concessions such as the "leasing" or the donation of the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to the USSR and the handing over of the eastern provinces of Turkey—again a direct continuation of Tsarist Imperialism.

At Yalta, on 10 February, after 6 p.m., the seventh plenary session yields this result concerning Turkey:

Stalin: "... According to the Convention of Montreux (1936-the author) the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in case of war, but also when, in their opinion, the danger of war exists. I demand an immediate revision of the convention... It is an intolerable situation that Turkey can throttle Russia at any time."

Roosevelt: "I understand you completely! I hate it when nations erect barriers between each other. Look at the 3000 mile long boundary between Canada and the United States: no fort and no soldier stand on the entire border. Besides, it is... understandable that the USSR wishes to have an ice-free port in the west" (underlined by author).

Churchill: "I am also in agreement, under the condition that the independence and the integrity of Turkey are guaranteed." 3

After some discussion the Soviet request wins the day. At Yalta as in the long run, Britain proved unable to resist Stalin in the face of American amity toward the Soviets and it was not until 1946-47 that President Truman saw his way toward containment in the Near East.

In toto, it may be stated with but slight hyperbole that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980, her threat to Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, her designs on the Persian Gulf, on Arabia and on East Africa, and her power dominance over most of Asia north and east of a line from Baghdad to Bombay to Bangkok, were made much easier by Yalta, as well as by Teheran and Potsdam.

PART II

In Europe, the conclusions of the Yalta Conference concerning the division of Germany west of the Oder River into zones administered by an Allied Control Council were kept rigidly, months later, by the Americans and the British. It should never be forgotten that the heart of Europe, vital to the survival of all the continent, East or West, had been occupied by the forces of the West first and then abandoned to the depredations of the Red Army. This heartland included western and southern Bohemia with the large industrial city of Pilsen, the German state of Thuringia, heavily industrial Saxony up to the Elbe River, parts of Brandenburg-Prussia and of the Baltic coastal state of Mecklenburg.

Despite the urgings of the United States' General Patton, of Winston Churchill—who had "seen the light" about Soviet power far too late—and of General Montgomery, American politicians still under the spell of Yalta expressly declined, from March to May, 1945, to take Berlin and Prague while it was still possible. Patton's forces were grounded by administrative fiat in Bohemia a few miles west of Prague even though a jeep, or jeeps, full of American G.I.'s toured Prague and were celebrated by the populace. Had Prague been occupied by America, the frightful atrocities visited by Czech mobs on their German compatriots—compatriots of 800 to 1000 years—would have been avoided. Had Pilsen, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Wismar been kept, and had Berlin and Prague been taken by America and Britain—steps which would have required few sacrifices in 1945—all of European and world history since then would have differed fundamentally from today's sorry "reality."

The charge, sometimes disputed, that in 1944 and early 1945 Churchill and Roosevelt abandoned the Polish Government-in-Exile in London to Stalin's designs by ceding eastern Poland to him while throwing to the Poles, in compensation, the territories of eastern Germany, is justified. When the Polish premier-in-exile, Stanislas Mikolajczyk, visited Roosevelt in June 1944, the latter explained to him that "Stalin is no imperialist... (He) is

very deft, ... has a sense of humor."4

In illustration of this humor Roosevelt related "Uncle Joe's" toast, at the Conference of Teheran, to the "death of at least 50,000 German officers" to which Churchill had reacted angrily and which he, FDR, then sought to improve by toasting to the death of "... at least 49,500 German officers in battle." Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and his ambassdor, Ciechanowski, apparently failed to be amused as they were reminded of the fate of 20,000 Polish officers "liquidated" by Stalin, some of them thrown into mass graves in the woods near Katyn.

Caught between the Kremlin's devices and the aspirations of his nation, Mikolajczyk resigned in November, 1944. His successor Arciszewski—a socialist and a fighter in the Polish underground until July 1944—was equally unwilling to impart his blessings to an act of national catastrophe. On 3 February 1945, Arciszewski sent Roosevelt a telegram the text of which, in excerpts, is worth remembering:

I trust that you will not take part in any decision which endangers Poland's legitimate rights or her independence and that, in regard to Poland, you will not recognize any faits accomplis... If the European peace is to endure it must rest upon the principles of justice, of respect for the law, of good-neighborly relations and of trust, in the lives of peoples...

The so-called Provisional Government in Lublin has declared openly that it will treat all soldiers of the Inner-Polish Army and of the Polish Underground Movement as traitors . . Mass arrests

and deportations already have taken place . . . 6

The White House gave Ambassador Ciechanowski the cold shoulder. He succeeded but once in grabbing hold of Roosevelt's intimus, Harry Hopkins: "What could be more important than laying the cornerstone, now, for the future cooperation of united nations on the basis of American principles and the Four Basic Freedoms?" In a fit of laughter Hopkins replied, "We also have to think of the 1948 elections!"

Premier Arciszewski, his government, and his nation were sacrificed to the communist-dominated "Lublin Government"

formed under Stalin's aegis.

Thus, Yalta, its antecedents and its consequences can in fact be blamed for the futility of the periodic uprisings in Soviet-occupied Central Europe: for the uprising in the Soviet Zone of Germany, 17-19 June 1953; for the revolts in Poland in the spring of 1956, in 1970 and in 1981/82; for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956; for the Spring and the Fall of Prague, 1968. Without Yalta these fateful bloodbaths, this oppression of the spirit of entire, great nations would not have taken place. Without Yalta they would have been unnecessary.

PART III

National catastrophe on a cataclysmic scale befell the people

of Germany, her old men, women and children.

Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam laid the foundation for the most abhorrent "ethnocide" in history: the expulsion of twenty million (20 million) Germans and Hungarians from their age-old national homelands in central and eastern Europe, and the attendant destruction of many of them: in the Soviet Union; the Baltic states; Poland proper; the lands of eastern Germany; Czecho-Slovakia; Transylvania and the Carpathians; Rumania and Yugo-Slavia.

In brief, by the end of 1950, 7.95 million Germans from the east had experienced an "orderly transfer" to the three western zones (the Federal Republic of Germany), 4.4 million to the Soviet Zone, and over 300,000 to Austria. By 1952 the number of German expellees in West Germany had risen to ten million, with an additional 2.2 million political refugees—not expellees—from the Soviet Zone of Germany by August 1953—a problem of stark survival and of absorption into a war-shattered country of a

magnitude unparalleled anywhere.

More than three million men, women and children from the German areas of east-central and eastern Europe perished or are listed as "missing" in the desolate wastes of the Soviet Union. Mass expulsions of Germans had been contemplated since 1848 and, with growing vehemence, since 1866 by the Pan-Slav theorists of Prague and Moscow and, since about the turn of the century, by Western ideologues such as the British geopolitician and Chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee, Halford Mackinder. The storms of outraged indignation which swept Britain when Germany rose to the rank of naval power were stoked carefully by the press lords of Fleet Street. The jingoist outcries in which such papers as the Daily Mail, the Daily Telgraph and the periodical Vanity Fair indulged parallelled the more weighty sentiments expressed by dynamic personalities such as First Sea Lord (after 1904) Admiral Sir John Fisher and his superior of later days, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill. If opinions be permitted, it seems quite clear that these mass media campaigns were rooted in the same persons—or the same circles and in similar policies at the time both of the First and the Second World Wars.

Several cruel "population transfers" were effected at the end of the First War which, apparently, further whetted the radical appetites of Eduard Benes, at various times League of Nations delegate, Foreign Minister and President of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, a sinister figure behind aspects of the Yalta and the Potsdam Conferences.

Still, Yalta stands and falls on its own demerits.

No wonder the Right Hon. Mr. Boothby declared in the House of Commons on 10 October 1945:

Nobody realizes more clearly than I do that the high aspirations expressed in the Atlantic Charter have long ago gone by the board, but few can have thought, even a year ago, that we were fighting this war in order to turn Central and Eastern Europe into a desert containing a decimated population. 8

JCS 1067 (Joint Chiefs of Staff directive number 1067) almost managed to convert all of western Germany and much of western Europe into a wasteland also. This document, issued in April. 1945, was entitled "Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany" and specified:

. . . 4.b. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation . . . You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population . . . 5.a. . . . Controls upon the German economy may be imposed . . . as they may be essential to protect the safety and meet the needs of the occupying forces and assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would endanger these forces . . .

b. . . . Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility . . . for any breakdowns in those controls will rest with themselves and German authorities . . .

16. ... You will take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy . . . 9

Under the conditions of utter chaos then prevailing in Germany JCS 1067, if put into effect according to the letter of the law. would have rung the death knell both for tens of millions of people in West Germany and, probably, for the reconstruction of the highly interdependent economies of all of Western Europe, as well. The probable consequences might have been anarchy and revolt in the entire region—and a welcome opportunity for com-

munism to step into the void.

Who had drawn up this remarkable paper? In 1944, three United States Government agencies had composed competing versions looking toward a putative reconstruction of Germany: (1) the Department of State under Secretary of State Hull; (2) the War Department under-the Republican-Secretary Stimson and his able and intelligent Assistant Secretary, McCloy; and (3) the Treasury Department. What seems to have been true of other eras of the twentieth century U.S. history also proved true in this case; the State Department was too weak to make its more statesmanlike version prevail, the War Department was interested mainly in planning for a non-political, military, occupation and it was the Treasury—with Roosevelt's support—that won the

day and the year and the war. The name of the Secretary of the Treasury was Henry Morgenthau. His closest assistant was the

communist, Harry Dexter White.

Lest we jump to unnecessary conclusions I should emphasize that the Morgenthau-White Plans—Morgenthau's variation was more severe than White's—in their destructiveness echoed the counsel of British Conservative Vansittart whose roots, in turn, were firmly implanted in the mass media hate campaigns that preceded and accompanied the conduct of the First World War on the British side.

Rebus sic stantibus it was not until 15 July 1947, that JCS 1067 was superseded by JCS 1779 and its more statesmanlike terms:

While continuing restraints...our Military Government (will take) measures which will bring about the establishment of stable political and economic conditions in Germany and which will enable Germany to make a maximum contribution to European re-

covery . . .

...5. It is an objective of the United States Government that there should arise in Germany as rapidly as possible a form of political organization and a manner of political life which, resting on a substantial basis of economic well being, will lead to tranquillity within Germany and will contribute to the spirit of peace among nations ... 10

On 20 July 1948, the Western Allies and Dr. Erhardt carried out the Currency Reform, a monumental first step toward economic and political reconstruction. From 26 June 1948, to 29 July 1949, the Soviets blockaded Berlin and the West replied with the Air Lift. On 4 April 1949, the United States and her Western Allies established NATO. After nine months of deliberation the new constitution, the German Basic Law, was ratified on 23 May, 1949. The first elections to the Parliament at Bonn followed in August. Dr. Adenauer, the Catholic former mayor of Cologne, was the first Federal Chancellor of Germany.

Conclusion

Tentative characterization of Roosevelt's wartime diplomacy. Briefly, very briefly, the surest conclusion concerning FDR's conduct of foreign relations is that this scion of the East Coast Upper Caste was neither a communist nor a socialist, appearances to the contrary. Neither was he a realist—self-proclaimed or otherwise—nor an idealist who strove to master the concrete demands of life, in the mold of President Woodrow Wilson. No. Quite simply, he was a power politician whose talents in juggling and besting the competing interest groups of this country proved insufficient to wrest a lasting peace from the jaws of victory abroad. He, and his most intimate advisors, had little inkling of

what an intelligent policy of prudent self-interest meant for his country and for himself. He had hedged himself in with a rigid ideologism which distorted his perceptions and his policies. He sought escape from ideological rigidity in the arms of an equally rigid, starry-eyed, aura of overblown "plans" on a cosmic scale. Placed face-to-face with a serious global situation as the leader of the strongest country on earth he proved delinquent to America, a disaster to the world.

Three examples: At Yalta, on Saturday, 10 February, Harry Hopkins slips Roosevelt this incomprehensible note (on the matter of exacting reparations worth 20 billion gold dollars from Germany): "Mr. President, the Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don't think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to . . ." 11 Roosevelt gives in.

His intransigeance on the "unconditional surrender" formula at the Conference of Casablanca, and later, met with the feigned opposition of Churchill and, initially, even of Stalin who reasoned that it would prolong the war by provoking desparate resistance among the peoples of the Axis Powers, particularly the Germans and the Japanese. His reply to this opposition, and to similar objections from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his comment on the State Department memoranda that the German Army and the German people were ready—in 1943-44—to make peace "over the heads of the Nazi Government" took the following form:

On his return from the Quebec Conference, Roosevelt calls Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York to the White House for a friendly chat, on 2 September 1943:

The division (of the world) will be simple . . . The Far East goes to China. The Pacific to the United States. Africa and Europe will be divided between Russia and Great Britain . . . I hope the Russian intervention in Europe won't be too rough . . . (It is to be expected that Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia and other countries will receive Communist-dominated governments) But what can we do about it? . . . Hopefully, due to the influence of the Europeans, the Russians will become less barbaric in the next ten to twenty years . . . France might escape communism if it gets a government a la Leon Blum . . . 13

On FDR's ideas about which other European countries might be saved from communism, he intended to allow popular elections in: "France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Norway and Greece. Not... Czecho-Slovakia." No mention of Denmark and Sweden, nor of Turkey. Not a glimmering of comprehension of the conditions which the realization of his facile dreams would impose upon the entire world and this, his own, country.

As for Yalta, its precedents and its consequences still are very much with us today. They promise to remain so for some time to come.

Footnotes

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Context and Perspective in the 'Holocaust' Controversy

ARTHUR R. BUTZ

(Presented at the IHR's 1982 Revisionist Conference)

Introduction

When in the discussion of some subject we criticize somebody because "he can't see the forest for the trees," we refer to a special sort of intellectual failing. We do not mean that the object of our criticism is incompetent or that his views on the subject of interest are erroneous or irrelevant. His views may, on the contrary, be buttressed by investigations of depth and power that would be a credit to any intellect. We mean that he is so focused on details that he fails to see the subject in proper and larger context, especially from the higher perspective which, if adopted and pursued, would solve many of the problems that excited general curiosity in the subject in the first place.

When I first addressed an IHR conference three years ago I explicitly made reference to this problem by pointing out that on p10 of the Hoax of the Twentieth Century I had mentioned the consideration that, if appreciated adequately, would have made

much of my study superfluous:

The simplest valid reason for being skeptical about the extermination claim is also the simplest conceivable reason; at the end of the war they were still there.

Through all of the controversy on the "Holocaust" my thoughts have continually returned to this point. That so much controversy could have raged, with only rare occurrences of this observation, raises questions that are worth exploring.

On the one hand my making of the above and similar general historical observations in my book shows that I did not myopically see only the trees and not the forest. On the other hand in some parts of the book my focus may seem to be on obscure details and to suggest myopia. This bifocalism is the topic of this paper. For one thing, I want to develop the "forest" side of the subject further, i.e. I want to place the "Holocaust" subject more firmly in the context of the higher history of the twentieth century. On the other hand. I want to consider the fact that so much of the investigation that has been conducted in recent years, certainly including my own, has presupposed and sought to satisfy myopic demands. I will argue, partly from historical analogy, that as a practical matter this great emphasis on detail seems justified and even necessary in the times we are in, but that it is important, even to avoid getting tripped up on points of detail, that we keep the larger context in mind.

Gitta Sereny

Gitta Sereny's article in the New Statesman of 2 November 1979 furnishes a useful illustration. She attempted to encounter my arguments in only one respect. In the course of writing Into That Darkness she had interviewed, in a German prison, Franz Stangl, former commandant of Treblinka (a facility in central Poland that served as a transit camp for deportations of Warsaw Jews). She wrote:

I talked with Stangl for weeks in prison; I talked to others who worked under him, and to their families. I talked to people who, otherwise uninvolved, witnessed these events in Poland. And I talked to a few of those very few who survived.

Butz claims in his *Hoax* that those (hundreds) who admitted taking part in extermination were doing so as plea-bargaining, in order to get lighter sentences. But those I talked to had been tried. Many had served their sentences, and none of them had anything to gain—except shame—by what they told me. Stangl himself wanted only to talk, and them to die. And Stangl is dead. But if ... Butz ... were really interested in the truth, Stangl's wife, and many other witnesses are still able to testify.

Although the point is not of major importance, I note that Sereny has misleadingly reported Stangl's hopes during her interview. According to her Into That Darkness Stangl was awaiting the decision on his appeal against a life sentence, so he presumably wanted to get out of jail before he died.

Anybody who has taken even a brief look at the details of the Treblinka legend (e.g. the claim that the exhausts of captured Russian tanks and trucks were used in the "gassings") would understand that history was not being served by Sereny's re-

marks on her interviews with Stangl. However I am afraid that in the typical case such healthy skepticism might be accompanied by some myopia in offering an explanation for Sereny's account.

The most obvious myopic reaction would be to say or suggest that Sereny was lying, that Stangl never said anything like what she has attributed to him. Other possibilities might be to suggest that such remarks by Stangl were produced by bribery or torture. That such reactions quite miss the mark is easily seen by first considering the context, rather than the content, of Stangl's remarks. He was by then an old man. He had heard the tales of what was supposed to have happened at Treblinka for twenty five years. Of course he privately scoffed at them at first. Then he got acccustomed to living in a culture in which such tales were never publicly challenged. He may (as sometimes happens in such circumstances) have started to believe them himself, or perhaps he privately cultivated his knowledge that the tales were almost pure invention. It is most unlikely that we shall ever know, but we do know that in his confrontation with the journalist Sereny, the hapless old man could scarcely have reasoned that he could help himself by denying the legend as it applies to Treblinka, I am confident that Stangl told Sereny something like she reports. Of course Stangl sought to excuse himself personally, but what possible self-serving reason could he have found for telling Serenv that the "gassings" are a myth?

Accordingly I wrote in my letter of reply to the New Statesman, which was not published there but was published in this journal:¹

The key point is that the objective served by such statements should be presumed to be personal interest rather than historical truth. At a "trial" some specific thing is to be tried, i.e. the court is supposed to start by treating that thing as an open question.

The "extermination" allegation has never been at question in any practical sense in any of the relevant trials, and in some it has not been open to question in a formal legal sense. The question was always only personal responsibility in a context in which the extermination allegation was unquestionable. Thus the "confessions" of Germans, which in all cases sought to deny or mitigate personal responsibility, were merely the only defenses they could present in their circumstances.

This is not exactly "plea-bargaining," where there is negotiation between prosecution and defense, but it is related. All it amounts to is presenting a story that it was possible for the court to accept. The logical dilemma is inescapable once the defendant resolves to take the "trial" seriously. To deny the legend was not the way to stay out of jail.

Moreover it is not true, as Sereny implicitly asserts, that this logical dilemma no longer holds when the defendant is serving a life sentence. If he is seeking pardon or parole, he would not try to overturn what has already been decided in court; that is not the

way pardon or parole works. For example, at the Frankfurt "Auschwitz trial" of 1963-1965, so monstrous were the supposed deeds of Robert Mulka that many thought his sentence to 14 years at hard labor unduly light. Then, in a denouement that would amaze all who have not studied this subject closely, Mulka was quietly released less than four months later. However, if Mulka had claimed in any plea (as he could have truthfully), either at his trial or afterwards, that there were no exterminations at Auschwitz and that he was in a position to know, then he would have served a full life sentence in the former case and the full fourteen years in the latter, if he lived that long.

It is not widely known, but there have been many such instances—the subject is hard to investigate. In no instance would it have made any sense, in terms of immediate self interest, to deny the

exterminations. That was not the way to get out of jail.

If one accepts, as the terms of the debate, the purely defensive attitude of responding to the specific points made by the other side, then I still believe this to be the correct way to answer Sereny. I was satisfied as I wrote those lines but, in the course of so doing, the madness of the immediate context struck me. It was 1979, not 1942, and Sereny was trying to explain to readers of the New Statesman, via her account of a lone old man's remarks, that they should believe the "extermination" tales. Continuing the letter, then, I wrote:

We do not need "confessions" or "trials" to determine that the bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima, or the reprisals at Lidice following Heydrich's assassination, really took place. Now, the extermination legend does not claim a few instances of homicide, but alleges events continental in geographical scope, of three years in temporal scope, and of several million in scope of victims. How ludicrous, then, is the position of the bearers of the legend, who in the last analysis will attempt to "prove" such events on the basis of "confessions" delivered under the fabric of hysteria, censorship, intimidation, persecution and blatant illegality that has been shrouding this subject for 35 years.

To put it another way, Sereny in her 1979 article was arguing the reality of the colossal events alleged by reporting what a tired old man recently told her in prison. One might as well argue that the gipsies burned down New York City in 1950, on the basis of confessions of gipsies who were living there at the time. Of course Sereny would argue that I am seizing on only one remark of hers and making it appear to be her whole argument. However, while I concede that she has a great deal more to say on this subject, the basic observation still stands. She was taking a great deal of space in a prominent journal in presenting arguments that in 1979 were wildly incommensurate with the allegation in question. If the Jews of Europe really had been exterminated, such arguments would not be offered.

When I saw Robert Faurisson in 1980 he congratulated me on this point, i.e. for pointing out that we do not need "trials" in order to believe in real historical events (Hiroshima, Lidice, etc.). and said he wished he had thought of it. I knew how he felt for, at about the time of Sereny's article a man I had never heard of before telephoned me and raised a point I wished I had thought of, namely, why didn't those Jewish bodies outside the Axis sphere, who had so much to say about "extermination" and "murder," undertake to warn the Jews under Hitler what supposedly lay in store for them in the German resettlement programs? In all accounts we are told that the Jews packed up for the deportations and entered camps later without imagining that they were to be killed. This feature of the legend is of course necessary for it is well known that violent resistance to the deportations was very rare (I implicitly touched this point on p. 109 of Hoax, but nowhere nearly as strong as I should have).

The general lesson suggested by these two incidents is the subject of this paper. We see that what was involved in both incidents was temporary myopia, not merely of the bearers of the received legend, but more importantly of the revisionists, who were so busy analyzing the trees that it took some fortuitous prodding to make them notice some important features of the forest. This is not a failing of individuals. It is a consequence of the historical circumstances in which we find ourselves. I shall try to describe those circumstances and show how we should handle them today. This is done partly by presenting my approximation of posterity's outlook on these matters, and partly by offering several suggestions on the conduct of practical controversy.

The Donation Of Constantine

The "Donation of Constantine" is the most famous forgery in European history. It first appeared somewhere around the year 800. It is a document allegedly in the "hands" (sic) of Emperor Constantine I (288?-337), which recounts the long standing and false legend of Constantine's conversion and baptism by Pope Sylvester I. Its principal feature is its grant to the Pope of temporal authority over "the city of Rome and all the provinces, places and states of Italy, and the western regions." It also decrees that the Pope "shall have the supremacy as well over the four principal (holy) sees, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Constantinople," and makes various additional specific grants. To make it clear that the Donation is in earnest, the document then has Constantine declare his intention to transfer his own capital to "the province of Byzantia (where) a city should be built in our name . . . for where the primate of priests and the head of the Christian religion is established by the Heavenly Emperor, it is not right that an earthly Emperor shall have authority there."

What is of the greatest interest here is that the authenticity of this document was rarely questioned before the fifteenth century, despite the facts that (1) according to legends and histories widely available throughout the Middle Ages and to the document itself, the city that Constantine founded on the ancient site of Byzantium, and which was later called "Constantinople," had not yet been founded, much less made the site of a principal holy see and (2) more conclusively, and in analogy with our "they were still there" observation on the "Holocaust," according to records and histories available throughout the Middle Ages, imperial rule continued in Italy during the times of Constantine, Sylvester, and their immediate successors.

It was certainly not lack of interest or relevance that explains the long failure to see the Donation as a fraud. Much of the political life of the Middle Ages revolved around the controversy over the relative power of Pope and Holy Roman (i.e. German) Emperor, and able intellects participated in circumstances in which the Donation was considered one of the arguments on the side of the Pope. Even Dante (1265-1321), an outspoken enemy of papal temporal power, touched on the Donation in his Inferno only to deplore Constantine's granting of it:

O Constantine, what great evil had as its mother Not your conversion, but that dowry Which the first rich father got from you!

Thus a wildly ahistoric forgery, approximately in the class of a letter bearing the alleged signature of George Washington, granting the Methodist Episcopal Church "authority to rule over Washington, D.C. and subject territories of North America," went almost unchallenged throughout centuries of relevant contro-

versv.

The first challenges were typically silly, off the mark, tendentious, or circumlocutory, and often, with Dante, challenged only the desirability of the Donation and not its historicity. In the middle of the twelfth century the reform movement of Arnold of Brescia attacked the whole legend of Sylvester and the Donation by arguing that Constantine was already a Christian when he met Sylvester. Among the anti-papal Ghibellines of Germany there arose around 1200 the legend that, when Constantine made the Donation, the angels cried audibly "Alas, alas, this day has poison been dropped into the Church of God." The partisans of the Pope retorted that, sure, the weeping was heard, but it was just the Devil in disguise, trying to deceive us. Others argued that the Donation was not valid because Constantine was tainted with Arian heresy, or because the consent of the people had not been obtained, or because the grant was supposed to apply only to Constantine's reign. Others turned the Donation into a back

handed blow at the papacy by arguing that it showed papal primacy to be derived not from God, but from the Emperor. Indeed the last argument became, until the middle of the fifteenth century, a standard attitude toward the Donation on the part of anti-papal spokesmen. Around 1200 two writers had pointed to the fact of the continuity of imperial rule in Italy after the alleged Donation, but their presentations were circumlocutory and did not reveal their personal conclusions on the matter, and they had no evident influence on future controversy.

What should have been a conclusive critique of the Donation came in 1433, not from an anti-papal source, but from somebody we might charaterize as a liberal reformer within the Church. Cusanus, Deacon of St. Florinus of Coblenz, presented for the use of the Council of Basle a critique of the Donation which emphasized the overwhelming historical evidence against any transfer of sovereignty from Emperor to Pope in or just after the time of

Sylvester and Constantine.

Cusanus' De concordantia catholica had little direct impact, partly because of its dry and dispassionate tone, and partly because it was eclipsed by the 1440 treatise of Lorenzo Valla, De falso credita et ementita Constantini. It is Valla's name that is most closely associated with the overthrow of the hoax, partly because his own considerable talents were supplemented by Cusanus' work, partly because of the oratorical and passionate nature of his treatise, and partly because the quickly succeeding developments of printing and the Reformation movement gave the treatise a massive distribution in various translations.

Valla's basic approach was to subject the Donation to criticism from every perspective that was available to him. For example he starts by trying to look at the matter from the perspective of Constantine, "a man who through thirst for dominion had waged war against nations, and attacking friends and relatives in civil strife had taken the government from them," who then allegedly would "set about giving to another out of pure generosity the city of Rome, his fatherland, the head of the world, the queen of states, . . . betaking himself thence to an humble little town, Byzantium." After reading only a few pages of Valla the Donation seems incredible, but the treatise runs to about 80 pages in English translation and is a classic case of "overkill." Valla supported Cusanus' argument, that the alleged transfer of sovereignty had not taken place, with the evidence of the Roman coins of the period, which were issued in the names of Emperors, not Popes. Valla analyzed the language and vocabulary of the Donation document, and showed they could not have represented the sort of Latin used by Constantine. Such methods were novel for the times.

Valla was not a disinterested scholar. At the time he wrote the treatise he was employed as secretary to Alfonso of Aragon, who was contesting the rule of Naples with the Pope. Valla left his reader in no doubt of his view that temporal power of the Pope is bad and ought to be abolished. Nevertheless Valla's treatise is a landmark in the rise of historical criticism, and I believe it can profitably be studied today by those engaged in "debunking the

genocide myth."

Although somebody was burned at the stake in Strassburg in 1458 for denying the Donation, Valla's thesis was at first quite well received among educated people, although the treatise remained in manuscript. By 1500 it seemed the legend was finished; the relative quiescence of fundamental controversy on the character of the papacy was probably helpful. However the development of the Reformation movement, and the wide use of Valla's treatise as a weapon against the papacy, had the ironic effect of reviving the defense of the legend. On the one hand Martin Luther declared in 1537 that Valla's treatise had convinced him that the Pope was the embodiment of the Antichrist. On the other hand Steuchus, librarian of the Vatican, produced in 1547 a rather able attack on Valla's treatise, which was put on the Index shortly later. The process of overthrowing the legend could only be considered completed around 1600 when the great Catholic historian Baronius declared that the falsity of the Donation had been proved.

This short sketch begs at least two fundamental questions. First, we have observed that the fraudulence of the Donation seems obvious, on the grounds that the transfer of sovereighty alleged did not in fact take place. Why then did it take so long to

expose it?

I believe that the reason is fundamentally that it would have been impolitic, earlier than the Renaissance, to have drawn the obvious conclusions about the Donation. Important political and economic interests are difficult to oppose with mere observations, regardless of how factual and relevant. The two explanations that come most readily to mind, for the overthrowing of the legend at the time it was done, are, first, that the Renaissance introduced a new higher level of scholarship to Europe and, second, that the Reformation assisted anti-papal developments. I believe this interpretation is valid provided it is not thereby implied that the Middle Ages did not have the intellectual acumen to see through the fraud. The political developments of the post-medieval period were decisive in making it safe and even opportune to see the obvious.

We can elaborate on this basically political explanation by noting the old problem; we see the trees, not the forest, unless we make unusual efforts to do otherwise. To see the obvious, it must first be presented somehow. What people heard in the Donation controversy were the claims of Popes to temporal authority, references to the relevant document, and all sorts of arguments from quarters hostile to the Pope. Roman history, while known to a good extent, was not normally ably presented. For this perhaps amazing omission there are simple explanations. For one thing the Popes represented the entrenched position and called the tune on what was to be discussed; they could hardly be expected to encourage examination on historical grounds. For another thing spokesmen against the Donation, on account of their dissident position, had to address familiar subjects in order to accomplish the practical objective of being heard. Moreover as they typically represented political or religious interests rather than historical studies, they often did not know the relevant history anyway. On the other hand the professional scholars were largely dependent on ecclesiastic authorities for their livelihoods. Thus the field was suitable for a reign of politically founded stupidity.

To ask a second fundamental question, if the fraudulence of the Donation should have been obvious to the unintimidated and inquiring intellect, and if political developments weakened and even removed the intimidation, then why was a lengthy treatise

such a Valla's necessary to overthrow it?

The question as posed is loaded, mainly in the sense of presupposing cause and effect relationships. We cannot separate causes and effects in complex events which saw (a) the shattering of the power of the papacy in the Reformation and (b) the overthrowing of one of the impostures which supported that power and (c) the wide circulation of a book exposing that imposture.

At best we can ask what role Valla's treatise played in these events and a good conjecture can be made on the basis of the contents of the treatise, which were far more extensive, and far more detailed, than what was required to prove the thesis. It contained intellectual material of such quantity and diversity that the spread of its influence was all but irresistible. Old coin buffs got something to talk about; the specialists in Latin grammar and language were invited into the controversy; the historians of Rome saw something for them, ditto the historians of the Church. In short, articulate tongues were set wagging against a background of colossal political development.

In my Convention paper three years ago I stressed that extraacademic controversy should not be underrated as a means of nudging the scholars along on controversial subjects. That is to say, and here I am speaking from direct experience as a member of academe, the typical attitude toward "hot" subjects, on the part of the basically honest but all-too-human scholar, is evasion. To be sure there is a small minority, the hirelings of the profiteers of the reigning thesis, who consciously lie and obfuscate. Eventually there is a small minority that assualts the entrenched position, and whose dissident utterances have the temporary effect of allying a larger minority with the conscious liars, in denunciation of the heretics. However the typical honest scholar, who tries to maintain self respect while paying his bills, evades the hot issue.

This evasion is made difficult or impossible if diverse members of the populace abound with challenging questions. If the popular expression goes far enough, it can transform itself from a factor making evasion impossible, into a factor making heresy relatively safe. Thus do not underrate popularization of hot subjects as a means of nudging or even propelling those who ought to handle them.

The main points I want to make in this section are as follows. Simple and decisive arguments against the Donation of Constantine which, it seems to us, should have been obvious to the Middle Ages, were smothered by the politics of the times. Valla's treatise, going into far more detail than seems necessary to our historical sense, played a crucial practical role in bringing down the legend of the Donation, but this process was inseparably linked to political developments favorable to Valla's thesis and its unintimidated consideration.

The Analogies

The analogies to our own "Holocaust" legend may seem almost too obvious to belabor. The academics of the Midddle Ages and the Renaissance who would not see the simple stand in painful and embarrassing analogy to academics of today. However it is

worthwhile to expand on a few points.

We have seen that the legend of the Donation was overthrown in a period of political development highly unfavorable to the papacy, and this suggests another obvious analogy and expectation: that the Holocaust legend will be overthrown in this period of political development highly unfavorable to Zionism. This anticipated confluence is above all inevitable and inescapable, but it is useful to note its dangerous aspects. It will introduce dangerous pressures, political and intellectual, into the revisionist camp.

For example as this is written the Israeli invasion of Lebanon has made Menachem Begin the most unpopular man, and Israel the most unpopular state, in the world. It can plausibly be argued that the invasion has been brutally negligent of the welfare of innocent Lebanese civilians who have died in shocking numbers or suffered the privations attendant to the Israeli attempt to destroy the PLO forces. It can plausibly be argued that Ameri-

cans have been dopes or dupes for giving Israel almost everything it wanted in the past. However I have read, even in publications friendly to revisionism, that the Israeli policy amounts to "genocide," which it does not, either in intent or (thus far) in effect, at least not in my understanding of the meaning of the word, which is somewhat close to "extermination." While such ill conceived cussing may be the norm for the popular press, it is upsetting to see revisionist oriented circles do it for they, above all, should be able to make the distinctions among the various inhumanities that are necessary to keep the historical record straight.

A recognition of real danger comes with the understanding that such confusion of issues may have an explanation in terms of politics as well as in terms of normal human inexactitude. In the coming years there will be strong pressures on many, including revisionists, to be "for" the Arabs as distinct from fair to them. The pressure will arise partly from the fact that it will be precisely the Middle East developments that will create opportunities for the revisionists to be heard. Thus the revisionists will have to walk a tightrope, on the one hand resisting dangerous pressures, on the other hand exploiting such openings, as political developments may make, for the expression of legitimate historical observations. We should dearly love to consider the Hoax in an ivory tower, but it is not going to happen that way.

As history never repeats itself, the Donation-Holocaust analogy does not hold on all salient points. However there is another important point of similarity worth noting, namely, the excessive attention to detail in both Valla's treatise and in contemporary revisionist investigations: overkill in both cases. The people of the Renaissance would not observe that the alleged transfer of sovereignty did not take place, and let go at that, and we will not observe that the Jews were still there, and let it go at that. Apparently we must pursue the subject into areas of detail that may seem fantastic to posterity. For example we are not satisfied that the Zyklon, allegedly used in the "gassings," was an insecticide; we need to exhaustively analze the technical aspects of the claim.

This preoccupation with detail is both desirable and necessary. That it is desirable has been suggested in the discussion of the Donation. A preoccupation with detail entails a great diversity and quantity of thought on the legend which, even if it might seem myopic to posterity will, indeed has, set tongues wagging in the practical and urgent present to the extent that those formally charged with such concerns will no longer be able to avoid them. Indeed that this point "has" been reached is essentially admitted by Raul Hilberg, author of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, in a recent interview in a French weekly: ⁴

I will say that, in a certain manner, Faurisson and others, without having wished it, have done us a service. They have raised questions which have had as effect to engage the historians in new research. They have forced the gathering of more information, the re-examination of documents, and going further into the understanding of what happened.

That our preoccupation with detail is also necessary in the present circumstances follows from the propaganda strategy of the promoters and defenders of the established legend. One aspect of that strategy is to evade the real and simple question of whether or not the Jews of Europe were in fact physically exterminated by the Germans, and concentrate instead on the superficially similar and (provided enough confusion is generated) speciously equivalent question of whether or not "gas chambers"

were operated by the Germans.

This is one basic trick of the hoaxers (there are others I shall mention) and too many of the revisionist camp or bent fall for it. To anticipate any misunderstanding on the point, let me give my assurance that I hold the answers to both questions to be "no"; there was no extermination program and there were no gas chambers. However the former is the real bone of contention and the latter is of only subsidiary importance to the Holocaust revisionist school as I understand its implicit tenets. For example, if it turned out that, one day in 1942, ten adult male Jews were marched into Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia, placed in Hitler's shower (with suitable hasty mechanical modifications) and there gassed before the approving eyes of the Fuehrer, I would have many reasons, historical and technical, for being astonished, but I would not be forced to change or withdraw any major conclusion on the "Extermination" matter. The discovery would rock the revisionists for whom Hitler is of central interest, e.g. David Irving, but that is irrelevant.

By various tricks, e.g. focusing on certain types of testimonies or discussing "Zyklon" out of context, the defenders of the legend are often able to arrange the quiet substitution, in public controversy, of the "gas chamber" question for the "extermination" question, not because they confuse the two, but because by so doing they are able to take advantage of certain routine reserva-

tions that apply to nearly every historical subject.

For example until a short time ago, if I were asked if the Japanese had gassed prisoners during World War II, I would have answered that I was unaware of any such gassings. Now I have very recently read a credible report that they gassed 404 "human guinea pigs" in connection with "research on biological warfare." However I continue to be certain that the Japanese did not "exterminate" any populations.

As another example, I am certain that during World War II the Allied powers did not exterminate any significant portion of the Eskimo population, and I am also confident that no individual communities of Eskimoes were gassed by them, but note that I am "certain" in the former case and only "confident" in the latter. The difference arises from the fact that, while one can show that there was no extermination program for Eskimoes (e.g. no significant absences were noted after the war), one cannot show that no Eskimoes were gassed. Of course, one can cite the lack of an evident motivation for gassing Eskimoes, the lack of subsequent charges of Eskimo gassings, etc., and one can be "confident" no communities of Eskimoes were gassed (of course individual Eskimoes might have been gassed for specific offenses in California). However one must e.g. allow the possibility that some isolated Eskimo community, perhaps posing a security menace to some highly secret Allied military operation, was gassed in great secrecy. This is just routine historical reserve, applying to all phases of history, whose potential relevance to every historical subject is so taken for granted that it is rarely mentioned.

We can prove that the Eskimoes were not exterminated, but we cannot prove that no communities of Eskimoes were gassed. Likewise, and at the risk of giving the opposition words which can be lifted out of context and used dishonestly, I can prove that there was no German program of physical extermination of the Jews, but I cannot prove that no Jews were gassed, although after living long with the evidence I am confident that no Jews were

gassed.

If one examines closely the arguments that are offered when the tact is to argue that Jews were gassed, it is clear that the allegation is of the "isolated Eskimo community" sort. In place of geographical isolation, there is substituted the claim of administrative isolation, i.e. that no written records were kept of the design of the gas chambers or of their construction, or of the gassings themselves, that in order to conceal the deeds the bodies were burned and not a trace was left, and that in order to keep the number of witnesses to a minimum lewish work parties were used in the operations, these Jews later being killed also. Why such secrecy should have been considered necessary or relevant, given rallies in Madison Square Garden against the alleged slaughter, official Allied and Presidential declarations in condemnation, etc.,6 is never explained, as few will ask such questions. The important thing is that the whole thing can then be "proved" via declarations of a few "witnesses," upheld in court, and then used to support a preposterous allegation of a very different and even incommensurate sort, namely, the physical extermination of the Jews of Europe.

It is a cheap trick. It relies on a massive dropping of context and shift of perspective, wherein the rubes are not expected to follow the simple shell game. Unfortunately it has been successful, and this is why a preoccupation with detail, on the part of revisionists, is necessary as well as desirable. The bearers of the legend do not want to confront the "extermination" allegation directly, as easily available information makes it clear the Jews were not exterminated. However, no easily available information makes clear what happened at every location in eastern Europe during the war, especially in view of the political character of the postwar exploitation of documents, and this is where the hoaxers go to work. They offer to fill in such gaps, usually not via written records, but via alleged reconstruction on the basis of their "trials." As they represent the entrenched position, they effectively call the tune on what is to be debated, and that is why the revisionists, in the minority of instances in which their opponents engage them in superficially scholarly debate, will find themselves confronted with details assembled for mendacious ends. The hoaxers dare not focus on the real question, as it is too simple.

Context And Perspective

While the present interest in detail is desirable from the revisionist point of view, it is also necessary because the defenders of the legend have decided that, for the sake of their contrary purposes, a focus on detail can also be desirable, when there is to be anything like a debate. This odd harmony of the two camps is

of course superficial.

That the focus on detail contains dangers for the revisionists is seen by noting that the defenders of the legend take this tact because they have thereby substituted more malleable questions for the real one. Specifically, they trick their audiences into losing context and perspective. What Stangl said to Sereny in jail cannot be understood without the perspective gained by noting Stangl's hapless position in the postwar world, particularly in postwar Germany, which has a political system imposed by the foreign conquerors who made possible the establishment of the legend in the first place. The claim, that the lack of ordinary historical evidence for "exterminations" is explained by a German policy of utmost secrecy, cannot be easily demolished except via some observation on the historical context of the alleged episode, such as made above. Therefore while it is fine to focus on detail in these times, we risk losing battles, if not the war, if we forget the historical context and lose perspective.

Context and perspective constitute the theme of this paper, but it was necessary to discuss at length the nature of the need. Posterity will see this "Holocaust," this curious imposture that enthralled us for two or three decades, as a transient phenomenon involving what will appear to be utterly audacious distortions of the historical record, which we should have seen more easily than we did, as the relevant episodes will seem to have simpler interpretations than we see or at any rate emphasize. While of course we cannot see things as posterity will, we can at least attempt to see the subject from a higher perspective. This will not only help our future reputation, but will also help us avoid getting

tripped up on details in current controversy.

We can start by asking just what will draw posterity's attention as extraordinary. It will not be "exterminations" of Jews, as there were none. It will also not be the German program of expulsion of the Jews. There will of course be some interest in that program, just as today there is interest on the part of the historians in all sorts of past episodes. However that German program was in its essentials far from unique, the Jews having been expelled from the Jerusalem area in the second century and from Spain in the fifteenth, to mention only the most famous two of many expulsions. The German program may seem deplorable, but it will not seem extraordinary.

What will seem unique is the establishment in Western society of the "Holocaust" legend, its exploitation past the point of sanity, its challenge from unconventional quarters a few decades later, and its subsequent overthrow. One implication of this, perhaps for the revisionists at once instructive and deflating, is that the revisionists will themselves be objects of historical scrutiny, i.e. we are part of the historical process that posterity will

see, not merely its pioneering investigators.

I believe they will see us that way mainly because of our tendency, explanations for which have already been given, of getting entangled in details while bypassing or downplaying the observations that, it will seem, should have been both obvious and conclusive.

A specific illustration. In order for something to be "obvious" it ought to be figuratively before our very noses. Let us look at two of the recently published and widely discussed books in support of the extermination legend, namely Auschwitz and the Allies by Martin Gilbert (biographer of Winston Churchill) and The Terrible Secret by Walter Laqueur (Director of the Institute of Contemporary History, London, and editor of the Journal of Contemporary History). The two books look at the subject from similar perspectives and cover much of the same ground.

At the end of his long and copiously annotated study, Gilbert

writes:

Between May 1942 and June 1944, almost none of the messages reaching the west had referred to Auschwitz as the destination of Jewish deportees, or as a killing centre. Nor had the name of Auschwitz made any impression on those who were building up what they believed to be an increasingly comprehensive picture of the fate of the Jews.

On the other hand early in his shorter but also copiously annotated study Laqueur explains that mass exterminations at Auschwitz could not have been concealed, noting that Auschwitz was "a veritable archipelago," that "Auschwitz inmates... were, in fact, dispersed all over Silesia, and... met with thousands of people," that "hundreds of civilian employees... worked at Auschwitz," and that "journalists travelled in the

General Government and were bound to hear," etc. 8

I have no quarrel with such observations, as I made them myself, on the basis of essentially the same considerations. Now the reader of Gilbert, Laqueur, and Butz can make a very simple determination. He is being told that (a) in the period May 1942 to June 1944, those interested in such matters had no information of mass exterminations at Auschwitz and (b) mass exterminations at Auschwitz could not have been concealed from the world for any significant length of time. Since he is hearing the same story from both sides then, by a process of inference necessary to those who want to form an opinion but do not have the time or means to become historians, he should assume both claims true. There was no information of mass exterminations at Auschwitz during the relevant period, and mass exterminations at Auschwitz would not have been kept secret. Therefore, there were no mass exterminations at Auschwitz.

The conclusion is inescapable and requires only elementary logic. It is comparable to the syllogism: "I see no elephant in my basement; an elephant could not be concealed from sight in my basement: therefore, there is no elephant in my basement."

Logic tells us that this observation should be conclusive, and yet I know that in controversies to come it will often be lost sight of. It is a good example of a point on which we shall puzzle posterity for our myopia, since it will wonder why it was so seldom raised in a heated controversy. It is not the sole example of its type. The literature of the defenders of the legend is overflowing with concessions that will make posterity wonder how the legend ever could have been believed in the first place, and why a revisionist literature was necessary at all. Let us be specific.

The principal actors in the historical episode are the governments of the various powers at war, Jewish organizations operating in Allied and neutral countries, Jewish organizations operating openly under the German occupation, clandestine resistance

organizations in German-occupied Europe, Jewish or otherwise, the Catholic Church (on account of its twin attributes of ubiquity and centralization), and the International Red Cross.

Prominent among the Jewish organizations were the JDC (American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), closely associated with the American Jewish Committee, the "political organization of the non-Zionist elite of American Jewry." ¹⁰ The JDC was primary in extending material assistance to Jews. In Europe an important representative was Joseph J. Schwartz in Lisbon. ¹¹ More important from our point of view was Saly Mayer, the sometimes unofficial but always principal representative of the JDC in Switzerland. Mayer was in constant contact with the JDC in Lisbon and New York, and also with Jews in occupied Europe, eastern and western. ¹²

Also prominent among the Jewish organizations were the JA (Jewish Agency), the unofficial Israeli government of the time, whose guiding light was Chaim Weizmann, and which was represented in Geneva by Richard Lichtheim and Abraham Silbershein. Zionism was also represented by the WJC (World Jewish Congress), whose guiding lights were Nahum Goldman and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, and whose principal representative in Switzerland was Gerhart Riegner. The Swiss representatives of these and other Jewish organizations were in constant contact with both Jews of occupied Europe and with Jewish and other representatives in the Allied countries. For example, postal and telephone communications between Jews in occupied countries and those in neutral countries such as Switzerland and Turkey were easily established. ¹³

As made abundantly clear by many books in addition to my own (e.g. Gilbert's book), it is from the WJC, supplemented by the JA, the Polish exile government in London, and occasionally more obscure groups, that the early extermination propaganda emanated.

Here are eight simple observations, all drawn from the literature of the defenders of the legend (sometimes via the intermediary of my book), which establish the non-historicity of the "Holocaust" or, more precisely, a program of mass physical extermination of Europe's Jews.

The postwar claims had their origin in the wartime extermination claims. However the differences between the two are such that it is implied that the wartime claims were not based on fact.

There are two principal sorts of differences between the wartime and postwar claims. First, much of what was claimed during the war was dropped afterwards, only a fraction being retained. Second, the centerpiece of the postwar claims, Auschwitz, was not claimed at all until the very end of the relevant period. Both observations were made in Chapter 3 of my book, and the second was made above, and both are confirmed by more recent publications. The first is shown by listing specific examples, and those given in *Hoax* can be supplemented with some taken from the recent literature, particularly the Gilbert book, which gives

numerous such examples.14

To discuss a specific example, it is well to focus on one Jan Karski, a non-Jewish member of the Polish resistance, who is said to have been sent from Poland by the underground, in November 1942, to report to the Polish exile government in London. His report described Polish Jews being sent to Treblinka, Belzec and Sobibor in railway cars packed with "lime and chlorine sprinkled with water." On the trip half die from suffocation, poisonous fumes, and lack of food and water. These are burned. The remainder are put to death by firing squads, in "lethal gas chambers" and, at Belzec, in an "electrocuting station"; this remainder was buried. This report was widely publicized and circulated. 15

Of course the present story is that almost all the Jews were killed in gas chambers, their bodies later being burned. Also there is nothing about Auschwitz as an extermination camp in this report of the Polish underground which, in this instance,

cannot be accused of ignoring the plight of the Jews.

Karski published his story in 1944 as a silly book, Story of a Secret State, which sold well. At present he is a Professor of Government at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Although the wild disagreement between his wartime tall tales and the postwar tall tales is not novel to a student of this subject. I thought it useful to select Karski for mention because in recent years, in the deluge of "Holocaust" propaganda, he has been rediscovered and feted as something of a hero. He wrote a new and sanitized version of his story in 1979, no doubt for the benefit of those of his friends embarrassed by his book. 16 Then in 1981 he was a participant in a conference held at the State Department and sponsored by the United States Holocaust Memorial Council whose chairman, author Elie Wiesel, "organized the event in part to build a bulwark against a rising tide of revisionist history." I have no evidence that anybody at the conference sought to get Karski to explain the discrepancies between his and today's received accounts of "exterminations." 17

I am sometimes asked why I ignore Elie Wiesel, so here I shall give him one paragraph. I ignore him because, unlike authors I usually discuss, he is frankly a novelist and there is next to nothing in his declarations that could be considered historical argument. Even his allegedly autobiographical Night is too histrionic to be entertained as a purported primary source. This does not mean that there is absolutely nothing to be gained from

noticing him. That a novelist was chosen to be Director of the President's Commission on the Holocaust, a plum for which there must have been a lot of behind the scenes jostling, is tremendously revealing of the forces at work today. As for a short judgement of Wiesel's various writings on the "Holocaust." I think it is fair to characterize them as reaching the heights that most of us can reach only with the help of the sorts of magic potions that are made out of gin and vermouth and comparable ingredients: Wiesel does not need such help. 18

To return to the point, namely, "that the wartime claims were not based on fact," the logic goes as follows. The defenders of the legend could explain the retention of only a fraction of the wartime reports only by claiming that wartime exigencies made corroboration of information impracticable and that as a consequence many inaccurate stories were passed along for public consumption. The result was a set of reports which, although originally inspired by fact, exaggerated the real situation. However such an explanation cannot be reconciled with the fact of the absence of Auschwitz from the extermination claims. The Auschwitz aspect would be consistent with the proffered explanation only if some story exaggerated in relation to the postwar claims had been presented during the war, e.g. exterminations of Jews by means in addition to gas chambers. The logic thus leads to the conclusion that the wartime claims were not inspired by fact.

Both the wartime records and behavior of the Jews in occupied Europe show that they had no information of an extermination program.

That resistance to deportation was rare, and that Jews went to the various camps with no suspicion that they were to be killed. has been well known for many years and recently published material has only reinforced this observation. However its implications are usually not appreciated. Note that the observation holds for the Jewish leadership in the various occupied countries

as well as for the general Jewish population.

To give some examples, late in 1942 Slovakian Jewish leaders. negotiating with the Germans, took seriously the Germans' offers to cease deportations of Slovakian Jews from Auschwitz. In the French Jewish records "we find a wealth of documentation that tends to deny" exterminations. French Jewish leaders saw "Auschwitz as a place of work" and in November 1944 (after the Germans had been driven out of France) were thinking, in regard to the deportees, mainly of reuniting families. We are told that "Jews in Holland never really knew what was going on in Poland" and that the records of the Amsterdam Jewish Council of 22 January 1943 show that the possibility of "extermination" was not even being entertained as an explanation for the breaking up of families. Jewish leaders in Rome were unaware of any extermination program and feared deportations only in connection with such things as "the rigors of winter and the fragile health of many deportees." Under such conditions it is not at all surprising that there was only one derailment of an Auschwitz deportation train engineered by Jewish/resistance activities (in Belgium). 19

To focus on a man who should certainly have been well informed, Rabbi Leo Baeck, "venerated head of German Jewry," showed via a letter he wrote in November 1942 that he had no suspicion that Jewish deportees were being killed, and by his own postwar admission told no other Jews of "exterminations" during during his stay at Theresienstadt, from which there were many

deportations, 20

By the spring of 1944, right after the German occupation of Hungary, the Hungarian Jewish leaders had heard the extermination claims, including (finally) the Auschwitz claims. However they "gave no publicity whatsoever to" such claims. "Not urgent warnings to their fellow Jews to resist deportation, but secret negotiations with the SS aimed at averting deportation altogether, had become the avenue of hope chosen by the Hungarian Zionist leaders." ²¹

As for Poland, there was a famous rebellion of the Warsaw ghetto in April 1943. However this came only after almost all the Jews of Warsaw had been deported east. The claim is that "by March 1943 the destruction of Polish Jewry was almost complete." During the period that they were supposedly being destroyed there was no significant resistance to deportations. ²² Moreover Jewish record keeping in Poland was diligent and extensive, so that "many posthumous records have come down to us." Yet there is an "absence of vital subjects from the records." ²³

Thus the Jews were not cognizant of an extermination program in the only senses that would be convincing, in the senses of resisting deportations or at least recording the "Holocaust" in their confidential records.

Jewish bodies outside occupied Europe, such as the JDC, the WJC, the JA and others did not act as though they believed their own claims of "extermination."

There are quite a few senses in which this is the case but the most important relates directly to the point discussed above. The Jews who, we are told, boarded deportation trains with no inkling that they were to be killed, were as was noted above in close contact with Jewish bodies outside occupied Europe. Indeed many of the records that show their ignorance of an extermination program are among their communications with these Jews

outside Europe. Yet the Jews outside Europe did not undertake to impress on those inside what the deportations were allegedly all about, if one were to believe the remarks they were making for the consumption of others. Otherwise the alleged ignorance would not have existed.

This is enough to prove the point but it is useful to give some good examples of the real behavior of the Jewish bodies outside

Europe during their supposed "Holocaust."

Chaim Weizmann used the extermination claims when he thought them useful. However in May 1943 Weizmann complained to Churchill's secretariat that if "an Allied press release reporting the fact that Jewish scientists were among those involved in the Allied scientific war effort . . . were repeated, the Germans would carry out further anti-Jewish reprisals." ²⁴ Just what reprisals could be graver than physical extermination of all is not apparent.

It was noted above that the legend claims that by March 1943 almost all Polish Jews had been killed. However throughout the alleged period of killing, and even into 1944, Jewish relief organizations in the west sent food parcels to Jews in Poland, particularly through the JUS (Jüdische Unterstützungsstelle or Jewish Aid Office), with the permission and cooperation of the German authorities. Money was also sent to Jewish organizations in Poland through the London Polish exile government, again with the

permission of the German authorities. 25

By 1944 Poland had become a battlefield. Accordingly on 14 March 1944 the WJC reminded the British, as Soviet forces were approaching Lvov, that there were "still a considerable number of Jews" in the Lvov area, and we should issue "a fresh and emphatic warning to the Germans" and also speed up the work of rescuing Jews from Nazi occupied territory (obviously to proceed to Palestine, as the WJC made clear by its wartime statements). ²⁶ In the opinion of the WJC, the murdered Jews were still there.

Jewish newspapers in the west, while occasionally publishing massacre claims, clearly thought the claims exaggerated greatly and tended to contradict themselves in their statements. For example the allegedly well informed leftist Jewish "Bund," in its publication The Ghetto Speaks for October 1943, spoke of the "struggle linking the Polish and Jewish masses." In their opinion, too, the murdered Jews were still there. However even apart from such specific incidents, it is admitted that even after the Allied declaration of 17 December 1942, the first official claim of "extermination," "there was no forceful, unequivocal response by American Jewry, including the JDC." As a rule, "the Jews themselves did not really press very hard for rescue, and their propa-

ganda for Palestine often seemed stronger than their concern for immediate steps to save their brethren." 27

The historical record thus shows that, apart from their occasional public claims of "extermination," the Jewish bodies outside occupied Europe conducted themselves as if there were no exterminations, as is most clearly shown by their failure to undertake to warn the European Jews, and by the nature of their real efforts (e.g. in connection with Palestine).

Allied governments and their officials did not act as though they believed the extermination claims, and their intelligence services never produced any information corroborative of the claims.

In connection with the actions of Allied governments and their officials we can say that (a) the declarations of the governments, in relation to "extermination," were inconsistent, equivocal, and unconvincingly timed, (b) no concrete measures were taken to interfere with deportations of Jews or with whatever was happening in the camps and (c) incidents involving leading officials show that they did not believe the claims.

Among relevant declarations of governments, perhaps the best known is the Allied declaration of 17 December 1942; this was unequivocally worded although very much lacking in specific details. However it seems unconvincingly timed. According to the legend exterminations outside Russia are supposed to have been in progress for almost a year. Moreover this date also marked the first unequivocal Soviet charge of "extermination," although such a program was allegedly in operation there since June 1941. This makes the belated Soviet statement particularly incredible, as "there is every reason to assume that the Soviet authorities were from the beginning well informed about all important events in the occupied (Soviet) territories." ²⁸

On the other hand the Allied "War Crimes Declaration" of 1 November 1943, condemning German atrocities, failed to mention Jews. During the drafting of the declaration, the British Foreign Office had deleted references to "gas chambers because the

evidence was untrustworthy."29

In connection with Auschwitz, there was on 10 October 1944 a broadcast from London and Washington charging the Germans with "plans (for the) mass execution of the people in the concentration camps" Auschwitz and Birkenau (my emphasis). The German Telegraph Service replied immediately that "these reports are false from beginning to end." ³⁰ The first high level Auschwitz claim by the Allies that resembled the legend of today came in late November 1944, after the claimed termination of the "exterminations," in the form of the publication of the document I have called the "WRB Report" (as it was published by the War

Thus the Allies also did not take the extermination claims seriously enough to give them more than occasional lip service.

The Vatican did not believe the extermination claims.

It is agreed that the far-flung nature of the operations of the Catholic Church guaranteed that the Vatican would have known what was happening to the Jews. ⁴⁴ Nevertheless no unequivocal condemnation of exterminations of Jews ever came from the Vatican even after the Germans had been driven out of Rome or even after Germany's defeat. This is despite strong pressures put on the Vatican, by the Allies, to issue such a declaration.

There was an equivocal statement in the Pope's Christmas message of 1942, but it was issued only after the British had strongly suggested that the issuance of such a statement might help to dissuade the Allies from bombing Rome. However the Pope made it clear to the Allies, even as his declaration was issued, that he did not believe the stories: "he felt that there had been some exaggeration for the purposes of propaganda." ⁴⁵ That Vatican spokesmen of today support the legend in their public statements is irrelevant to the historical point.

The actions and reports of the International Red Cross [IRC] do not harmonize with the extermination claims.

As with the Vatican, the statements of IRC spokesmen of today do support the legend, but that is irrelevant to the historical point. Also, general editorial remarks in books of documents published by the IRC right after the war do harmonize with the legend. However, all the historian should be interested in are the actual content of the reports and activities of the IRC during the war.

That the actions and reports of the IRC do not harmonize with the legend was discussed at length in my book and it seems pointless to repeat the material here. ⁴⁶ A couple more points I noticed recently are worth mentioning.

On 14 April 1943, the IRC made it clear that it considered Auschwitz a labor camp for deportees, to whom parcels could be sent. ⁴⁷

There were two highly publicized visits of the IRC to Theresienstadt, the Jewish settlement in Czechoslovakia. The IRC reports were relatively favorable in both cases. What is seldom noted is that the IRC delegate in the second visit in the spring of 1945 was George Dunant, who described Theresienstadt "as an experiment by certain leaders of the Reich, who were apparently less hostile to the Jews than those responsible for the racial policy of the German Government." Since Dunant was guided around Theresienstadt by Adolf Eichmann, he must have known that Theresienstadt was an operation of Himmler's SS. Dunant, moreover, was evidently in close contact with Jewish representatives. For exam-

ple early in 1945 he went to Bratislava, partly at the urging of Saly Mayer, in order to supply hiding Jews with funds. 48

The German documents speak not of extermination, but basically of a program of expulsion and resettlement in the east. There is nothing about "gas chambers" in the concentration camp or other German records.

That the German documents do not speak of extermination is well known. For example, there exists no written order of Hitler to kill the Jews. 49 The documents speak of the "Final Solution" as the ultimate expulsion of all Jews from Europe and of a war-

time process of resettling Jews in the occupied east. 50

The defenders of the legend of course claim that the Germans merely exercised commonplace circumspection and evasion regarding what they committed to writing. This excuse fails on the grounds that such attempts at concealment would make sense only in regard to something it was possible to conceal. It would have been obvious that the physical extermination of Europe's Jews, whatever the outcome of the war, would not have remained secret. Indeed for reasons discussed above it would have become widely known while it was happening. Even if we hypothesize incredible stupidity of the Germans on this point, we surely must grant that they were aware of the atrocity claims being made in the Allied countries and would have seen that documentary masquerade was of no avail.

There is also nothing about "gas chambers," in the sense of the legend, in the German documents. What the legend does at this point is produce the insecticide Zyklon B or other fumigation means, show us pictures of quite ordinary looking showers (alleging extraordinary concealed features), make references to the use of exhausts of diesel engines (apparently unconscious that the exhaust of a diesel is mainly carbon dioxide, not carbon monoxide), or play games with the concept of a "gas oven" (crematoria ovens, like most kitchen ovens, are "gas ovens" and the crematoria in the German camps were no exception).

All of this is so idiotic as to be torturing to discuss further. There is also no record of the design and construction of gas chambers. On the basis of my engineering experiences, it seems quite out of the question to suppress all normal historical records of engineering projects of the scope that could have produced the great "gas chambers." Documents must not only be produced, but also distributed to the great number of individuals charged with specific details; there is no other way to achieve coordination. Even if major documents are closely controlled (as is supposed to happen with "classified" material in the USA) the various individuals would later be able, one way or another, to supply details that, taken together, would cohere credibly. We do not

have such coherence with the "Holocaust." Indeed we have incoherence at not one but two levels. On one level we have the mutual incoherence, in relation to "gas chambers," of the authentic records dealing with crematoria and disinfection measures. On another level this attempt on the part of the hoaxers to supply specific technical details does not cohere with the feature of the legend according to which the "gas chambers" were improvised in a slapdash fashion by local non-technical German personnel. ⁵¹

It is of interest that two of Heinrich Himmler's closest aides, SS Generals Gottlob Berger and Karl Wolff, both testified that they had known nothing of an extermination program during the war. It is of greater interest that toward the end of the war Himmler

told a representative of the WIC that 52

In order to put a stop to the epidemics, we were forced to burn the bodies of incalculable numbers of people who had been destroyed by disease. We were therefore forced to build crematoria, and on this account they are knotting a noose for us.

Are we to believe that the essential agreement between this attempt at self exculpation on the part of Himmler, on the one hand, and on the other hand the picture formed by the documents that Himmler's enemies assembled in the three year period after his death, was either accidental or arranged by Himmler through superhuman diligence and prescience? Are we to believe likewise of the essential agreement between the German documents on Jewish policy, and the real wartime behavior of Germany's enemies?

The German resistance to Hitler, including the substantial part that was lodged in German military intelligence, was not cogni-

zant in any way of a program of exterminating Jews.

Part of the German resistance was of course opposed to the Hitler regime for reasons related to its anti-Jewish stance. Moreover the Abwehr, German military intelligence, was headed until 1944 by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, a conscious traitor. Next in command in the Abwehr was Hans Oster, who handled financial and administrative matters and kept the central list of agents. Both Oster and one of his subordinates, Hans von Dohnanyi, an "Aryanized" part Jew, made it their "business to deal with all kinds of operations unconnected with their immediate tasks." Among these operations were involvement in the anti-Hiler opposition and illegal assistance to various Jews. Both were executed for participation in the abortive coup of 20 July 1944. ⁵³

In the various accounts of the activities of the anti-Hitler resistance in Germany, for example The German Opposition to Hitler by Hans Rothfels, there is no evidence that this opposition was in

any way cognizant of a program of exterminating the Jews or passed any such information on to the Allies. If there had been knowledge of such a program, it is a certainty that the information would have been passed on since the anti-Hitler opposition was in contact with the Allies and attempted, without success, to get promises of some sort of Allied support in the event they succeeded in removing Hitler. 54

Even if we grant the possibility that some Germans involved in the anti-Hitler opposition could have been ignorant of a program of physical extermination of the Jews, even if one had existed, are we to believe this possible of high officials of the Abwehr?

This concludes the discussion of the "eight simple observations . . . which establish the non-historicity of . . . a program of mass physical extermination of Europe's Jews." The allegation fails every relevant historical test, and entails a level of audacity or "chutzpah" that would have staggered the imagination before the war. It is demanded that we believe that these "events continental in geographical scope, of three years in temporal scope, and of several million in scope of victims," all transpired without one relevant party being cognizant of them. It is like telling me that, while I saw no elephant when I looked in my basement, he was there anyway. Also while I was sitting in my living room I did not notice that the elephant managed to come upstairs and romp about a while, relevant stairways, door openings, and floors having suddenly miraculously become compatible with such activities. Then the elephant dashed outside into a busy mid-day shopping district, and then walked several miles back to the zoo, but nobody noticed.

Rassinier said somewhere, in connection with the extermination claim, "this is not serious." I am not in accord with that evaluation. This is mad. However that is not the point of this discussion. The point is that these observations can be considered to lie "figuratively before our very noses" because most have been made in books published recently, not by revisionists, but by the defenders of the legend, and the minority that were not made can be readily inferred from those books anyway. On account of the "Holocaustomania" of the past several years, their existence and general contents have been widely publicized. Perhaps these books have not served up the observations as succinctly and forthrightly as I have, but they have served them up. It would therefore be a case of myopia, of a sort posterity will find it hard to understand if, while pursuing "Holocaust" controversy, we allow ourselves to get so wrapped up with the little details that the defenders of the legend will raise that we allow ourselves to be diverted from taking into account the extraordinarily simple historical observations which really

settle beyond doubt any question of the existence of a program of physical extermination of the Jews of Europe.

Concluding Remarks

In controversies to come the partisans of the received legend will try mightily to confuse and complicate the subject with all the tricks that we can anticipate and perhaps then some. We have the precedent of the Donation controversy showing that simple observations that establish the wildly ahistorical nature of a reigning legend can get smothered. Thus my most important advice to those who enter the controversy is that they not lose sight of the fact that the real bone of contention, the extermination allegation, has been laid to rest beyond peradventure by ordinary historical analysis.

It follows that the basic tactic of the defenders of the legend, in controversies to come, will be to attempt to make claims that cannot be tested by the normal method of placing them as hypotheses in appropriate historical context and seeing if they cohere. That this process is under way can be seen from the remarkable New Statesman article of Gitta Sereny that is discussed above. She makes it clear that she would rather discuss places like Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka rather than Auschwitz.

There are good reasons for this. Sereny puts it this way: "Auschwitz...combined enormous labour installations and nearby facilities for extermination. Auschwitz, because so many people survived it, has added most to our knowledge, but also most of our confusion as between the two types of camps."

There is a valid distinction here. Auschwitz was a huge, multifaceted operation, while the other alleged extermination camps were obscure facilities that functioned only for short times for the virtually exclusive purpose of serving as transit camps for Jews. Thus we have a great deal of information about Auschwitz but much less about the others. For example there probably do not exist relevant aerial reconnaissance photographs of the others, nor were there any western prisoners of war at the others, nor were hundreds of ordinary civilians employed at the others, nor did inmates at the others come into contact with diverse people over a large territory, nor was there apparently any IRC cognizance of the others, nor were there nearly as many transports of west European Jews to the others (there were transports of Dutch Jews to Sobibor).

The consequence is that it is much easier to disprove the legend as it applies to Auschwitz than as it applies to the others, when we for the sake of discussion forego the general historical arguments against "extermination." That is really why the defenders of the legend would rather discuss Belzec, Sobibor and

Treblinka. There is much less directly contradicting their supposed "evidence," which consists mainly of postwar testimony. That postwar testimony was mostly given before German courts and under the present legal and political conditions in Germany, revisionists cannot examine it anyway. ⁵⁵ That is neat.

However the defenders of the legend are in an impossible position here. They cannot concede Auschwitz without conceding the whole issue, for the reason that there is no sort of evidence they offer for the others that is not also offered for Auschwitz. If the "confession" of Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Höss is fanciful,56 then who will believe the "confession" of Treblinka commandant Franz Stangl? If the Auschwitz accounts of Rudolf Vrba and Miklos Nyiszli are not credible, and their books sick jokes, then who will believe the equally sick Treblinka accounts of Jankiel Wiernik and other obscure people?⁵⁷ If the Nuremberg and postwar German trials have not established the truth about Auschwitz, then who will believe that they have established the truth about Treblinka? If the large numbers of Jews admittedly sent to Auschitz were not killed there, then who will believe that the large numbers of Jews sent to Treblinka were killed at that camp? My advice, then, to those who would engage in controversy is to not permit the defenders of the legend to get away with ignoring Auschwitz. The fact is that it is very easy to bring down the legend as it applies to Auschwitz and Auschwitz in turn, on account of the nature of the evidence involved, brings down the rest of the legend with it.

There is another type of argument resorted to by the defenders of the legend. It was very recently offered by Hilberg in the remarkable interview referred to above, which I recommend to those who want to get a good idea of the contemporary line.⁴

... the critics (i.e. the revisionists) do not account for a quite simple fact: what then became of the people who were deported? The deportation was not a secret event. It was announced. Several million people were displaced to definite places. Where are those people? They are not hidden in China!

It may seem incredible, at a time when scarcely a day goes by that the press does not discover some hitherto obscure Jew who was deported from his home but survived, at a time when events in the Middle East cannot fail to remind people of the great Jewish exodus from Europe after the war (and even during it), and at a time when the revisionist literature is recalling the various ways Jews were moved around during and after the war, ⁵⁸ that Hilberg would say such a thing. There seems to be no difficulty in accounting for the Jews. A reader's first impulse might be to assume that Hilberg has been misquoted.

However while he does not elaborate on the point, I can think of two interpretations of Hilberg's remarks. He has an argument here, but as usual its plausibility is only illusory and depends on

myopia and a loss of context and perspective.

What Hilberg probably has in mind is the fact that, while there is available a great deal of documentation that proves that Jews were deported to the camps in Poland, such as Auschwitz, Treblinka, etc., there is not available comparable documentation that proves that they proceeded on through those camps to points further east. At least, I have not seen such German records. I would be astonished to see them today. Admitted that the legend was thrown together in a sloppy fashion, mainly because some continuity with wartime propaganda was desired, it is nevertheless the case that the people who came into control of the German documents after the war, and who put selections of them into evidence at the Nuremberg trials, were not operating under such handicaps. They could suppress very effectively.

One must certainly note who "the people who came into control of the German documents" were. There are many ways to make it clear by historical-political argument or by specific example. My favorite among the latter is that the David Marcus who was prominent in making the U.S. occupation policy in Germany during and immediately after the war, and who headed the War Crimes Branch in Washington in 1946-1947, was the same David Marcus who commanded the Jewish forces in Palestine in the

first (1948) war with the Arabs. One could go on.⁵⁹

Hilberg's point would have some weight if we were talking about virgin historical records but, what he is in effect saying (if I interpret him correctly) is that we should trust the architects of the Nuremberg trials, which presupposes more than he is trying to prove (I presume he would want to argue only that these architects were right in this instance). The attempt to drop context at this point stands logic on its head. All that is being noted is that the hoaxers have not handed over the materials that directly

expose their hoax.

Hilberg might argue that such wholesale suppression is not possible and that traces of deportation of Jews further east would be left. That is true; moreover, there are such traces and scraps. If this is indeed Hilberg's point, then he ought to answer the following question. Where are the German records that deal with the deportations to and administration of the settlement (not concentration camp) near Riga that is described in Jeanette Wolf's article in Boehm's book? I do not know. I am not saying that they will never turn up, but I know that they were not available to those who looked for such things at the Nuremberg trials. 60

There is a second possible interpretation of Hilberg's remark. While little weight can be given to postwar Jewish population figures claimed for eastern Europe, it must be conceded that the number of Jews in postwar Poland is only some fraction of the

very large number (perhaps 3 million) that lived in prewar Poland (not quite the same territory). This is not because we must believe population figures that are offered. It is because Poland, unlike the Soviet Union, is not a large country and such large communities of Jews would certainly have been noticed if they were still there.

Thus, if one drops all historical context the argument seems simple. They are not in this territory we today call Poland; therefore they were killed. To those familiar with fairly commonplace history the conclusion is as much a non sequitur as would be the observation that since there were many millions of Germans and ethnic Germans living east of the Oder-Neisse before the war, and today almost none, then they were all killed. In fact the period was one of massive population movements, and the Jews were no exception. The Soviets deported many into the interior of the Soviet Union and in the period after the war the Polish Jews pouring into west Germany to proceed on to the U.S.A., Palestine and other destinations became a widely publicized problem. ⁶¹

I have little more advice at this time on prosecuting "Holocaust" controversy, and I cannot anticipate every trick. I cannot even promise that the Sereny and Hilberg expositions discussed here will be representative of what the reader might encounter as argument in support of the legend. Even today one runs into the argument that the American and British troops who captured Belsen, Buchenwald and Dachau "saw it with their own eyes." They saw dead bodies, and it has been relatively easily available knowledge since 1945 that the deaths were due to the privations entailed in Germany's collapse, but the reigning confusion is so great that we still hear the argument anyway. All I can add is that one should keep current with the revisionist literature and the more important pieces of literature in support of the legend and, in controversy, be mindful above all of preserving historical context and perspective and not getting trapped with myopic historical vision.

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
NOTES

- Journal of Historical Review, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 1980, 153ff. The "Dr." before my signature was added by the editor. I never sign that way.
- 2. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (2 Sep 79), E2.
- 3. e.g. The Spotlight (26 Jul 82), 10f.
- 4. Le Nouvel Observateur (3-9 Jul 82), 70+.
- 5. Chicago Tribune (5 Aug 82), section 1, 5.
- 6. e.g. Butz, 75-86, 146f.
- 7. Gilbert, 340.
- 8. Laqueur, 22-25.
- 9. Butz, 87f, 92ff.
- 10. Bauer, 21f.
- 11. Bauer, Ch. 8.
- 12. Bauer, Ch. 9, 246, 264, 272, 274, 333, 366f, 371f.
- 13. Laqueur, 4, 170f, 188.
- 14. Gilbert, 31, 39f, 44, 170.
- 15. Gilbert, 93ff; Laqueur, 231.
- 16. Laqueur, Appendix 5.
- Washington Post (28 Oct 81), A1; Los Angeles Times (29 Oct 81), pt. I. 20.
- See e.g. his contribution to the booklet Dimensions of the Holocaust, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1977. This is the published version of a lecture Wiesel gave at Northwestern in the spring of 1977, An alternative is his article in the London Jewish Chronicle (4 Nov 77).
- 19. Bauer, 264, 271, 274, 371; Gilbert, 121; Butz, 290.
- 20. Bauer, 56, 58; Butz, 109.
- 21. Gilbert, 204f.
- 22. Bauer, 325fff; Gilbert, 121.
- 23. Dawidowicz (1975), xvii; (1981), 125.
- 24. Gilbert, 143.

- 25. Bauer, 329-334.
- 26. Gilbert, 181.
- 27. Laqueur, 183-186; Bauer, 188-193, 403.
- 28. Butz, 77, 202; Laqueur, 68-72.
- 29. Laqueur, 121.
- 30. Gilbert, 325.
- 31. Butz, 89.
- 32. Gilbert, 337f.
- 33. Gilbert, 267-273, 290, 299-311, 341.
- 34. Feingold, 9, 170; Laqueur, 94.
- 35. Laqueur, 3.
- 36. DuBois, 184, 188; Butz, 67.
- 37. Gilbert, 68, 95f, 99.
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- 44. Laqueur, 55-58.
- 45. Butz, Appendix E; Gilbert, 104f.
- 46. Butz, 76, 133-145.
- 47. Gilbert, 129.
- 48. Bauer, 430f.
- 49. Laqueur, 152.
- 50. e.g. Butz, 205-212.
- 51. Butz, 101-108, 116, 120ff.
- 52. Butz, 194, 240; Laqueur, 18.
- 53. Laqueur, Appendix 1. The cases of the politician-journalist Lemmer and the economist Sommer, who are said to have passed information about exterminations to Swiss contacts, are of dubious import. Lemmer was not associated with the Abwehr and, as Laqueur notes, there is nothing in his autobiography about passing on information about extermination. Sommer was an army liason officer between the General Staff and the Abwehr and also travelled to Switzerland in connection with trade relations. One can infer from Gilbert, pp. 56ff, that Sommer's association with a summer 1942 report that "camps are being prepared where all the Jews of Europe and a great part of the Russian prisoners-of-war will be exterminated by gas" has been claimed not by Sommer, who died in 1965, but by two Jewish intermediaries. It is also worth noting that neither Lemmer nor Sommer appear to have been seriously involved with the anti-Hitler opposition; both survived the war.
- 54. Rothfels, 125-151.
- 55. Under German law the records of a trial are not open to the public. Exceptions are granted to those who are somehow involved personally in the case or to those considered to have a scholarly interest in aspects of the trial. Dr. Wilhelm Stäglich, retired German judge

and author of Der Auschwitz Mythos, was denied permission to consult trials testimonies. See his pp. 371fff. Dr. Robert Faurisson interprets remarks, made in a letter by Justice Ministry official Dr. Hans de With to Die Realschule (Oct 81), as suggesting that if Faurisson sets foot in West Germany he will be arrested and sent back to France.

- 56. Butz, Ch. 4. For the final solution of the Höss confession question, see Faurisson's discussions in The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1980), 103+; vol. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1981), 311+, 319+.
- 57. Donat.
- 58. Butz, Ch. 7.
- 59. Butz, 20-30.
- 60. Butz, 219f.
- 61. Butz, 14-17, 217-239.



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Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian National Army, and The War of India's Liberation

RANJAN BORRA

India's Army of Liberation in the West

The arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose in Germany in 1941 (during the turbulent period of World War II) and his anti-British activities in that country in co-operation with the German government, culminated in the formation of an Indian legion. This marks perhaps the most significant event in the annals of India's fight for independence. This event not only can be regarded as a historical link-up with what Bose himself chose to describe as "The Great Revolution of 1857," and which (in his words) "has been incorrectly called by English historians 'the Sepoy Mutiny,' but which is regarded by the Indian people as the First War of Independence." 1 It also represents the historical fact that, by that time persuasive methods conducted through a non-violent struggle under the leadership of Gandhi, had failed. An armed assault on the citadel of the British Empire in India was the only alternative left to deliver the country from bondage. While other leaders of the Indian National Congress fell short of realizing this fact and thus betrayed a lack of pragmatic approach to the turn of world events that provided India with a golden opportunity to strike at the British by a force of arms, Bose rose to the needs of the hour and was quick to seize that opportunity.

While Bose's compatriots in India remained totally wedded to an ideological creed (non-violence), which at that time could only serve the British and postpone the advent of independence, and while their ideological interpretations of the new revolutionary regimes in Europe—again largely influenced by British propaganda—prevented them from even harboring any thought of seeking their alliance and co-operation in the struggle against a common enemy, Subhas Chandra Bose alone had the courage to take the great plunge, thus risking his own life and reputation, solely in the interest and cause of his country. In January 1941, while under both house arrest and strict British surveillance, he escaped. After an arduous trek through the rugged terrains of several countries, with an Italian passport under the assumed name of Orlando Mazzota—(in which he was aided by underground revolutionaries and foreign diplomatic agents)—Bose ap-

peared in Berlin, via Moscow, on 28 March 1941.

Bose was welcome in Germany, although the news of his arrival there was kept a secret for some time for political reasons. The German Foreigh Office, which was assigned the primary responsibility of dealing with Bose and taking care of him, had been well informed of the background and political status of the Indian leader through its pre-war Consulate-General at Calcutta and also by its representative in Kabul. Bose himself, naturally somewhat impatient for getting into action soon after his arrival in Berlin, submitted a memorandum to the German government on 9 April 1941 which outlined a plan for co-operation between the Axis powers and India. Among other things, it called for the setting up of a "Free India Government" in Europe, preferably in Berlin: establishment of a Free India broadcasting station calling upon the Indian people to assert their independence and rise up in revolt against the British authorities; underground work in Afghanistan (Kabul) involving independent tribal territories lying between Afghanistan and India and within India itself for fostering and aiding the revolution; provision of finances by Germany in the form of a loan to the Free India government-in-exile; and deployment of German military contingents to smash the British army in India. In a supplementary memorandum bearing the same date, Bose requested that an early pronouncement be made regarding the freedom of India and the Arab countries.² It is significant to note that the memorandum did not mention the need for formation of an Indian legion. Evidently the idea of recruiting the Indian prisoners of war for the purpose of establishing a nucleus of an Indian national army did not occur to him during his early days in Berlin.

At that time the German govenment was in the process of formulating its own plan for dealing with Subhas Chandra Bose in the best possible manner. The Foreign Office felt itself inadequate to discharge this awesome responsibility without referring the whole matter to Hitler. While this issue was being considered at the highest level of the government, Bose's own requests as set forth in the submitted memorandum, made it far too complicated and involved to be resolved at an early date. There was a long

wait for Bose, during which period he often tended to become frustrated. Nevertheless, through several sympathetic officers of the Foreign Office, he continued to press his requests and put forth new ideas.

Finally, after months of waiting and many moments of disappointment often bordering on despair for Bose, Germany agreed to give him unconditional and all-out help. The two immediate results of this decision were the establishment of a Free India Center and inauguration of a Free India Radio, both beginning their operations in November 1941. These two organizations played vital and significant roles in projecting Bose's increasing activities in Germany, but a detailed account of their operation lies outside the purview of this paper. It should suffice to say that the German government put at Bose's disposal adequate funds to run these two organizations, and he was allowed complete freedom to run them the way he liked at his own discretion.

In its first official meeting on 2 November 1941, the Free India Center adopted four historical resolutions that would serve as guidelines for the entire movement in subsequent months and years in Europe and Asia, First, Jai Hind or Victory to India. would be the official form of salutation; secondly, Nobel laureate poet Rabindranath Tagore's famous patriotic song Jana Gana Mana was to be the national anthem for the free India Bose was fighting for; thirdly, in a multi-lingual state like India, the most widely-spoken language, Hindustani, was to be the national language; and fourthly, Subhas Chandra Bose would hereafter be known and addressed as Netaji, the Indian equivalent of the "leader" or the "Fuehrer." In November 1941, Azad Hind Radio (or the Free India Radio) opened its program with an announcing speech by Netaji himself, which, in fact, was a disclosure of his identity that had been kept officially secret for so long. The radio programs were broadcast in several Indian languages on a regular basis.

During this long period of "hibernation," the period between Netaji's arrival in Berlin and the beginning of operations of the two organizations, it can be reasonably assumed that the idea of forming an Indian legion that could be developed into an Indian Army of Liberation in the West, crossed Bose's mind. He might even have discussed this matter with his colleagues—the Indian compatriots in Germany who had joined him—as to how best to implement the idea. However, as mentioned earlier, his first memorandum submitted to the German Government did not include any such plan. According to N.G. Ganpuley, who was his associate in Berlin,

Netaji himself, when he left India, could not have, by any stretch of imagination, thought of forming a national army unit outside the country, and therefore he had no definite plans chalked out for its realization. Even while in Berlin, he could not think of it during the first few months of his stay there. 3

When and how, therefore, did he come to conceive such a plan? Mr. Ganpuley relates an interesting episode in this regard. To quote again from his book:

It was all due to a brain wave of Netaji which started working by a simple incident. He read one day about some half a dozen Indian prisoners-of-war who were brought to Berlin by the Radio Department to listen to the BBC and other stations which sent out their programmes in Hindustani. He saw them there going about, not as free Indians, but as prisoners-of-war. They were brought to the Radio Office every day to listen to and translate the Hindustani programmes, and were sent back to their quarters escorted by a sentry . . . After he had a talk with them about war, about their captivity and their present life, his active mind started working. . . He pondered over it for some time and decided to form a small national military unit . . . No sooner was this decision taken by him... he started negotiating with that section of the German Foreign Office with which he was in constant touch. He put before them his plans for training Indian youths from the prisoners' camps for a national militia.4

Although somewhat skeptical and hesitant at the beginning, the German response to the plans was encouraging. It was a time psychologically well-chosen by Netaji. The allied forces had been defeated on the Continent, and the Wehrmacht was marching ahead successfully in the Soviet Union. It was also a historical coincidence that a large number of British Indian prisoners-ofwar, captured during Rommel's blitzkrieg in North Africa, lay in German hands. Netaji's first idea was to form small parachute parties to spread propaganda in, and transmit intelligence from, the North-West Frontier in India. The reaction of some selected prisoners who were brought to Berlin from the camp of Lamsdorf in Germany and Cyrenaica was so encouraging that he asked for all Indian prisoners held in North Africa to be brought over to Germany at once. The Germans complied with this request, and the prisoners began to be concentrated at Annaburg camp near Dresden. The recruitment efforts, however, at the onset met with some opposition from the prisoners, who evidently had misgivings about Netaji's intentions and motivations. In this regard Hugh Toye writes:

When Bose himself visited the camp in December there was still marked hostility. His speech was interrupted, and much of what he had to say went unheard. But private interviews were more encouraging; the men's questions showed interest—what rank would they receive? What credit would be given for Indian Army seniority? How would the Legionary stand in relation to the German soldier? Bose refused to bargain, and some who might have

been influential recruits were turned away. On the other hand, many of the men paid him homage as a distinguished Indian, several professed themselves ready to join the Legion unconditionally. ⁵

Netaji sought and got agreement from the Germans that the Wehrmacht would train the Indians in the strictest military discipline, and they were to be trained in all branches of infantry in using weapons and motorized units the same way a German formation is trained; the Indian legionaries were not to be mixed up with any of the German formations; that they were not to be sent to any front other than in India for fighting against the British, but would be allowed to fight in self defense at any other place if surprised by any enemy formation; that in all other respects the Legion members would enjoy the same facilities and amenities regarding pay, clothing, food, leave, etc., as a German unit. By December 1941 all arrangements were complete and the next important task was to persuade men to come forward and form the nucleus. It appeared that the POWs needed to be convinced that there were civilian Indian youth as well, studying, well placed in life and responsible to their families at home, who were ready to give up everything to join the Legion. Ten of the forty young Indians then residing in Berlin, came forward. They were quickly joined by five POWs who were already in Berlin in connection with the German radio propaganda, and the first group of fifteen people was thus formed.

On 25 December 1941 a meeting of Indian residents in Berlin was called in the office of the Free India Center, to give a send-off to the first fifteen who were to leave the following day for Frankenburg, the first training camp and headquarters for the Legion. The brief ceremony was simple and solemn. Netaji blessed the Legion, the first of its kind in the history of the struggle for Indian independence. He christened it Azad Hind Fauj (Indian National Army). The Indian Army of Liberation in the West thus had a

humble and modest birth.

The strength of the Legion grew steadily, as the task of recruitment continued unabated. Once trained to a certain level and discipline, the members of the first batch were assigned the additional responsibility of visiting the Annaberg camp and aiding in the recruitment process. While the Legion was sent to Frankenburg in Saxony, another group was taken to Meseritz in Brandenburg to be trained in tactical warfare. Abid Hasan and N.G. Swamy, the two original recruiters whom Netaji had sent to the Annaberg camp in 1941, had become de-facto foundermembers of the Legion at Frankenburg and the irregular Company at Meseritz respectively. At Meseritz, the Indians were placed under the command of Hauptmann Harbig, whose first object was to make them forget that they had been prisoners.

There were Tajiks, Uzbeks and Persians as well under training for operational roles similar to that envisaged for the Indians. In due course the trainees went on to tactical operational training, such as wireless operating, demolitions and riding, and also undertook special mountain and parachute courses. According to Toye, "Morale, discipline and Indo-German relations were excellent, the German officers first-rate." 6

Netaji visited the camps from time to time and watched progress of the trainees. Since he himself was inclined toward military training and discipline, he followed the German training methods with great interest. It is understood that while in Germany Netaji himself underwent the rigors of such training, although authoritative documents on this subject are yet to be located by this writer. While in India, he was a member of the University Training Corps at school and commanded the volunteers at an annual session of the Indian National Congress, but he never had a formal military education prior to his arrival in Germany in 1941. As Joyce Lebra writes: "Though Bose was without any previous military experience, he got his training and discipline German-style, along with the soldiers of the Indian Legion." 7 To him, formation of a legion was more positive, more nationalistic and more gratifying than mere radio propaganda. Unlike his ex-compatriots in the Indian National Congress, including Gandhi, Nehru and Patel, he would rather seek confrontation with the British-with an army-than to work out a compromise with them on a conference table, on the issue of India's freedom. A firm believer in discipline and organization, nothing perhaps could be more satisfying to him than to see his men being trained by the German Command, with officers of the highest calibre. In four months, the number of trainees rose to three hundred. In another six months a further three hundred were added. By December 1942, exactly a year after the recruitment of the Legion was inaugurated, it attained the strength of four battalions. At the beginning of 1943 the Legion would be 2000 strong, well on its way up to the culminating point of 3500 men. But let us step back to early 1942, almost a year after Netaji's arrival in Berlin.

After the inauguration of the Free India Center, Free India Radio, and the sending of the first fifteen legionaries to the Frankenburg training camp, Netaji's activities in Germany began in full swing. His presence in Germany was not yet officially admitted—he was still being referred to as Signor Orlando Mazzota or His Excellency Mazzota—but he began to be known to more and more people in Berlin. Josef Goebbels wrote in his diary on 1 March:

We have succeeded in prevailing upon the Indian nationalist leader, Bose, to issue an imposing declaration of war against England. It will be published most prominently in the German press and commented upon. In that way we shall now begin our official fight on behalf of India, even though we don't as yet admit it openly. 8

On 14 March, he remarked of Bose, "He is an excellent worker." The fall of Singapore was a signal for Netaji to broadcast his first official speech over the Free India Radio, repeating his vow to fight British imperialism until the end. This he followed with a declaration of war against England, although at that stage such a pronouncement could only be symbolic. Netaji had not yet obtained an Axis declaration in support of the freedom of India that he pressed for in the supplement of his first memorandum to the German government. That government was of the opinion that the time was not ripe yet for such a declaration and unless a pronouncement of this nature could be supported by military action, it would not be of much value.

Meanwhile, Japan proposed a tripartite declaration on India. Encouraged by this, Bose met Mussolini in Rome on 5 May, and persuaded him to obtain such a declaration in favor of Indian independence. Mussolini telegraphed the Germans, proposing proceeding at once with the declaration. To back his new proposal Mussolini told the Germans that he had urged Bose to set up a "counter-government" and to appear more conspicuously. The German reaction, which still remained guarded, is recorded by Dr. Goebbels in his diary on 11 May:

We don't like this idea very much, since we do not think the time has yet come for such a political manoeuvre. It does appear though that the Japanese are very eager for some such step. However, emigre governments must not live too long in a vacuum. Unless they have some actuality to support them, they only exist in the realm of theory. 10

Netaji apparently was of the opinion that a tripartite declaration on Indian independence, followed up by a government-inexile, would give some credibility to his declaration of war on England, push over the brink the imminent revolution in India, and legitimize the Indian legion. However, Hitler held a different view. During an interview at the Fuehrer's field headquarters on 29 May, he told Netaji that a well-equipped army of a few thousand could control millions of unarmed revolutionaries, and there could be no political change in India until an external power knocked at her door. Germany could not yet do this. To convince Netaji, he took him to a wall map, pointed to the German positions in Russia and to India. The immense distances were yet to be bridged before such a declaration could be made. The world would consider it premature, even coming from him, at this stage. Hitler was perhaps being realistic, but nevertheless it must have come as some sort of disappointment for Netaji.

In July 1942, the Germans suggested that a contingent of the Irregular Company be sent for front-line propaganda against Indian troops at El Alamein; but Rommel, who did not like battle-fields turned into proving grounds for Foreign Office ideas, opposed the move. However, at the Lehrregiment manoeuvers in September, and on field exercises in October, the Indian performance won high praise. By January 1943, it was realized that maintenance of the irregulars as a separate entity was not of much practical use, and the ninety Indian men, (excepting four under N.G. Swamy who were being trained for work within India,) were absorbed into the Legion. Since the supply of recruits from the Annaburg camp was fast being depleted, it was decided to hasten the shipment of prisoners of war from Italy.

According to an agreement between Italy and Germany, all Indian POWs were to be sent directly to Germany without being held in Italian camps. But, in the meanwhile, an unforseen impediment stood in the way. A long-time Indian resident in Rome, Iqbal Shedai, formed an Indian unit under the Italians, and began broadcasting from Rome with the aid of a few Indian prisoners. It is understood that he had conferred with Netaji a few times, but obviously had no intention of co-operating with him. From radio broadcasting, he advanced into forming an Indian military unit, although it was in clear violation of the Italo-German agreement. The unit was named the Centro Militare India, but existed only from April to November 1942. During its bried period of existence, however, Shedai succeeded in diverting several hundred volunteers to Italian camps, who would normally have gone to Germany. In November the unit was three hundred and fifty strong, having been trained by Italian officers. On 9 November, after the Allied landing in North Africa, it was learnt that the men were being sent to fight in Libva, contrary to Shedai's promises. When they refused to go and mutinied, Shedai refused to intervene. Consequently, the Centro Militare India was disbanded. It was never revived, and thus a barrier that stood in Netaji's way toward recruitment was removed.

In August 1942, the Legion was moved to Koenigsbrueck, a large military training center in Saxony. This had been a regular training ground for the German infantry and motorized units for decades. Here the first contingents paraded before Netaji's eyes in October, and the growth was rapid. However, the rapid expansion of the Legion also posed the problem of finances. Hitherto, payment to soldiers was being made from the monthly grants to the Free India Center and its office. As the number of Legionaries grew, that source became insufficient. For this problem, there could be but one solution: direct payment to the Legion by the Germans. This would mean hereafter that the Legionaries would receive promotions and precedence as soldiers of national

socialist Germany, and would become, in fact, a regiment of the German army, while retaining its separate name and distinction. This was agreed upon between Netaji and the German government, necessitating the taking of a formal oath of loyalty to Adolph Hitler on the part of the Legionaries. Describing the ceremony, Hugh Toye writes:

Five hundred Legionaries were assembled. Their German commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Krappe, addressed them, and the oath was administered by German officers to six men at a time. All was done with solemnity, the soldiers touching their officer's sword as they spoke the German words: 'I swear by God this holy oath, that I will obey the leader of the German State and people, Adolph Hitler, as commander of the German Armed Forces, in the fight for freedom of India, in which fight the leader is Subhas Chandra Bose, and that as a brave soldier. I am willing to lay down my life for this oath.' Bose presented to the Legion its standard, a tricolor in the green, white and saffron of the Indian National Congress. superimposed with the figure of a springing tiger in place of the Congress spinning wheel. "Our names," he said, "will be written in gold letters in the history of free India; every martyr in this holy war will have a monument there." It was a brave, colorful show, and for Bose, a moment of pride and emotion. "I shall lead the army," he said, "when we march to India together." The Legionaries looked well in their new uniforms, the silken banner gleaming in their midst; their drill did them credit. 11

What was Netaji's plan for leading this army to India? When the Germans launched out beyond Stalingrad into Central Asia. the Indian irregulars, trained at Messeritz, would accompany their Tajik and Uzbek counterparts along with the German Troops. After Uzbekistan and Afghanistan were reached the Indian Company would leap ahead of the German advance to disrupt the British-Indian defenses in northwestern India. Netaji spoke of dropping parachute brigades, calling on the Indian peasantry to assist them. Through radio he issued warnings to British Indian soldiers and police to the effect that unless they assisted the liberation forces they would one day have to answer to the free Indian government for their criminal support of the British. The effect of the Indian army of liberation marching into India along with the German forces would be such that the entire British Indian Army morale would collapse, coinciding with a revolutionary uprising against the British. The Legion would then be the nucleus of an expanding army of free India. Netaji's plan, largely dependent on German Military successes in the Soviet Union, undoubtedly had a setback when the Wehrmacht was halted at Stalingrad. After the German retreat from that city, the plan for marching into India from the West had to be abandoned. The tide of war was turning swiftly, calling for devising new strategies on the part of Netaji.

While the German army's second thrust into Russia encountered an unexpected counter-offensive at Stalingrad and thus was forced to turn back, in another part of the world the forces of another Axis partner were forging ahead, nearer and nearer to India. Japan was achieving spectacular successes in the Far East and was ready to welcome Netaji as the leader of millions of Indians who lived in the countries of East and Southeast Asia. To Netaji, the Japanese attitude was extremely encouraging. Tojo. the Prime Minister, had issued statements in the Diet about Indian freedom early in 1942, and by March there was a Japanese proposal for a tripartite declaration on India. A small band of Indian National Army legionaires had already been in existence in the Southeast under Japanese patronage, although a few of its leaders, including Mohan Singh, had fallen out with the Japanese. Netaji would have no difficulty in reorganizing and expaning this organization. He would get the active support of millions of overseas Indians, and the many thousands of British Indian prisoners-of-war would provide him a greater opportunity for recruitment, and for thus organizing a formidable army of liberation that could immediately be deployed in forward positions as the Imperial Japanese Army kept on advancing through the steaming jungles of the Malayan peninsula and Burma. During his meeting with Hitler on 29 May, the Fuehrer had also suggested that in view of the prevalent world situation, Netaji should shift the center of his activities from Germany to the Far East.

Netaji could look back at his two years work in Germany with a sense of pride and accomplishment. Broadcasting, publications and propaganda were all extended. Azad Hind Radio had extended programs in several languages, and reports indicated that they were being listened to with interest in target areas: Azad Hind, a bilingual journal, was being published regularly. There were other papers for the Legion besides; the Free India Center had attained an acknowledged status in Germany. It was treated as a foreign mission, entitling its members to a higher scale of rations, and exemption from some of the Aliens' regulations. Netaji himself was given a good villa, a car and special rations for entertainment purposes. His personal allowance amounted to about eight hundred pounds a month. The monthly grant for the Free India Center rose from 1,200 pounds in 1941 to 3,200 pounds in 1944. All these Netaji stipulated as a loan from the German government, to be returned after India gained independence with the Axis assistance. However, the turn of events now demanded his presence in a different theater-of-war.

What would happen to the Legion in Netaji's absence? It was now 3,500 strong, well trained and equipped, ready for action. Netaji consulted with his aides in Berlin. A.C.N. Nambiar, an Indian journalist who had been in Europe for some eighteen years prior to Netaji's arrival in Germany, was his right-hand man. While preparing for his journey to the Asian theater-of-war, Netaji passed on to Nambiar his policy and instructions. As Hugh Toye writes:

There were plans for new branches of the Free India Center, for broadcasting, for Indians to study German police methods, and for the training of Indian seamen and airmen. As for the legion, it must be used actively as soon as possible, the German officers and NCOs must be quickly replaced by Indians, there must be no communalism. Legionaries were to be trained on all the most modern German equipment, including heavy artillery and tanks; Bose would send further instructions as opportunity offered. 12

A few words must be added regarding the Indo-German cooperation and comradeship during the critical days of World War II when the Legion was formed. None could describe it better than Adalbert Seifriz, who was a German Officer in the training camp of the Legionaries. He writes,

Agreeing to the proposal of Bose was a magnificient concession and consideration shown to the great personality of Bose by the German Government in those critical times when all German efforts were concentrated on the war . . . The mutual understanding and respect between Indians and Germans and the increasing contact between them in the interest of the common task made it possible for the Indian Legion to sustain and keep up discipline right up to the German capitulation in 1945. During the period of training and even afterwards the comradeship between Indians and Germans could not be destroyed . . . A meeting with Subhas Bose was a special event for the German training staff. We spent many evenings with him, discussing the future of India. He lives in the minds of the training staff members as an idealistic and fighting personality, never sparing himself in the service of his people and his country . . . The most rewarding fact was the real comradeship which grew between Indians and Germans, which proved true in dangerous hours, and exists still today in numerous cases. The Indian Legion was a precious instrument in strengthening and consolidating Indo-German friendship. 13

A report of Hitler's visit to the Indian Legion headquarters in Dresden was given by Shantaram Vishnu Samanta (one of the Legionaries) during a press interview in India, after his release from an internment camp. According to his statement, Hitler addressed the soldiers of the Legion after Netaji had left for East Asia. He spoke in German and his speech was translated into Hindustani by an interpreter. He said:

You are fortunate having been born in a country of glorious cultural traditions and a colossal manpower. I am impressed by the burning passion with which you and your Netaji seek to liberate your country from foreign domination. Your Netaji's status is even greater than mine. While I am the leader of eighty million Germans, he is the leader of 400 million Indians. In all respects he is a greater leader and a greater general than myself. I salute him, and Germany salutes him. It is the duty of all Indians to accept him as their fuehrer and obey him implicitly. I have no doubt that if you do this, his guidance will lead India very soon to freedom.

A statement by another soldier of the Indian Legion, who remains anonymous, has a somewhat different version. It stated that both Netaji and Hitler took a joint salute of the Indian Legion and a German infantry. In addition to comments cited earlier, Hitler was reported to have made these remarks as well:

German civilians, soldiers and free Indians! I take this opportunity to welcome your acting Fuehrer, Herr Subhas Chandra Bose. He has come here to guide all those free Indians who love their country and are determined to free it from foreign yoke. It is too much for me to dare to give you any instructions or advice because you are sons of a free country, and you would naturally like to obey implicitly the accredited leader of your own land. 14

However, reports of Hitler's visit and address to the Indian

Legionaries are not confirmed from any other source.

Netaji would be leaving Germany on 8 February 1943. On 26 January, "Independence Day for India," there was a great party in Berlin where hundreds of guests drank his health. On 28 January, which was set aside for observance as the "Legion Day" in honor of the Indian Legion, he addressed the Legion for the last time. It is believed that his departure was kept secret from his army. So, there were no visible emotions among the men; no gesture of a farewell. The impression Netaji was leaving at the Free India Center, was that he was going on a prolonged tour. So there were no signs of any anxiety. Except for a few top-ranking German officers and his closest aides, hardly anybody was aware that within a week-and-a-half he would be embarking on the most perilous journey ever undertaken by man; a submarine voyage through mine-infested waters to the other side of the world. In his absence, Nambiar settled down in his job as his successor and soon gained respect of the Legionaries.

Two months after Netaji's departure, as a result of discussion between the German Army Command and the Free India Center, it was decided to transfer the Legion from Koenigsbrueck to a coastal region in Holland, to involve it in a practical coastal defense training. It was also in accordance with Netaji's wishes. He had often expressed a desire to give his troops, whenever possible, some training in coastal defense. After the first battalion was given a hearty send-off, an untoward incident happened within the legion; two companies of the second battalion refused

to move. It was soon found out that there were three main reasons for staging this minor rebellion. Some Legionaries were unhappy that they were not promoted, but their names had to be put on the waiting list; some simply did not want to leave Koenigsbrueck; some were influenced by a rumor that Netaji had abandoned them and had gone off leaving them entirely in German hands, who were now going to use them in the Western Front, instead of sending them to the East to fight for India's liberation. However, the rebellion was soon quelled after a team of NCOs visited the officials of the Free India Center in Berlin and obtained clarification regarding the rebel Legionaries' grievances. The team went back to the camp and assured the men that they were not being sent to fight a war but were there purely for practical training purposes according to Netaji's wishes; that the promotions were not being passed up, they would follow in due course; and that Netaji had not abandoned them, and they would be informed about his whereabouts and plans as soon as possible. In pursuance of military discipline, the ringleaders of this act of insubordination were sent to prison camps for a specified period.

The Legion was stationed in the coastal areas of Holland for five months. Afterwards, there was a decision to move it to the coastal area of Bordeaux in France from the mouth of the Girond, opposite the fortification of Foyan to the Bay of Arcachon. The Legion was taking charge here. The stay in France was utilized to give the Legionaries a thorough training in the weaponry required for the defense of the Atlantic Wall. In the spring of 1944, the first batch of twelve Indians were promoted to officers. Field Marshal Rommel, who took charge of the Atlantic Wall, once visited the area where the Indian contingent was located. Gan-

pulay writes:

... after having seen the work carried out by the Indians, he exclaimed: "I am pleasantly surprised to find that in spite of very little training in coastal defense, the work done here is fairly satisfactory." While departing, he said to the Indian soldiers: "I am glad to see you have done good work; I wish you and your leader all the good luck!" 15

In the spring of 1944, one company of the Legion was sent to North Italy at the request of some officers who were seeking an opportunity to confront the British forces. After the Normandy invasion by the Allied forces in June 1944, the military situation in Europe began to deteriorate. It eventually became so critical that the German High Command decided to order the Indian Legion to return to Germany. So after about ten months of stay in the coastal region of Lacanau in France, the Indian Legion started its road back. It is to be understood at this point that with the landing of the Allied troops in France and their gradual advance

through the French countryside, the French Maquis (underground) guerillas had become very active, and along with the German troops they made the Legionaries as well the target of their attacks. After travelling a certain distance, the first battalion of the Legion was temporarily located in the area of Mansle near Poitiers, while the second and the third battalion were stationed in Angouleme and Poitiers respectively. After a rest for ten days in this region, during which period they had to ward off sporadic attacks by the French underground, the Legionaries took to the road once again. In this long march back to Germany, the Legion demonstrated exemplary courage and fortitude, and underwent rigors and hardships of battlefield with equinamity. At this time, British propaganda was directed to these men which was full of empty promises; some material was dropped from the air, while agents infiltrated into the ranks to persuade the men to desert. The progaganda promised the would-be deserters reinstatement in the British Indian army with full retroactive pay and pension, but the British hypocrisy was once again manifest in the fact that a few of the soldiers who had fallen victim to this bait were shot later by the French publicly in a market place in Poitiers without any trial, along with some German prisoners-ofwar.

In following the saga of the Indian Army of Liberation in the West, one has to remember that its fate was indissolubly linked with that of the Axis powers in Europe, especially Germany. The overpowering of the new revolutionary regimes of Europe by forces representing an alliance of capitalism and Marxism was an international tragedy which engulfed the Indian Legion in Europe as well. During its retreat into Germany, it encountered the enemy forces on several occasions and fought rearguard action with British and French forces, displaying exemplary bravery. The German military training had converted the regiment not only into a highly disciplined body, but a hard-core fighting unit as well. It is indeed a historical irony that this superb force could not be utilized for the purpose and way its creator and leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, had dreamt of. Nevertheless, the 950th Indian Regiment, as the Legion was officially designated, left its footprints in the battlefields of France and Germany, as their many other gallant comrades of the German Army.

In the fall of 1944 until Christmas, the Indian Legion spent its time in the quiet villages of southern Germany. Between Christmas and the New Year 1945, the unit was ordered to move into the military camp at the garrison town of Heuberg. In the spring of 1945 the Allied forces crossed the Rhine. The Russians entered the East German provinces murdering and plundering cities, townships and villages. Heavy bomber formations began de-

stroying German cities. Transport systems became completely disorganized and paralyzed. The end was near, and there was no point in remaining in the barracks. The Legion, therefore, left its winter quarters at Heuberg in March 1945, and headed for the Alpine passes. By that time all communications with the Free India Center in Berlin had been cut off. The Legion commanders took decisions independently. The Legion had already reached the Alpine regions east of Bodensee. However, with the surrender of the German forces on 7 May, all hopes also ended for the Free India Army. While attempting to cross over to Switzerland, the legionaries were overwhelmed by American and French units and were made prisoners. Those who fell into the hands of the French had to suffer very cruel treatment. Several were shot, while others died in prison camps in miserable conditions. The rest were eventually handed over to the British.

Although thus swept into the maelstrom of the Axis disintegration in Europe, Netaji's army of liberation in the west had carved for itself a niche in history; for, indeed, it was a nucleus which would evertually precipitate a much larger fighting force elsewhere. Inspired by its leader, that force would march into India to set in motion a process that would eventually deliver the country from an alien bondage. One, therefore, must not regard the saga of the Indian National Army in Europe as an isolated event that ended tragically. While its dream of crossing the Caucasus along with its allies, the German Armed Forces, and entering India from the Northwest, did not materialize in reality. its extension and successor. India's army of liberation in the east. did enter the country from the opposite direction, thus fulfilling the cherished dream of Netaji and his soldiers. Not only that, as we shall see subsequently, but that army made the mightiest contribution toward finally ending an imperialist rule in India.

During his interview with Netaji, Hitler had suggested to him that since it would take at least another one or two years before Germany could gain direct influence in India, and while Japan's influence, in view of its spectacular successes in Southeast Asia, could come in a few months. Bose should negotiate with the Japanese. The Fuehrer warned Bose against an air journey which could compel him to a forced landing in British territory. He thought Bose was too important a personality to let his life be endangered by such an experiment. Hitler suggested that he could place a German submarine at his disposal which would take him to Bangkok on a journey around the Cape of Good Hope. 16 However, despite Hitler's suggestions, it is believed that the German Foreign Office showed some reluctance in the matter of Netaji's leaving Germany and going to Japan. Col. Yamamoto Bin, Japanese military attache in Berlin (and a good personal friend of Netaji) along with the Japanese ambassador Lieutenant-General

Oshima Hiroshi, had met Netaji as early as October 1941 when the latter expressed hopes for enlisting Japanese aid in his plans for wresting Indian independence. This was the beginning of a series of such meetings.

After the entry of Japan in World War II in December, Netaji was more eager to go as soon as possible to East Asia and fight beside Japan for India's liberation. He reportedly urged Oshima to use his good offices to secure his passage to Asia. It was about at this point that both Oshima and Yamamoto encountered a feeling of reluctance in the matter on the part of the German Foreign Office. They had the feeeling that Germany was not too willing to let Japan lead India to independence. Bose was already a useful ally as an Indian patriot, and his propaganda broadcasts were effective in both India and Britain. The Indian Legion was already having a psychological impact in India and worrying the Allies. For these reasons, "they were guarding Bose like a tiger cub." 17

In the meantime, Ambassador Oshima had also met with Hitler and explained Bose's plan to him. According to Japanese records,

The Fuehrer readily agreed with Oshima that it was better for Bose to shift his activities to Southeast Asia now that his country's (Japan's) armies had overrun the area. The second problem was whether Bose would get enough support in Tokyo for his activities. On this. Oshima had contacted Tokyo many times but had not received any firm answer. Finally, Tokyo replied to Oshima that in principle it had no objection to Bose's visit to Japan. The third problem was to provide Bose with a safe means of transport to Japan. Communication between Germany and Japan was impossible during those days. Passage by boat was ruled out; and it was decided to use a plane belonging to the Lufthansa Company to airlift Bose from Germany to Japan via the Soviet Union. Tojo (Japanese Prime Minister) objected to this on the grounds that this would amount to a breach of trust with the Soviet Union. An attempt was made by both Yamamoto and Bose to get an Italian plane, but this also did not work. Finally the choice fell on a submarine. Germany agreed to carry Bose up to a certain unknown point in the east and asked that a Japanese submarine be pressed into service thence forward. After a series of exchanges with his government, Oshima finally obtained Tokyo's approval of the plan and communicated it to Bose. 18

Alexandar Werth writes:

An interesting anecdote related to this historic journey may perhaps be mentioned here. Shortly before Bose's departure the Japanese Naval Command raised objections because of an internal Japanese regulation not permitting civilians to travel on a warship in wartime. When Adam von Trott (of the German Foreign Office) received this message by cable from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, he sent the following reply: "Subhas Chandra Bose is by no

means a private person, but Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Liberation Army." Thus the bureaucratic interference was overcome. ¹⁹

On 8 February 1943, accompanied by Keppler, Nambiar and Werth, Netaji arrived at the port of Kiel where a German submarine under the command of Werner Musenberg was waiting for him. His would-be sole companion on this perilous voyage, Abid Hasan had travelled separately to Kiel in a special compartment without knowing his destination. Only after commencement of the journey was he to be informed of the itinerary. Netaji was leaving behind his chosen 3,500 soldiers of the Indian Legion, the 950th regiment of the German Army, specially trained and equipped for the task of liberating an India held in bondage by the British. We have already followed the history and fate of the Legion. Now let us turn to the East.

Indian National Army of Liberation in the East

On 15 February 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese army advancing southward from the Malayan peninsula. Two days later, in an impressive ceremony held at Farrar Park in the heart of the town, Indian troops were handed over to the Japanese as prisoners-of-war by their commanding officer, Colonel Hunt. Major Fujiwara took them over on behalf of the victorious Japanese, and then announced that he was handing them over to Captain Mohan Singh of the Indian contingents, who should be obeyed by them as their Supreme Commander. Mohan Singh then spoke to the Indian POWs, expressing his intention of raising an Indian national army out of them to fight for India's freedom. He held a preliminary discussion with some prominent Indians in Malay and Burma in a meeting in Singapore on 9 and 10 March, which was attended by Rashbehari Bose, a veteran Indian revolutionary exile living in Japan for the last quarter of a century. Bose then called a conference in Tokyo, which was held 28-30 March. The delegates representing several East and Southeast Asian countries present at the conference, decided to form the Indian Independence League to organize an Indian independence movement in East Asia. Bose was recognized as head of the organization. The conference further resolved that "militay action against the British in India will be taken only by the INA and under Indian command, together with such military, naval and air cooperation and assistance as may be requested from the Japanese by the Council of Action" and further, "after the liberation of India, the framing of the future constitution of India will be left entirely to the representatives of the people of India."20

On 15 June 1942, a conference opened in Bangkok with over a hundred delegates of the IIL attending from all over Asia. By the

close of the nine-day conference a resolution was unanimously adopted setting forth the policies of the independence movement in East Asia. The IIL was proclaimed the organization to work for India's freedom; the Indian National Army was declared the military arm of the movement with Mohan Singh as the Commander-in-chief and Rashbehari Bose was elected president of the Council of Action. It was further decided that Singapore would be the headquarters of the IIL. Netaji had stated in a message to the conference that his personal experience had convinced him that Japan, Italy and Germany were sworn enemies of British imperialism; yet, independence could come only through the efforts of Indians themselves. India's freedom would mean the rout of British imperialism. The Indian National Army was officially inaugurated in September 1942.

Unfortunately, at this point a distrust began to grow within the Indian group against Rashbehari Bose's leadership. Some thought that having been long associated with Japan, he gave precedence to the Japanese interests over Indian interests. Ac-

cording to Japanese records:

Some even thought that he was just the protege of the Japanese, and that the latter was exploiting Indians for their own ends. Such resentment finally resulted in a revolt of a group of leaders headed by Captain Mohan Singh within the INA in November 1942. As a consequence, Mohan Singh and his associate, Colonel Gill were both arrested by the Japanese and the Indian Army was disbanded. However, in 1943 a new Indian Army was organized, put under the command of Lt. Col. Bhonsle, who held this post until the final dissolution of the army. 21

Describing the revived INA. Joyce Lebra writes:

On 15 February 1943, the INA was reorganized and former ranks and badges revived. The Director of the Military Bureau, Lieutenant-Colonel Bhonsle, was clearly placed under the authority of the IIL to avoid any repetition of IIL-INA rivalry. Under Bhonsle was Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan as Chief of General Staff; Major P.K. Sahgal as Military Secretary; Major Habibur Rahman as commandant of the Officers' Training School; and Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji, and later Major A.D. Jahangir, as head of enlightenment and culture. Apart from this policy-forming body was the Army itself, under the command of Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani. This was the organization which held the INA together until the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose from Berlin, six months later. ²²

In February, the Japanese military officer Iwakuro had called a meeting of about three hundred officers of the INA at Bidadri camp in Singapore and spoke to them about the advisability of joining the army, but with no effect. According to Ghosh, "Later on, in a 'Heart to heart talk' with some officers, it emerged that a large number of officers and men would be willing to continue in

the INA on the express condition that Netaji would be coming to Singapore." ²³

The story of Netaji's exploits in Germany and the history of the Indian Legion was known to Indian revolutionaries of the IIL in East Asia for some time now, and they awaited his arrival eagerly. As the first INA wavered, faltered and was finally disbanded, and as its successor merely continued to exist, the need for Netaji's leadership began to be felt more keenly. Mohan Singh had mentioned his name to General Fujiwara as early as 1941. In all conferences the need of his guidance had been emphasized

by the delegates.

While Netaji and Abid Hasan continued to push toward the East making a wide sweep out into the Atlantic, by pre-arrangement, a Japanese submarine left Penang Island on 20 April for the tip of Africa, under strict orders not to attack or risk detection. The two submarines had a rendevous four hundred miles southsouthwest of Madagascar on 26 April. After sighting each other and confirming their identity, the submarines waited for a day for the sea to become calm. Then on 28 April, in what was known to be the only known submarine-to-submarine transfer of passengers (in the annals of World War II) in an area dominated by the enemy's air and naval strength, Netaji and Abid Hasan were transhipped into the Japanese submarine via a rubber raft. Travelling across the ocean, the Japanese I-29 reached Sabang on 6 May, 1943. It was an isolated offshore islet north of Sumatra. There, Netaji was welcomed by Colonel Yamamoto, who was the head of the Hikari Kikan, the Japanese-Indian liaison group. From Sabang, Netaji and Yamamoto left for Tokyo by plane, stopping en route at Penang, Manila, Saigon and Taiwan. The plane landed in Tokyo on 16 May. All throughout his submarine voyage from Germany and for about a month after his arrival in Tokyo, Netaji's identity and presence was kept a secret. He was supposed to be a Japanese VIP named Matsuda. Although he remained incognito during the first few weeks in Japan, Netaji did not waste any time by just waiting. From 17 May onwards, he met Japanese Army and Navy Chiefs-of-Staff, Navy Minister and Foreign Minister in rapid succession. However, he had to wait for nearly three weeks before Japanese Prime Minister Tojo granted him an interview. But Tojo was so impressed with Netaji's personality that he offered to meet him again after four days. Two days later, on 16 June, Netaji was invited to visit the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) where Tojo surprised him with his historic declaration on India:

We are indignant about the fact that India is still under the ruthless suppression of Britain and are in full sympathy with her desperate struggle for independence. We are determined to extend every possible assistance to the cause of India's independence. It is our belief that the day is not far off when India will enjoy freedom and prosperity after winning independence. 24

It was not until 18 June that Tokyo Radio announced Netaji's arrival. The news was reported in the Tokyo press the following day. At this announcement, the atmosphere was electrified overnight. The Axis press and radio stressed the significance of the event. The INA and the Indian independence movement suddenly assumed far greater importance in the eyes of all. On 19 June, Netaji held a press conference. This was followed by two broadcasts to publicize further his presence in East Asia, and during the course of these he unfolded his plan of action. As Ghosh describes.

Bose's plan stood for the co-ordination of the nationalist forces within India and abroad to make it a gigantic movement powerful enough to overthrow the British rulers of India. The assumption on which Bose seemed to have based his grand scheme was that the internal conditions in India were ripe for a revolt. The no-cooperation movement must turn into an active revolt. ²⁵

And to quote Netaji's own words during the press conference: "Civil disobedience must develop into armed struggle. And only when the Indian people have received the baptism of fire on a large scale would they be qualified to achieve freedom." ²⁶ Netaji then embarked upon a series of meetings, press conferences. radio broadcasts and lectures in order to explain his immediate task to the people concerned, and the world.

Accompanied by Rashbehari Bose, Netaji arrived at Singapore from Tokyo on 27 June. He was given a tumultuous welcome by the resident Indians and was profusely 'garlanded' wherever he went. His speeches kept the listeners spellbound. By now, a legend had grown around him, and its magic infected his audiences. Addressing representatives of the Indian communities in East Asia on 4 July he said:

Not content with a civil disobedience campaign, Indian people are now morally prepared to employ other means for achieving their liberation. The time has therefore come to pass on to the next stage of our campaign. All organizations whether inside India or outside, must now transform themselves into a disciplined fighting organization under one leadership. The aim and purpose of this organization should be to take up arms against British imperialism when the time is ripe and signal is given. 27

At a public meeting where Netaji spoke these words, Rashbehari Bose formally handed over to Subhas Chandra Bose the leadership of the IIL and command of the INA. The hall was packed to capacity. In his last speech as leader of the movement Rashbehari Bose said: Friends! This is one of the happiest moments in my life. I have brought you one of the most outstanding personalities of our great Motherland to participate in our campaign. In your presence today, I resign my office as president of the Indian Independence League in East Asia. From now on, Subhas Chandra Bose is your president, your leader in the fight for India's independence, and I am confident that under his leadership, you will march on to battle and to victory. 28

In that meeting Netaji announced his plan to organize a Provisional Government of Free India.

It will be the task of this provisional government to lead the Indian Revolution to its successful conclusion . . . The Provisional Government will have to prepare the Indian people, inside and outside India, for an armed struggle which will be the culmination of all our national efforts since 1883. We have a grim fight ahead of us. In this final march to freedom, you will have to face danger, thirst, privation, forced marches—and death. Only when you pass this test will freedom be yours. ²⁹

The next day, on 5 July, Netaji took over the command of the Indian National Army, now christened Azad Hind Fauj (Free India Army). Tojo arrived from Manila in time to review the parade of troops standing alongside with Bose. Addressing the soldiers, Netaji said:

Throughout my pubic career, I have always felt that, though India is otherwise ripe for independence in every way, she has lacked one thing, namely, an army of liberation. George Washington of America could fight and win freedom, because he had his army. Garibaldi could liberate Italy because he had his armed volunteers behind him. It is your privilege and honor to be the first to come forward and organize India's national army. By doing so you have removed the last obstacle in our path to freedom . . . When France declared war on Germany in 1939 and the campaign began, there was but one cry which rose from the lips of German soldiers—"To Paris! To Paris!" When the brave soldiers of Nippon set out on their march in December 1941, there was but one cry which rose from their lips-"To Singapore! To Singapore!" Comrades! My soldiers! Let your battle-cry be-"To Delhi! To Delhi!" How many of us will individually survive this war of freedom, I do not know. But I do know this, that we shall ultimately win and our task will not end until our surviving heroes hold the victory parade on another graveyard of the British Empire-Lal Kila or the Red Fortress of ancient Delhi. 30

On 27 July, Netaji left Singapore for a 17-day tour of the East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The prime objective of this tour was to enlist moral and monetary support for his movement from other countries, as well as the resident Indian communities. He was given a rousing reception in Rangoon, where he attended the Burmese independence on 1 August; from Rangoon Netaji

went to Bangkok and met Thai Prime Minister Pilbulsongram. He won the moral support of Thailand and tumultuous ovation from the Indian community. He then flew to Saigon and addressed Indians there. Returning to Singapore for a brief rest, he flew to Penang to address a rally of 15,000 Indians. Everywhere, he held his audience spellbound for hours with his superb oratory, and at the conclusion of his speech the people raced to reach the platform and pile up all they had before him—a total of two million dollars. This scene was repeated over and over in towns and cities all over Southeast Asia, when Netaji stood before thousands of people like a prophet, addressing them for the cause of India's freedom. Merchants, traders, businessmen and women came forward everywhere and donated their wealth and ornaments in abundance, to enable their leader to fulfill his mission.

In his plan for total mobilization, Netaji had outlined a grandiose scheme for an army of three million men. However, the immediate target was set at 50,000. The Major part of this number would be from the Indian POWs and the rest from civilian volunteers. According to Bose's plan there would be three divisions from thirty thousand regulars and another unit of twenty thousand mainly from civilian volunteers. The Japanese authorities informed Netaji at that time that it could provide arms for thirty thousand men only. However, by 1945, it was authoritatively known that the actual strength of the INA rose to not less than 45,000 men. After completing the task of reorganizing the Indian Independence League and launching preparations for revolutionizing the army, and after conducting a successful campaign to mobilize the support of the Indian communities throughout Southeast Asia—a phase which lasted from July to October— Netaji turned toward formation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India). This had to be done before the army could be sent for action in the battlefield. This government was officially proclaimed in Singapore at a mass rally on 21 October 1943 where Netaji was unanimously elected as the Head of the State and The Supreme Commander of the Indian National Army. While taking the oath he said:

In the name of God, I take this sacred oath that to liberate India and the three hundred eighty million of my countrymen, I, Subhas Chandra Bose, will continue the sacred war of freedom till the last breath of my life. I shall remain always a servant of India, and to look after the welfare of three hundred eighty million of Indian brothers and sisters shall be for me my highest duty. Even after winning freedom, I will always be prepared to shed even the last drop of my blood for the preservation of India's freedom.³¹

The Provisional Government of Free India had five Ministers with Netaji as the Head of the State, Prime Minister and Minister for War and advisers representing the Indian communities in East Asia. The first momentous decision which the new government took was its declaration of war on Britain and the United States, which was decided on the night of 22-23 October. Toye writes: "The Cabinet had not been unanimous about the inclusion of the U.S.A. Bose had shown impatience and displeasure—there was never any question then or later of his absolute authority: the Cabinet had no responsibility and could only tender advice." ³² Recognition of the Provisional Government came quickly from nine countries—the Axis powers and their allies. They were: Japan, Burma, Croatia, Germany, the Philippines, Nanking China, Manchuto, Italy and Siam (Thailand), but for some unknown reasons, Vichy France withheld its recognition. The Japanese Army promised all-out support for the provisional government.

Toward the end of October, Netaji flew to Tokyo again to meet Tojo and to attend the greater East Asia Conference. Since India technically did not fall within this sphere, he attended as an observer. He made an impressive speech at the conference, stressing the creation of a new Asia where all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism would be eliminated. The Japanese navy had captured the Andaman and Nicober islands in the Bay of Bengal during the early months of war. As a result of Netaji's requests, Prime Minister Tojo announced at the conference that Japan had decided to place the two islands under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of Free India, thereby giving it its first sovereignty over a territory. The ceremonial transfer took place in December, and Netaji named Lieutenant-Colonel Loganathan. an officer in the Medical Services, as the chief commissioner in charge of the civil administration of the islands. Soon thereafter. preparations began for sending the army to the front and moving the provisional government headquarters to Rangoon, in Burma. In the meantime, Netaji announced the formation of a women's brigade within the INA, and named it "Rani of Ihansi Regiment." after the celebrated queen of Jhansi, Laxmibai, who had led her soldiers against the British in an uprising during the First War of Independence in 1857. Coincidentially, another Laxmi, Lieutenant-Col. Laxmi, was placed in charge of this regiment by Netaji. In November it was agreed between Netaji and the Japanese militay headquarters, that the INA first division and the civil and military headquarters would move to Burma in January 1944.

The Imphal Campaign

The Imphal Campaign, including the battle of Kohima—the first major town to be captured by the INA inside India—will perhaps go down as one of the most daring and disastrous campaigns in the annals of world military history. General Mutaguchi, commander of the Japanese forces in North Burma since 1943, had been convinced that Imphal should be attacked. The objects of such an offensive were to forstall any invasion of Burma in 1944 and to establish the Japanese defences on the frontier mountains. The idea would be first to overwhelm the British in Arakan, involving all their reserves in battle for Chittagong and the gateway to eastern Bengal. Then, by April, Kohima and Imphal could be conquered at leisure, without danger of their being reinforced. The monsoon, beginning in May, would postpone operations, and after the rains were over, in the absence of a new British defense posture east of the river Brahmaputra, the entire Assam and East Bengal would lie open to the Indian National Army and the Japanese.

Imphal, the capital of the state of Manipur, lay on a flat, nearly treeless plateau just inside the Indian border. Its elevation was about 3,000 feet, surrounded on all sides by impassable mountains. The mountain range in the east with 2,000-4,000 foot peaks above the plateau stretches some five hundred miles. To the West and South are the Chin hills of the Arakan range, a formidable stretch of inhospitable terrain. The jungle surrounding this basin is hostile to human habitation. The northern access to the plain from India and Assam lay through Dimapur and the steep Kohima Road. From Dimapur, a single track railway swept through Assam and Bengal and was an important military objective to both armies. For the INA the importance of the Imphal campaign was that it was the only major battle in which it would participate with the object of achieving freedom for India. As Saito and Hayashida writes:

The Imphal Operation was the final offensive of the East Asia War, mounted by three Burma-based Japanese divisions, and one INA division. The campaign lasted from 15 March to 9 July 1944. The operation has often been compared to the operation Wacht am Rhein or the Battle of the Bulge, which was the final all-out drive launched by Germany towards Ardennes on the Western Front, from December 1944 to January 1945. Both operations almost succeeded and both are termed "gambles" by historians today. If the German push towards Ardennes was Wacht am Rhein, the Japanese-Indian thrust against Imphal might be called "Wacht am Chindwin" although the official Japanese code-name for the action was most prosaic: Operation "U", 33

River Chindwin lay across the Indo-Burmese border, and its crossing from the east by an army would signal an invasion of India.

Execution orders for Operation U became operative on 7 January 1944, coinciding with completion of the shifting of the Provisional Government headquarters in Rangoon. In the evening of the same day, Lt. General Masakazy Kawabe, commanding the

overall Burma headquarters, held a welcome party in honor of Netaji and his staff officers. Netaji spoke, and concluded his speech with these words: "My only prayer to the Almighty at this moment is that we may be given the earliest opportunity to pay for our freedom with our own blood." One INA Division, named after Netaji as Subhas Regiment, was readied for action at the front with the Japanese. Toye writes:

... He spent the whole days... with the Subhas Regiment, reviewing, watching it at exercises and on parade, talking to its officers, exerting his magic on it in a way that he had not attemped before. These were his comrades, the men by whose means he would uphold the rights and honour of India. Everything depended on their achievement in battle; they must absorb all his feelings of confidence, feel the whole of his personal force. On 3 February he bade them farewell: "Blood is calling for blood. Arise! We have no time to lose. Take up your arms. There in front of you is the road our pioneers have built. We shall march along that road. We shall carve our way through enemy's ranks, or, if God wills, we shall die a martyr's death. And in our last sleep we shall kiss the road which will bring our Army to Delhi. The road to Delhi is the road to Freedom. On to Delhi!" 35

Mutaguchi set 15 March as the D-day for the beginning of the Imphal campaign. The deployment of well over 120,000 troops along the Chindwin river, a front of some 200 kilometers, went on smoothly and undetected by British spies planted in the area. In the meantime, Netaji received some good news. The Arakan offensive, launched on 4 February, had cut off the 7th Indian Division of the British Army in Mayu valley. Contributing to this success was the reconnaissance and subversion of an Indian outpost position by Major Misra, the INA Commander in Arakan. At the same time, he received messages from the underground network working inside India under his direction, whose selected trained spies had been sent by submarine. On D-day, Mutaguchi assembled the war correspondents at his headquarters in central Burma and declared: "I am firmly convinced that my three divisions will reduce Imphal in one month. In order that they can march fast, they carry the lightest possible equipment and food enough for three weeks. Ah, they will get everything from the British supplies and dumps. Boys! See you again in Imphal at the celebration of the Emperor's birthday on 29 April."36

The Japanese-Indian offensive took the British by complete surprise. The Japanese and INA troops literally galloped through mountains and jungles routing the enemy on the way. Prior to the Imphal offensive, an INA detachment under Colonel Sahgal had created a breach through the British lines in the Arakan sector. Now the INA's deployment was extended to the Imphal sector. As the INA under Netaji's command set foot on the Indian soil, the

main Japanese force also defeated the obstinate resistance of the enemy on 22 March, broke through the India-Burma border, and advanced from the north and west to encircle Imphal. The initial success of the INA at the Arakan front generated much enthusiasm. In a Special Order of the Day, Netaji referred to the "Glorious and brilliant actions of the brave forces of the Azad Hind Faui." 37

On 8 April, Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued a communique which said: "Japanese troops, fighting side by side with the Indian National Army, captured Kohima early on 6 April. 38 A jubilant Netaji at this time started talking with the Japanese about the administration of the liberated and soon-to-be-liberated territories in India. In response to a call by Netaii, Prime Minister Tojo made an announcement clarifying that all areas of India occupied as a result of Japanese advance would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government. This was followed by Netaji's announcement that he was appointing the Finance Minister of his cabinet, Major-General A.C. Chatterjee, as the governor of the newly liberated areas. Netaji described the march of the INA into India as the event of the century. He had also just declared the Legion in Europe to be part of the INA and had appointed Nambiar to be a Minister in the Provisional Government; his Chief Commissioner had been installed in the Andamans, his first heroes from the Arakan front had been decorated. and the INA troops had raised the national standard of free India in Kohima; and now, the fall of Imphal seemed very near.

Did the Imphal Campaign come almost two years too late? What would have happened if Netaji had arrived in East Asia a year earlier? by the end of 1942, the Axis had scored successes

everywhere.

Rommel was in Egypt, the German invasion of Russia had gone smoothly, Nationalist China was on her knees, and India and Australia were expecting a Japanese invasion. Prospects for the Allies were dark in the Pacific and the Rising Sun was at its zenith from Japan to the Bay of Bengal . . . Britain was unable to dispute with the Japanese Navy, and there were not enough British and Indian troops in India to assure its defense. Even air protection was inadequte . . . Japanese forces had not pursued retreating British troops beyond the Chindwin river in Burma in May 1942, allegedly because "an invasion was likely to arouse ill-feelings amongst the Indian masses." . . . So the Japanese remained east of the Chindwin river, leaving British Indian forces to build up their strength in the Imphal plain. 39

But above all, in that moment of a golden opportunity, the towering leadership of Netaji, a provisional government, and an Indian national army worthy of its name—all these were non-existent in East Asia. Japan by itself simply lacked the motivation for ex-

tending war into India, let alone think of its independence. The fact remains, however, that the Imphal campaign was indeed first conceived in 1942, right after the conquest of Burma. According to the official history of the British Armed Forces in the Second World War.

Soon after the completion of the Japanese conquest of Burma in June 1942, a certain Lt. Col. Hayashi had advocated an attack on Imphal. He considered that the Japanese should strike against India without giving time to the defenders to recuperate from their disastrous retreat, and Imphal's capture would rob them of the best base for launching a counter-offensive against Burma... 18th division argued that the jungles of Burma were impassable for large bodies of operational troops and that any attack on Indian territory would provoke anti-Japanese feelings in India. About December 1942, therefore, the plan was abandoned. 40

Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigetoku, Southern Army Chief of Staff, stated later that if the operation had been carried out in 1942 when first conceived, rather than in 1944, it would have succeeded. According to Lebra, "General Tojo stated in the spring of 1945 that he regretted Japan had missed the opportunity in 1942." 41

As the INA and the Japanese forces continued to lay siege on Imphal, the Allied air superiority gained strength and the enemy was preparing for counterattack. Shah Nawaz, commanding two battalions of the Subhas Regiment in the Chin Hills, told of the hardships his men were suffering as a result of disease and of supply and transport difficulties. However, owing to communication problems, the news of difficulties his men were undergoing at the front did not reach Netaji in detail. While there was a stalemate in the front and the offensive came to a halt, there were meetings and jubilations at Rangoon where Netaji collected money and donations in other forms for the conduct of his campaign. He offered to send additional INA regiments to the Front and more troops were despatched. For about a month Operation U went according to plan. Enemy forces were successfully encircled in the Imphal area. Suddenly, in the middle of April, the military balance began to shift against Japan and the INA. Wingate's airborne unit had already been attacking from air over Burma supply routes. British forces were being supplied by airlift into the besieged Imphal, and reinforcements began to flow in. British forces were being sent to Kohima to the north by both rail and air. Japan had no matching air power to strike back at enemy air operations. By the end of April the battle strength of Japanese and INA divisions was decreased forty percent. Time for success by surprise attack had already passed and gradually the offensive turned into a defensive battle. The monsoon that followed. brought the ultimate disaster. As roads became impassable, all

supply routes were cut off. Muddy streams flooded roads and valleys, and rivers swelled to sweep away tanks and ammunition. In the wake of the monsoon, disease became rampant. Cholera, malaria, dysentery, beriberi and jungle sores began to take their toll. The INA and the Japanese started living on rations consisting of rice mixed with jungle grass. The 33rd Division had fought desperately for forty days without being able to penetrate the British lines at Imphal. And now that vast amounts of military supplies were reaching the beleaguered garrison at Imphal, there was virtually no hope for a renewed offensive. On 8 July, on the recommendation of top-ranking Generals including Kawabe and Mutaguchi, Prime Minister Tojo issued the order to halt the operation.

The story of retreat from Imphal is one of the greatest tragedies of World War II. It is a story of misery, hunger and death. Japanese and INA troops, bottled up in the Kawab valley between the Chin Hills in the west and the Chindwin river in the west, began their long trek back through jungles and mountains, headed by division commanders and guards in jeeps and horses. Officers, supply, communication and medical units followed. Behind them marched thousands of stragglers: rain-soaked, emaciated with fever and malnutrition. Soon, corpses began accumulating along the trek, and they had to be left unburied. Of the 220,000 Japanese troops who began the Imphal Campaign, only 130,000 survived, and of these only 70,000 remained at the front to retreat. INA casualties were over fifty percent. It was a disaster equal in magnitude to Dunkirk and Stalingrad. Lebra writes:

When Bose heard the order to retreat he was stunned. He drew himself up and said to Kawabe in ringing tones: "Though the Japanese Army has given up the operation, we will continue it. We will not repent even if the advance of our revolutionary army to attain independence of our homeland is completely defeated. Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are not reasons enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only spirit we will not stop advancing toward our homeland. This is the spirit of our revolutionary army." In an article in Azad Hind on 6 November 1944, after the retreat from Imphal, Bose was reported to have "reiterated his firm conviction that final victory in this war would belong to Japan and Germany... that a new phase of war was approaching in which the initiative would again lie in the hands of the Japanese." 42

Each Japanese commander gave his own analysis of the causes of the failure of Operation U, like the problem of the chain of command, lack of air power, on dispersal rather than concentration of forces. However, Netaji thought it was timing, with respect to the monsoon. He felt that the only chance to take Imphal was

before the rains came, and most strategists agreed on this point. From the historic perspective, however, Fujiwara perhaps was the most correct. According to him, the Imphal disaster could have been avoided had the operation been undertaken a year earlier, at a time when the British power in the region was weak. The delay in launching the Imphal offensive was no doubt due to Netaji's late arrival from Europe to East Asia. The Imphal campaign should have been undertaken at a time when the Axis victories had reached their zenith and the Allied forces were on retreat everywhere.

During the last three months of 1944, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the banks of the Irrawaddy in Burma, where they intended to make a stand. Netaji enthusiastically offered the reorganized INA First Division, when the Japanese 15th division was ordered to oppose the British. Subsquently, the 2nd Division was also readied for action. In February 1945, the INA held some positions in the region of Mandalay in Burma, giving battle to the advancing enemy. This was the second campaign of Netaji's army, and it held out tenaciously at Nyaungu for some time. However, allied troops later crossed the Irrawaddy at several points and the Japanese and INA units were surrounded. There were some desertions. Despite unique examples of heroism and Netaji's presence in the battlefields, risking his own life in the face of enemy attacks, the second campaign of the INA (which was purely a defensive one) finally had to give way to the gradual reconquest of Burma by the British.

The end of this campaign was followed by a chain of events that included the final Japanese defeat, an alleged plane crash in Formosa in which Netaji reportedly perished, the surrender of the INA to the allied forces and the trial of their leaders at the Red Fort in Delhi, staged by the British. However, all these fateful events, occuring during the final phase of World War II and its aftermath, should be considered parts of an altogether different episode relating to Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army. In the present episode we have examined the historical tasks fulfilled by Netaji and his army in Europe and Asia during World War II, and their significance. In recognition of Netaji's historically significant role as a war leader, Guy Wint pays him a rare tribute with these words: "He played . . . an extraordinarily decisive part. By accident, and by seizing an exceptional opportunity, he was able to cut a figure which made him outstanding among the comparatively small number of men who influenced the course of the war by their individual qualities." 43

The Myth of "Freedom through Non-violence under Gandhi's Leadership"

Modern historians in India are taking a second look at the way the country's freedom was achieved, and in that process are demolishing a number of theories, assumptions and myths preached by the "court historians." However, in order to grasp the magnitude of the issue, with its many ramifications, it is essential to understand first the concept of freedom as envisaged by Netaji—the ideal which motivated him to wrest it from the hands of the British by the force of arms. In his entire political career, Subhas Chandra Bose was guided by two cardinal principles in his quest for his country's emancipation: that there could be no compromise with alien colonialists on the issue, and that on no account would the country be partitioned. The Indian

geographical unity was to be maintained at all costs.

As we have already seen, the unfortunate turn of events during World War II prevented Netaji's dream of his victorious march to Delhi at the head of his Indian National Army from becoming a reality. In his and his army's absence in a post-war India, politicians under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru did exactly what Netaji never wanted: they negotiated and compromised with the British on the issue of freedom, and in their haste to get into power, agreed to a formula of partitioning India presented to them by the British. The transfer of power was followed by two more developments that were alien to Netaji's philosophy and his blueprint for a free India: introduction of a parliamentary democratic system by Nehru and his decision to keep India in the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was a truncated freedom, achieved over the bloodbath of millions who had perished in fratricidal religious rioting during the process of partition, as the erstwhile India emerged on the world map as the two nations of India and Pakistan. Even so, the fragmented freedom that fell as India's share after the British had skillfully played their age-old game of divide and rule came not as a result of Gandhi's civil disobedience and non-violent movement as the court historians would have us believe; nor was it due to persistent negotiations by Nehru and other Indian National Congress leaders on the conference table, which the British found so easy to keep stalling. The British finally quit when they began to feel the foundations of loyalty being shaken among the British Indian soldiers-the mainstay of the colonial power—as a result of the INA exploits that became known to the world after the cessation of hostilities in East Asia.

Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, the eminent Indian historian who passed away recently, and who by virtue of his challenges to several historical myths can rightly be called the Dean of new historians in India, observed in his book Three Phases of India's Struggle for Freedom:

There is, however, no basis for the claim that the Civil Disobedience Movement directly led to independence. The campaigns of Gandhi . . . came to an ignoble end about fourteen years before India achieved independence . . . During the First World War the Indian revolutionaries sought to take advantage of German help in the shape of war materials to free the country by armed revolt. But the attempt did not succeed. During the Second World War Subhas Bose followed the same method and created the INA. In spite of brilliant planning and initial success, the violent campaigns of Subhas Bose failed . . . The Battles for India's freedom were also being fought against Britain, though indirectly, by Hitler in Europe and Japan in Asia. None of these scored direct success, but few would deny that it was the cumulative effect of all the three that brought freedom to India. In particular, the revelations made by the INA trial, and the reaction it produced in India, made it quite plain to the British, already exhausted by the war, that they could no longer depend upon the loyalty of the sepoys for maintaining their authority in India. This had probably the greatest influence upon their final decision to quit India. 44

Despite Japan's defeat and the consequent withering away of the Indian National Army on the India-Burma front, both Subhas Chandra Bose and his INA became household names throughout the country as the returning soldiers were sought to be prosecuted by the British. By then, the Congress leadership under Gandhi and Nehru had pre-empted itself, and the year 1945 seemed relatively calm and uneventful. However, Netaji and his legend worked up a movement all over the country which even a Gandhi could never produce. Echoing this mass upsurge Michael Edwardes wrote in his Last Years of British India:

The Government of India had hoped, by prosecuting members of the INA, to reinforce the morale of the Indian army. It succeeded only in creating unease, in making the soldiers feel slightly ashamed that they themselves had supported the British. If Bose and his men had been on the right side—and all India now confirmed that they were—then Indians in the Indian army must have been on the wrong side. It slowly dawned upon the Government of India that the backbone of the British rule, the Indian army, might now no longer be trustworthy. The ghost of Subhas Bose, like Hamlet's father, walked the battlements of the Red Fort (where the INA soldiers were being tried), and his suddenly amplified figure overawed the conference that was to lead to independence. ⁴⁵

Apart from revisionist historians, it was none other than Lord Clement Atlee himself, the British Prime Minster responsible for conceding independence to India, who gave a shattering blow to the myth sought to be perpetuated by court historians, that Gandhi and his movement had led the country to freedom. Chief

Justice P.B. Chakrabarty of Calcutta High Court, who had also served as the acting Governor of West Bengal in India, disclosed the following in a letter addressed to the publisher of Dr. R.C. Majumdar's book A History of Bengal. The Chief Justice wrote:

You have fulfilled a noble task by persuading Dr. Majumdar to write this history of Bengal and publishing it . . . In the preface of the book Dr. Majumdar has written that he could not accept the thesis that Indian independence was brought about solely, or predominantly by the non-violent civil disobedience movement of Gandhi. When I was the acting Governor, Lord Atlee, who had given us independence by withdrawing the British rule from India. spent two days in the Governor's palace at Calcutta during his tour of India. At that time I had a prolonged discussion with him regarding the real factors that had led the British to quit India. My direct question to him was that since Gandhi's "Quit India" movement had tapered off quite some time ago and in 1947 no such new compelling situation had arisen that would necessitate a hasty British departure, why did they have to leave? In his reply Atlee cited several reasons, the principal among them being the erosion of loyalty to the British Crown among the Indian army and navy personnel as a result of the military activities of Netaji. Toward the end of our discussion I asked Atlee what was the extent of Gandhi's influence upon the British decision to quit India. Hearing this question, Atlee's lips became twisted in a sarcastic smile as he slowly chewed out the word, "m-i-n-i-m-a-l!" 46

When the new version of the history of the Twentieth Century India, and especially the episode of the country's unique struggle for independence comes to be written, it will no doubt single out but one person who made the most significant and outstanding contribution among all his compatriots toward the emancipation of his motherland from the shackles of an alien bondage. During World War II this man strode across two continents like a colossus, and the footsteps of his army of liberation reverberated through the forests and plains of Europe and the jungles and mountians of Asia. His armed assaults shook the very foundations of the British Empire. His name was Subhas Chandra Bose.

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Epic: The Story of the Waffen SS

LEON DEGRELLE

(Presented at the IHR's 1982 Revisionist Conference)

Introduction

You are about to hear Leon Degrelle, who before the Second World War was Europe's youngest political leader and the founder of the Rexist Party of Belgium. During that cataclysmic confrontation he was one of the greatest heroes on the Eastern Front. Of Leon Degrelle Hitler said: "If I should have a son I would like him to be like Leon."

As a statesman and a soldier he has known very closely Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Franco, Laval, Marshal Petain and all the European leaders during the enormous ideological and military clash that was World War Two. Alone among them, he has survived, remaining the number one witness of that historical period.

The life of Leon Degrelle began in 1906 in Bouillon, a small town in the Belgian Ardennes. His family was of French origin.

He studied at the University of Louvain, where he acquired a doctorate in law. He was—and is—also interested in other academic disciplines, such as political science, art, archeology and Tomistic philosophy.

As a student his natural gift of leadership became apparent. By the time he reached twenty he had already published five books and operated his own weekly newspaper. Out of his deep Christian conviction he joined Belgium's Catholic Action Movement and became one of its leaders. But his passion has always been people.

He wanted to win the crowds, particularly the Marxist ones. He wanted them to share his ideals of social and spiritual change for society. He wanted to lift people up; to forge for them a stable, efficient and responsible state, a state backed by the good sense of people and for the sole benefit of the people.

He addressed more than 2,000 meetings, always controversial. His books and newspaper were read everywhere because they always dealt with the real issues. Although not yet twenty-five,

people listened to him avidly.

In a few short years he had won over a large part of the population. On the twenty-fourth of May 1936 his Rexist Party won against the established parties a smashing electoral victory: Thirty-four house and senate seats.

The Europe of 1936 was still split into little countries, jealous of their pasts and closed to any contact with their neighbors.

Leon Degrelle saw further. In his student days he had traveled across Latin America, the United States and Canada. He had visited North Africa, the Middle East and of course all of the European countries. He felt that Europe had a unique destiny and must unite.

Mussolini invited him to Rome. Churchill saw him in London

and Hitler received him in Berlin.

Putting his political life on the line, he made desperate efforts to stop the railroading of Europe into another war. But old rivalries, petty hatreds and suspicion between the French and the German, were cleverly exploited. The established parties and the Communist Party worked on the same side: for war. For the Kremlin it was a unique opportunity to communize Europe after it had been bled white.

Thus, war started, First in Poland, then in Western Europe in 1940. This was to become the Second World War in 1941.

Soon the flag of the Swastika flew from the North Pole to the

shores of Greece to the border of Spain.

But the European civil war between England and Germany continued. And the rulers of Communism got ready to move in and pick up the pieces.

But Hitler beat them to it and invaded the Soviet Union on June 22. 1941. For Europe it was to be heads or tails; Hitlers wins or

Stalin wins.

It was then that from every country in Europe thousands of young men made up their minds that the destiny of their native country was at stake. They would volunteer their lives to fight communism and create a united Europe.

In all, they would grow to be more than 600,000 non-German Europeans fighting on the Eastern Front. They would bring scores

of divisions to the Waffen SS.

The Waffen SS were ideological and military shock troops of Europe. The Germans, numbering 400,000, were actually in the minority.

The one million-strong Waffen SS represented the first truly

European army to ever exist.

After the war each unit of this army was to provide their people with a political structure free of the petty nationalism of the past. All the SS fought the same struggle. All shared the same world view. All became comrades in arms.

The most important political and military phenomenon of World War Two is also the least known: the phenomenon of the

Waffen SS.

Leon Degrelle is one of the most famous Waffen SS soldiers. After joining as a private he earned all stripes from corporal to general for exceptional bravery in combat. He engaged in seventy-five hand-to-hand combat actions. He was wounded on numerous occasions. He was the recipient of the highest honors: The Ritterkreuz, the Oak-Leaves, the Gold German Cross and numerous other decorations for outstanding valor under enemy fire.

One of the last to fight on the Eastern Front, Leon Degrelle escaped unconditional surrender by flying some 1500 miles across Europe toward Spain. He managed to survive constant fire all along the way and crash landed on the beach of San Sebastian

in Spain, critically wounded.

Against all odds he survived. Slowly he managed to re-build a

new life in exile for himself and his family.

For Degrelle philosophy and politics cannot exist without historical knowledge. For him beauty enhances people and people cannot improve their lives without it.

This philosophy is reflected in everything he does. In his Span-

ish home art blends gracefully with history.

The work of Leon Degrelle has always been epic and poetic. As he walks in the environment of his home one feels the greatness of Rome with its marbles, its bronzes, its translucent glass; one feels the elegant Arabian architecture, the gravity of the Gothic form and the sumptuousness of Renaissance and Baroque art. One feels the glory of his flags.

In this atmosphere of beauty and greatness, the last and most important living witness of World War Two awaits you. Ladies

and Gentlemen: General Leon Degrelle.

The Degrelle Lecture

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am asked to talk to you about the great unknown of World War Two: the Waffen SS.

It is somewhat amazing that the organization which was both political and military and which during World War Two united more than one million fighting volunteers, should still be officially ignored.

Why?

Why is it that the official record still virtually ignores this extraordinary army of volunteers? An army which was at the vortex of the most gigantic struggle, affecting the entire world.

The answer may well be found in the fact that the most striking feature of the Waffen SS was that it was composed of volunteers from some thirty different countries.

What cause gathered them and why did they volunteer their lives?

Was it a German phenomenon?

At the beginning, yes.

Initially, the Waffen SS amounted to less than two hundred members. It grew consistently until 1940 when it evolved into a second phase: the Germanic Waffen SS. In addition to Germans from Germany, northwestern Europeans and descendants of Germans from all across Europe enlisted.

Then, in 1941 during the great clash with the Soviet Union, rose the European Waffen SS. Young men from the most distant countries fought together on the Russian front.

No one knew anything about the Waffen SS for most of the years preceding the war. The Germans themselves took some time to recognize the distinctiveness of the Waffen SS.

Hitler rose to the chancellorship democratically, winning at the ballot box. He ran electoral campaigns like any other politician. He addressed meetings, advertised on billboards, his message attracted capacity audiences. More and more people liked what he had to say and more and more people voted members of his party into congress. Hitler did not come to power by force but was duly elected by the people and duly installed as Chancellor by the President of Germany, General von Hindenburg. His government was legitimate and democratic. In fact, only two of his followers were included in the Cabinet.

Later he succeeded always through the electoral process in increasing his majority. When some elections gave him up to 90% of the vote, Hitler earned every vote on his own merit.

During his campaigns Hitler faced formidable enemies: the power establishment who had no qualms whatsoever in tampering with the electoral process. He had to face the Weimar establishment and its well-financed left-wing and liberal parties and highly organized bloc of six million Communist Party members. Only the most fearless and relentless struggle to convince people to vote for him, enabled Hitler to obtain a democratic majority.

In those days the Waffen SS was not even a factor. There was, of course, the SA with some three million men. They were rank and file members of the National Socialist Workers Party but certainly not an army.

Their main function was to protect party candidates from Communist violence. And the violence was murderous indeed: more than five hundred National Socialists were murdered by the

communists. Thousands were grieviously injured.

The SA was a volunteer, non-government organization and as

on as Hitler rose to power he could no longer avail himself of its help.

He had to work within the system he was elected to serve.

He came in a state of disadvantage. He had to contend with an entrenched bureaucracy appointed by the old regime. In fact, when the war started in 1939, 70% of German bureaucrats had been appointed by the old regime and did not belong to Hitler's party. Hitler could not count on the support of the Church hierarchy. Both big business and the Communist Party were totally hostile to his programs. On top of all this, extreme poverty existed and six million workers were unemployed. No country in Europe had ever known so many people to be out of work.

So here is a man quite isolated. The three million SA party members are not in the government. They vote and help win the elections but they cannot supplant the entrenched bureaucracy in the government posts. The SA also was unable to exert influence on the army, because the top brass, fearful of competition, was hostile to the SA.

This hostility reached such a point that Hitler was faced with a wrenching dilemma. What to do with the millions of followers who helped him to power? He could not abandon them.

The army was a highly organized power structure. Although only numbering 100,000 as dictated by the Treaty of Versailles it exerted great influence in the affairs of state. The President of Germany was Field Marshal von Hindenburg. The army was a privileged caste. Almost all the officers belonged to the upper classes of society.

It was impossible for Hitler to take on the powerful army frontally. Hitler was elected democratically and he could not do what Stalin did: to have firing squads execute the entire military establishment. Stalin killed thirty thousand high ranking officers. That was Stalin's way to make room for his own trusted commissars.

Such drastic methods could not occur in Germany and unlike Stalin, Hitler was surrounded by international enemies.

His election had provoked international rage. He had gone to the voters directly without the intermediary of the establishment parties. His party platform included an appeal for racial purity in Germany as well as a return of power to the people. Such tenets so infuriated world Jewry that in 1933 it officially declared war on Germany.

Contrary to what one is told Hitler had limited power and was quite alone. How this man ever survived these early years defy comprehension. Only the fact that Hitler was an exceptional genius explains his survival against all odds. Abroad and at home Hitler had to bend over backwards just to demonstrate his good will.

But despite all his efforts Hitler was gradually being driven into a corner. The feud between the SA and the army was coming to a head. His old comrade, Ernst Roehm, Chief of the SA wanted to follow Stalin's example and physically eliminate the army brass. The showdown resulted in the death of Roehm, either by suicide or murder, and many of his assistants, with the army picking up the pieces and putting the SA back in its place.

At this time the only SS to be found in Germany were in Chancellor Hitler's personal guard: one hundred eighty men in all. They were young men of exceptional qualities but without any political role. Their duties consisted of guarding the Chancellory

and presenting arms to visiting dignitaries.

It was from this miniscule group of 180 men that a few years later would spring an army of a million soldiers. An army of unprecedented valor extending its call throughout Europe.

After Hitler was compelled to acknowledge the superiority of the army he realized that the brass would never support his revolutionary social programs. It was an army of aristocrats.

Hitler was a man of the people, a man who succeeded in wiping out unemployment, a feat unsurpassed to this day. Within two years he gave work to six million Germans and got rid of rampant poverty. In five years the German worker doubled his income without inflation. Hundreds of thousands of beautiful homes were built for workers at a minimal cost. Each home had a garden to grow flowers and vegetables. All the factories were provided with sport fields, swimming pools and attractive and decent workshops.

For the first time paid vacations were created. The communists and capitalists had never offered paid vacations; this was Hitler's creation. He organized the famous "strength through joy" programs which meant that workers could, at affordable prices,

board passenger ships and visit any part of the world.

All these social improvements did not please the establishment. Big business tycoons and international bankers were worried. But Hitler stood up to them. Business can make profits but only if people are paid decently and are allowed to live and work in dignity. People, not profits, come first.

This was only one of Hitler's reforms. He initiated hundreds of others. He literally rebuilt Germany. In a few years more than five thousand miles of freeways were built. For the worker the affordable Volkswagen was created. Any worker could get this car on a payment of five marks a week. It was unprecedented in Europe. Thanks to the freeways the worker for the first time could visit any part of Germany whenever they liked. The same programs applied to the farmers and middle class.

Hitler realized that if his social reforms were to proceed free of sabotage he needed a powerful lever, a lever that commanded

respect.

Hitler still did not confront the army but skillfully started to build up the SS. He desperately needed the SS because above all Hitler was a political man; to him war was the last resort. His aim was to convince people, to obtain their loyalty, particularly the younger generation. He knew that the establishment-minded brass would oppose him at every turn.

And he was right. Through the high ranking officers the establishment plotted the overthrow of the democratically elected Hitler government. Known as the Munich Plot, the conspirators were

detected in time. That was in 1938.

On 20 July 1944, Hitler almost lost his life when aristocratic

officers planted a time bomb underneath his desk.

In order not to alert the army Hitler enlarged the SS into a force responsible for law and order. There was of course a German police force but there again Hitler was unsure of their loyalty. The 150,000 police were appointed by the Weimar regime. Hitler needed the SS not only to detect plots but mostly to protect his reforms. As his initial Leibstandarte unit of 180 grew, other regiments were found such as the Deutschland and the Germania.

The army brass did everything to prevent SS recruitment. Hitler bypassed the obstacles by having the interior minister and not the war ministry do the recruiting.

The army countered by discouraging the recruitment of men between the ages of 18 and 45. On the ground of national defense, privates were ordered to serve four years, non-commissioned officers twelve and officers twenty-five years.

Such orders, it was thought, would stop SS recruitment dead in its tracks. The reverse happened. Thousands of young men rushed to apply, despite the lengthy service, more than could be

accepted.

The young felt the SS was the only armed force which repre-

sented their own ideas.

The new formations of young SS captivated public imagination. Clad in smart black uniforms the SS attracted more and more young men.

It took two years from 1933 to 1935 and a constant battle of wits with the army to raise a force of 8.000 SS.

At the time the name Waffen SS did not even exist. It was not until 1940, after the French campaign, that the SS will be officially named "Waffen SS." In 1935 they were called just SS. However, 8,000 SS did not go far in a country of 80 million people. And Hitler had yet to devise another way to get around the army. He created the Totenkopf guard corps. They were really SS in disguise but their official function was to guard the concentration camps.

What were these concentration camps?

They were just work camps where intractable communists were put to work. They were well treated because it was thought they would be converted sooner or later to patriotism. There were two concentration camps with a total of three thousand men. Three thousand out of a total of six million card-carrying members of the Communist Party. That represents one per two thousand. Right until the war there were fewer than ten thousand inmates.

So the Totenkopf ploy produced four regiments. At the right moment they will join the SS. The Totenkopf kept a low profile through an elaborate system of recruiting reserves in order to keep its strength inconspicuous.

At the beginning of the war the *Totenkopf* numbered 40,000 men. They will be sent to 163 separate units. Meanwhile the initial *Leibstandarte* regiment reached 2800 and a fourth regiment was formed in Vienna at the time of the Anschluss.

The young men who joined the SS were trained like no other army in the world. Military and academic instruction were intensive, but it was the physical training that was the most rigorous. They practice sports with excellence. Each of them would have performed with distinction at the Olympic games. The extraordinary physical endurance of the SS on the Russian front, which so amazed the world, was due to this intensive training.

There was also the ideological training. They were taught why they were fighting, what kind of Germany was being resurrected before their very eyes. They were shown how Germany was being morally united through class reconciliation and physically united through the return of the lost German homelands. They were made aware of their kinship with all the other Germans living in foreign lands, in Poland, Russia, the Sudentenland and other parts of Europe. They were taught that all Germans represented an ethnic unity.

Young SS were educated in two military academies, one in Bad Toelz the other in Braunschweig. These academies were totally different from the grim barracks of the past. Combining aesthetics with the latest technology they were located in the middle of hundreds of acres of beautiful country.

Hitler was opposed to any war, particularly in Western Europe. He did not even conceive that the SS could participate in such a war. Above all the SS was a political force. Hitler regarded Western countries as individual cultures which could be federated but certainly not conquered. He felt a conflict within the West would be a no-win civil war.

Hitler's conception of Europe then was far ahead of his neighbors. The mentality of 1914-1918, when small countries fought other small countries over bits of real estate, still prevailed in the Europe of 1939. Not so in the case of the Soviet Union where internationalism replaced nationalism. The communists never aimed at serving the interests of Russia. Communism does not limit itself to acquire chunks of territories but aims at total world domination.

This is a dramatically new factor. This policy of world conquest is still being carried out today whether in Viet Nam, Afganistan, Africa or Poland. At the time it was an entirely new concept. Alone among all the leaders of the world Hitler saw this concept as an equal threat to all nations.

Hitler recalled vividly the havor the communists unleashed in Germany at the end of World War One. Particularly in Berlin and Bavaria the Communists under foreign orders organized a state within a state and almost took over. For Hitler, everything pointed East. The threat was Communism.

Apart from his lack of interest in subjugating Western Europe, Hitler was well aware he could not wage war on two fronts.

At this point instead of letting Hitler fight Communism the Allies made the fateful decision to attack Hitler.

The so-called Western Democracies allied themselves with the Soviet Union for the purpose of encircling and destroying the democratic government of Germany.

The Treaty of Versailles had already amputated Germany from all sides. It was designed to keep Germany in a state of permanent economic collapse and military impotence. The Allies had ratified a string of treaties with Belgium, the newly created Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Rumania to pressure Germany from all sides.

Now in the summer of 1939 the governments of Britain and France were secretly negotiating a full military alliance with the Soviet Union. The talks were held in Moscow and the minutes were signed by Marshal Zhukov.

I have these minutes in my possession. They are stupefying. One can read a report guaranteeing Britain and France of Soviet participation against Germany. Upon ratification the Soviet Union was to provide the Anglo-French forces with the Soviet support of 5500 combat planes immediately plus the back up of the entire Soviet air force. Between 9,000 to 10,000 tanks would

also be made available. In return, the Soviet Union demanded the Baltic states and free access to Poland. The plan called for an

early joint attack.

Germany was still minimally armed at that stage. The French negotiators realized that the 10,000 Soviet tanks would soon destroy the 2000 German tanks but did not see that they would be unlikely to stop at the French border. Likewise the British government was quite prepared to let the Soviets take over Europe.

Facing total encirclement Hitler decided once more to make his own peace with one or the other side of the Soviet-British part-

nership.

He turned to the British and French governments and requested formal peace talks. His quest for peace was answered by an outpouring of insults and denunciations. The international press went on an orgy of hate against Hitler unprecedented in history. It is mind-boggling to re-read these newspapers today.

When Hitler made similar peace overtures to Moscow he was surprised to find the Soviets eager to sign a peace treaty with Germany. In fact, Stalin did not sign a peace treaty for the purpose of peace. He signed to let Europe destroy itself in a war of attrition while giving him the time he needed to build up his

military strength.

Stalin's real intent is revealed in the minutes of the Soviet High Command, also in my possession. Stalin states his intent to come into the war the moment Hitler and the Western powers have annihilated each other. Stalin had great interest in marking time and letting others fight first. I have read his military plans and I have seen how they were achieved. By 1941 Stalin's ten thousand tanks had increased to 17,999, the next year they would have been 32,000, ten times more than Germany's. The air force would also have been 10 to 1 in Stalin's favor.

The very week Stalin signed the peace treaty with Hitler he gave orders to build 96 air fields on the Western Soviet border, 180 were planned for the following year. His strategy was constant: "The more the Western powers fight it out the weaker they will be. The longer I wait the stronger I get." It was under these appalling circumstances that World War Two started. A war

which was offered to the Soviets on a silver platter.

Aware of Stalin's preparations Hitler knew he would have to face communism sooner rather than later. And to fight communism he had to rely on totally loyal men, men who would fight for an ideology against another ideology. It had always been Hitler's policy to oppose the ideology of class war with an ideology of class cooperation.

Hitler had observed that Marxist class war had not brought prosperity to the Russian people. Russian workers were poorly clothed, as they are now, badly housed, badly fed. Goods are always in short supply and to this day, housing in Moscow is as nightmarish as it was before the war. For Hitler the failure of class war made class cooperation the only just alternative. To make it work Hitler saw to it that one class would not be allowed to abuse the other.

It is a fact that the newly rich classes emerging from the industrial revolution had enormously abused their privileges and it was for this reason that the National Socialists were socialists.

National Socialism was a popular movement in the truest sense. The great majority of National Socialists were blue collars. 70% of the Hitler Youth were children of blue collar workers. Hitler won the elections because the great mass of workers were solidly behind him. One often wonders why six million communists who had voted against Hitler, turned their back on Communism after Hitler had been elected in 1933. There is only one reason: they witnessed and experienced the benefits of class cooperation. Some say they were forced to change; it is not true. Like other loyal Germans they fought four years on the Russian Front with distinction.

The workers never abandoned Hitler, but the upper classes did. Hitler spelled out his formula of class cooperation as the answer to communism with these words: "Class cooperation means that capitalists will never again treat the workers as mere economic components. Money is but one part of our economic life, the workers are more than machines to whom one throws a pay packet every week. The real wealth of Germany is its workers."

Hitler replaced gold with work as the foundation of his economy. National Socialism was the exact opposite of Communism.

Extraordinary achievements followed Hitler's election.

We always hear about Hitler and the camps, Hitler and the Jews, but we never hear about his immense social work. If so much hatred was generated against Hitler by the international bankers and the servile press it was because of his social work. It is obvious that a genuine popular movement like National Socialism was going to collide with the selfish interest of high finance. Hitler made clear that the control of money did not convey the right of rapacious exploitation of an entire country because there are also people living in the country, millions of them, and these people have the right to live with dignity and without want. What Hitler said and practised had won over the German youth. It was this social revolution that the SS felt compelled to spread throughout Germany and defend with their lives if need be.

The 1939 war in Western Europe defied all reason. It was a civil war among those who should have been united. It was a

monstrous stupidity.

The young SS were trained to lead the new National Socialist revolution. In five or ten years they were to replace all those who had been put in office by the former regime. But at the beginning of the war it was not possible for these young men to stay home. Like the other young men in the country they had to defend their country and they had to defend it better than the others.

The war turned the SS from a home political force to a national

army fighting abroad and then to a supranational army.

We are now at the beginning of the war in Poland with its far reaching consequences. Could the war have been avoided? Emphatically yes! Even after it had moved into Poland.

The Danzig conflict was inconsequential. The Treaty of Versailles had separated the German city of Danzig from Germany

and given it to Poland against the wish of its citizens.

This action was so outrageous that it had been condemned all over the world. A large section of Germany was sliced through the middle. To go from Western Prussia to Eastern Prussia one had to travel in a sealed train through Polish territory. The citizens of Danzig had voted 99% to have their city returned to Germany. Their right of self-determination had been consistently ignored.

However, the war in Poland started for reasons other than

Danzig's self-determination or even Poland's.

Poland just a few months before had attacked Czechoslovakia at the same time Hitler had returned the Sudetenland to Germany. The Poles were ready to work with Hitler. If Poland turned against Germany it is because the British government did everything in its power to poison German-Polish relations.

Why?

Much has to do with a longstanding inferiority complex British rulers have felt towards Europe. This complex has manifested itself in the British Establishment's obsession in keeping Europe

weak through wars and dissension.

At the time the British Empire controlled 500 million human beings outside of Europe but somehow it was more preoccupied with its traditional hobby: sowing dissension in Europe. This policy of never allowing the emergence of a strong European country has been the British Establishment's modus operandi for centuries.

Whether it was Charles the Fifth of Spain, Louis the Fourteenth or Napolean of France or William the Second of Germany, the British Establishment never tolerated any unifying power in Europe. Germany never wanted to meddle in British affairs. However, the British Establishment always made it a point to meddle in European affairs, particularly in Central Europe and the Balkans.

Hitler's entry into Prague brought the British running to the fray. Prague and Bohemia had been part of Germany for centuries and always within the German sphere of influence. British meddling in this area was totally injustified. For Germany the Prague regime represented a grave threat. Benes, Stalin's servile Czech satrap, had been ordered by his Kremlin masters to open his borders to the Communist armies at a moment's notice. Prague was to be the Soviet springboard to Germany.

For Hitler, Prague was a watchtower to central Europe and an advance post to delay a Soviet invasion. There were also Prague's historical economic links with Germany. Germany has always had economic links with Central Europe. Rumania, the Balkans, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia have had longstanding complimentary economies with Germany which have functioned to this day.

Hitler's European economic policy was based on common sense and realism. And it was Hitler's emerging Central European Common Market rather than concern for Czech freedom that the

British Establishment could not tolerate.

Yet English people felt great admiration for Hitler. I remember when Lloyd George addressed the German press outside Hitler's home, where he had just been a guest. He stated: "You can thank God you have such a wonderful man as your leader!" Lloyd George, the enemy of Germany during World War One, said that!

King Edward the Eighth of England who had just abdicated and was now the Duke of Windsor also came to see Hitler at his Berchtesgaden home, accompanied by his wife, who incidentally had been used to force his abdication. Whey they returned the Duke sent a wire to Hitler. It read: "What a wonderful day we have spent with your Excellency. Unforgettable!" The Duke reflected what many English people knew, remarking on: "how well off the German workers were." The Duke was telling the truth. The German worker earned twice as much, without inflation, as he did before Hitler and consequently his standard of living was high.

Even Churchill, the most fanatic German-hater of them all, had in 1938, a year before the war, sent a letter to Hitler in which he wrote: "If ever Great Britain was plunged into a disaster comparable to the one that afflicted Germany in 1918 I would ask God that He should send us a man with the strength and the character

of your Excellency."

The London Times reported this extraordinary statement.

Friend or foe, all acknowledge that Hitler was a man of exceptional genius. His achievements were the envy of the world. In five short years he rebuilt a bankrupt nation burdened with millions of unemployed into the strongest economic power in Europe. It was so strong that the small country that was Germany was unable to withstand a war against the whole world for six years.

Churchill acknowledged that no one in the world could match such a feat. He stated just before the war: "there is no doubt we can work out a peace formula with Hitler." But Churchill received other instructions. The Establishment, fearful that Hitler's successes in Germany could spread to other countries, was determined to destroy him. It created hatred against Germany across Europe by stirring old grievances. It also exploited the envy some Europeans felt toward Germany.

The Germans' high birth rate had made Germany the most populous country in Western Europe. In science and technology Germany was ahead of both France and Britain. Hitler had built Germany into an economic powerhouse. That was Hitler's crime and the British Establishment opted to destroy Hitler and Ger-

many by any means.

The British manipulated the Polish government against Germany. The Poles themselves were more than willing to live in peace with the Germans. Instead, the unfortunate Poles were railroaded into war by the British. One must not forget that one and a half million Germans lived in Poland at the time, at great benefit to the Polish economy. Apart from economic ties with Germany, the Poles saw a chance that with Germany's help they would be able to recover their Polish territories from the Soviet Union, territories they had tried to recover in vain since 1919.

In January 1939 Hitler had proposed to Beck, the Polish leader, a compromise to solve the Danzig issue: The Danziger's vote to return to Germany would be honored and Poland would continue to have free port access and facilities, guaranteed by treaty.

The prevailing notion of the day that every country must have a sea port really does not make sense. Switzerland, Hungary and other countries with no sea ports manage quite well. Hitler's proposals were based on the principles of self-determination and reciprocity. Even Churchill admitted that such a solution could dispose of the Danzig problem. This admission, however, did not prevent him to sent an ultimatum to Germany: withdrawal from Poland or war. The world has recently seen what happened when Israel invaded Lebanon. Heavily populated cities like Tyre and Sidon were destroyed and so was West Beirut. Everybody called for Israel's withdrawal but no one declared war on Israel when it refused to budge.

With a little patience a peaceful solution would have been found Danzig. Instead, the international press unleashed a massive campaign of outright lies and distortions against Hitler. His proposals were willfully misrepresented by a relentless press

onslaught.

Of all the crimes of World War Two, one never hears about the wholesale massacres that occured in Poland just before the war. I have detailed reports in my files documenting the mass slaughter of defenseless Germans in Poland.

Thousands of German men, women and children were massacred in the most horrendous fashion by Press-enraged mobs. The photographs of these massacres are too sickening to look at! Hitler decided to halt the slaughter and he rushed to the rescue.

The Polish campaign showed Hitler to be a military genius. History had already started to recognize this most startling of Hitler's characteristics: his rare military genius. All the successful military campaigns of the Third Reich were thought out and directed by Hitler personally, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hitler inspired a number of generals who became his most able executives in later campaigns.

In regard to the Polish campaign the General Staff had planned an offensive along the Baltic coastline in order to take Danzig, a plan logistically doomed to failure. Instead, Hitler invented the Blitzkrieg or lightning war and in no time captured Warsaw. The Waffen SS appeared on the Polish Front and its performance

amazed the world.

The second campaign in France was also swift and humane. The British-French forces had rushed to Holland and Belgium to check the German advance, but they were outwitted and out-

flanked in Sedan. It was all over in a matter of days.

The story goes that Hitler had nothing to do with this operation; that it was all the work of General von Manstein. That is entirely false. Marshall von Manstein had indeed conceived the idea but when he submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff he was reprimanded, demoted and retired to Dresden. The General Staff had not brought this particular incident to Hitler's attention. On his own, Hitler ran a campaign along the same lines and routed the British-French forces. It was not until March 1940 that von Manstein came into contact with Hitler.

Hitler also planned the Balkan and Russian campaigns. On the rare occasions where Hitler allowed the General Staff to have

their way, such as in Kursk, the battle was lost.

In the 1939 polish campaign Hitler did not rely on military textbook theories devised fifty years ago, as advocated by the General Staff, but on his own plan of swift, pincer-like encirclement. In eight days the Polish war was won and over in spite of the fact that Poland is as large as France.

The eight day campaign saw three SS regiments in action: The Leibstandarte, the Deutschland and the Germania. There was also an SS motorbike battalion, a corps of engineers and a transmission unit. In all it was a comprehensive but small force of

25,000 men.

Sepp Dietriech and his Leibstandarte alone had, after bolting out of Silesia, split Poland in half within days. With less than 3,000 men he had defeated a Polish force of 15,000 and taken 10,000 prisoners. Such victories were not acheved without loss.

It is hard to imagine that from a total of one million SS, 352,000 were killed in action with 50,000 more missing. It is a grim figure! Four hundred thousand of the finest young men in Europe! Without hesitation they sacrificed themselves for their beliefs. They knew they had to give an example. They were the first on the front line as a way to defend their country and their ideals.

In victory or defeat the Waffen SS always sought to be the best

representatives of their people.

The SS was a democratic expression of power: people gath-

ering of their own free will.

The consent of the ballot box is not only this; there is consent of the heart and the mind of men. In action, the Waffen SS made a plebiscite: that the German people should be proud of them, should give them their respect and their love. Such high motivation made the volunteers of the Waffen SS the best fighters in the world.

The SS had proved themselves in action. They were not empty talking politicians, but they gave their lives, the first to go and fight in an extraordinary spurt of comradeship. This comradeship was one of the most distinctive characteristics of the SS: the SS leader was the comrade of the others.

It was on the front lines that the results of the SS physical training could really be noticed. An SS officer had the same rigorous training as the soldiers. Those officers and privates competed in the same sports events, and only the best man won, regardless of rank. This created a real brotherhood which literally energized the entire Waffen SS. Only the teamwork of free men, bonded by a higher ideal could unite Europe. Look at the Common Market of today. It is a failure. There is no unifying ideal. Everything is based on haggling over the price of tomatoes, steel, coal, or booze. Fruitful unions are based on something a little higher than that.

The relationship of equality and mutual respect between soldiers and officers was always present. Half of all division commanders were killed in action. Half! There is not an army in the world where this happened. The SS officer always led his troops to battle. I was engaged in seventy-five hand-to-hand combats because as an SS officer I had to be the first to meet the enemy. SS soldiers were not sent to slaughter by behind-the-line officers, they followed their officers with passionate loyalty. Every SS commander knew and taught all his men, and often received unexpected answers.

After breaking out of Tcherkassy's siege I talked with all my soldiers one-by-one, there were thousands at the time. For two weeks every day from dawn to dusk, I asked them questions, and heard their replies. Sometimes it happens that some soldiers who brag a little, receive medals, while others—heroes—who keep

quiet, miss out. I talked to all of them because I wanted to know first-hand what happened, and what they had done. To be just I had to know the truth.

It was on this occasion that two of my soldiers suddenly pulled their identity cards from the Belgian Resistance Movement. They had been sent to kill me. At the front line, it is very simple to shoot someone in the back. But the extraordinary SS team spirit had won them over. SS officers could expect loyalty of their men by their example.

The life expectancy of an SS officer at the front was three months. In Estonia I received ten new young officers from Bad Toelz academy one Monday; by Thursday, one was left and he was wounded.

In the conventional armies, officers talked at the men, from superior to inferior, and seldom as brothers in combat and

brothers in ideology.

Thus, by 1939, the Waffen SS had earned general admiration and respect. This gave Hitler the opportunity to call for an increase in their numbers. Instead of regiments, there would be three divisions.

Again, the Army brass laid down draconian recruiting conditions: SS could only join for not less than four years of combat duty. The brass felt no one would take such a risk. Again, they guessed wrong. In the month of February 1940 alone, 49,000 joined the SS. From 25,000 in September 1939 there would be 150,000 in May 1940.

Thus, from 180 to 8,000 to 25,000 to 150,000 and eventually one

million men, all this against all odds.

Hitler had no interest whatever in getting involved with the war in France, a war forced on him.

The 150,000 SS had to serve under the Army, and they were given the most dangerous and difficult missions. Despite the fact that they were provided with inferior hand-arms and equipment. They had no tanks. In 1940 the Leibstandarte was provided with a few scouting tanks. The SS were given wheels and that's all. But with trucks, motorbikes and varied limited means they were able to perform amazing feats.

The Leibstandarte and Der Fuehrer regiments were sent to Holland under the Leadership of Sepp Dietrich. They had to cross Dutch waterways. The Luftwaffe had dropped parachutists to hold the bridges 120 miles deep in Dutch territory, and it was vital for the SS to reach these bridges with the greatest speed.

The Leibstandarte would realize an unprecedented feat in ten days: to advance 120 miles in one day. It was unheard of at the time, and the world was staggered. At that rate German troops would reach Spain in one week. In one day the SS had crossed all the Dutch canals on flimsy rubber rafts. Here again, SS losses

were heavy. But, thanks to their heroism and speed, the German Army reached Rotterdam in three days. The parachutists all risked being wiped out had the SS not accomplished their light-

ning-thrust.

In Belgium, the SS regiment Der Fuehrer faced head on the French Army, which after falling in the Sedan trap, had rushed toward Breda, Holland. There, one would see for the first time a small motivated army route a large national army. It took one SS regiment and a number of German troops to throw the whole French Army off balance and drive it back from Breda to Antwerp, Belgium and Northern France.

The Leibstandarte and Der Fuehrer regiments jointly advanced on the large Zealand Islands, between the Escaut and Rhine

rivers. In a few days they would be under control.

In no time the Leibstandarte had then crossed Belgium and Northern France. The second major battle of SS regiments occurs in concert with the Army tank division. The SS, still with their tanks, are under the command of General Rommel and General Guderian. They spearhead a thrust toward the North Sea.

Sepp Dietrich and his troops have now crossed the French canals, but are pinned down by the enemy in a mud field, and just manage to avoid extermination. But despite the loss of many soldiers, officers and one battalion commander, all killed in action, the Germans reach Dunkirk.

Hitler is very proud of them.

The following week, Hitler deploys them along the Somme River, from which they will pour out across France. There again, the SS will prove itself to be the best fighting force in the world. Sepp Dietrich and the 2nd Division of the SS, Totenkopf, advance so far so fast they they even lose contact with the rest of the Army for three days.

They found themselves in Lyon, France, a city they had to leave

after the French-German peace treaty.

Sepp Dietrich and a handful of SS on trucks had achieved the

impossible.

Der Fuehrer SS division spearheaded the Maginot Line breakthrough. Everyone had said the Line was impenetrable. The war in France was over. Hitler had the three SS divisions march through Paris. Berlin honored the heroes also. But the Army was so jealous that it would not cite a single SS for valor or bravery. It was Hitler himself who in front of the German congress solemnly paid tribute to the heroism of the SS. It was on this occasion that Hitler officially recognized the name of the Waffen SS.

But it was more than just a name-change. The Waffen SS became Germanic, as volunteers were accepted from all Germanic countries. The SS had found out by themselves that the people of Western Europe were closely related to them: the

Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch, the Flemish—all belonged to the same Germanic family. These Germanic people were themselves very much impressed by the SS, and so, by the way, were the French.

The people of Western Europe had marvelled at this extraordinary German force with a style unlike any others: if two SS scouts would reach town ahead of everybody else, on motorbikes, before presenting themselves to the local authorities they would first clean themselves up so as to be of impeccable appearance.

The people could not help but be impressed.

The admiration felt by young Europeans of Germanic stock for the SS was very natural. Thousands of young men from Norway, Denmark, Flanders, and Holland were awed with surprise and admiration. They felt irresistably drawn to the SS. It was not Europe, but their own Germanic race that so deeply stirred their souls. They identified with the victorious Germans. To them, Hitler was the most exceptional man ever seen. Hitler understood them, and had the remarkable idea to open the doors of the SS to them. It was quite risky. No one had ever thought of this before. Prior to Hitler, German imperialism consisted only of peddling goods to other countries, without any thought of creating an ideology called "community"—a common ideal with its neighbors.

Suddenly, instead of peddling and haggling, here was a man who offered a glorious ideal: an enthralling social justice, for which they all had yearned in vain, for years. A broad New Order, instead of the formless cosmopolitanism of the pre-war so-called "democracies." The response to Hitler's offer was overwhelming. Legions from Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Flanders were formed. Thousands of young men now wore the SS uniform. Hitler created specifically for them the famous Viking division. One destined to become one of the most formidable divisions of the Waffen SS.

The Army was still doing everything to stop men from joining the SS in Germany, and acted as though the SS did not exist. Against this background of obstructionism at home, it was normal and understandable that the SS would welcome men from outside

Germany.

The Germans living abroad provided a rich source of volunteers. As there are millions of German-Americans, there are millions of Germans in all parts of Europe—in Hungary, in Rumania, in Russia. There was even a Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans. These were the descendants of Germans who had emigrated two centuries before. Other Europeans, like the French Huguenots, who went to Prussia, also shared this type of emigration with the Germans. So, Europe was dotted with German settlements. The victories of the Third Reich had made them

proud of belonging to the German family. Hitler welcomed them home. He saw them, first, as a source of elite SS men, and also as an important factor in unifying all Germans ideologically.

Here again, the enthusiastic response was amazing. 300,000 volunteers of German ancestory would join, from all over Europe. 54,000 from Rumania alone. In the context of that era, these were remarkable figures. There were numerous problems to overcome. For instance, most of the Germanic volunteers no longer spoke German. Their families had settled in foreign lands for 200 years or so. In Spain, for instance, I can see the children of my legionaries being assimilated with the Spaniards—and their grand-children no longer speak French. The Germans follow the same pattern. When the German volunteers first arrived at the SS, they spoke many different languages, had different ways and different needs.

How to find officers who could speak all these languages? How to coordinate such a disparate lot? The mastery of these problems was the miracle of the Waffen SS assimilation program. This homecoming of the separated "tribes" was seen by the Waffen SS as the foundation for real European unity. The 300,000 Germanic volunteers were welcomed by the SS as brothers, and they reciprocated by being as dedicated, loyal and heroic as the German SS.

Within the year, everything had changed for the Waffen SS. The barracks were full, the academies were full. The strictest admission standards and requirements equally applied for the Germanic volunteers. They had to be the best in every way, both physically and mentally. They had to be the best of the Germanic race.

German racialism has been deliberately distorted. It never was an anti-"other race" racialism. It was a pro-German racialism. It was concerned with making the German race strong and healthy in every way. Hitler was not interested in having millions of degenerates, if it was in his power not to have them. Today one finds rampant alchohol and drug addiction everywhere. Hitler cared that the German families be healthy, cared that they raise healthy children for the renewal of a healthy nation. German racialism meant re-discovering the creative values of their own race, re-discovering their culture. It was a search for excellence, a noble idea. National Socialist racialism was not against the other races, it was for its own race. It aimed at defending and improving its race, and wished that all other races did the same for themselves.

That was demonstrated when the Waffen SS enlarged its ranks to include 60,000 Islamic SS. The Waffen SS respected their way of life, their customs, and their religious beliefs. Each Islamic SS battalion had an *imam*, each company had a *mullah*. It was our

common wish that their qualities found their highest expression. This was our racialism. I was present when each of my Islamic comrades received a personal gift from Hitler during the new year. It was a pendant with a small Koran. Hitler was honoring them with this small symbolic gift. He was honoring them with what was the most important aspect of their lives and their history. National Socialist racialism was loyal to the German race and totally respected all other races.

At this point, one hears: "What about the anti-Jewish racism?"

One can answer: "What about Jewish anti-Gentilism?"

It has been the misfortune of the Jewish race that never could they get on with any other race. It is an unusual historical fact and phenomenon. When one studies the history-and I say this without any passion—of the Jewish people, their evolution across the centuries, one observes that always, at all times, and at all places, they were hated. They were hated in ancient Egypt, they were hated in ancient Greece, they were hated in Roman times to such a degree that 3,000 of them were deported to Sardina. It was the first Jewish deportation. They were hated in Spain, in France, in England (they were banned from England for centuries), and in Germany. The conscientious Jewish author Lazare wrote a very interesting book on Anti-Semitism, where he asked himself: "We Jews should ask ourselves a question: why are we always hated everywhere? It is not because of our persecutors, all of different times and places. It is because there is something within us that is very unlikeable." What is unlikeable is that the Jews have always wanted to live as a privileged class divinely-chosen and beyond scrutiny. This attitude has made them unlikeable everywhere. The Jewish race is therefore a unique case. Hitler had no intention of destroying it. He wanted the Jews to find their own identity in their own environment, but not to the detriment of others. The fight-if we can call it that-of National Socialism against the Jews was purely limited to one objective: that the Jews leave Germany in peace. It was planned to give them a country of their own, outside Germany. Madagascar was contemplated, but the plans were dropped when the United States entered the war. In the meanwhile, Hitler thought of letting the Jews live in their own traditional ghettos. They would have their own organizations, they would run their own affairs and live the way they wanted to live. They had their own police, their own tramways, their own flag, their own factories which, incidentally, were built by the German government. As far as other races were concerned, they were all welcomed in Germany as guests, but not as privileged occupants.

In one year the Waffen SS had gathered a large number of Germanic people from Northern Europe and hundreds of thousands of Germans from outside Germany, the Volksdeutsche, or Germanic SS. It was then that the conflict between Communism and National Socialism burst into the open. The conflict had always existed. In Mein Kampf, Hitler had clearly set out his objective: "to eliminate the world threat of Communism." and incidentally claim some land in Eastern Europe! This eastward expansionism created much outrage: How could the Germans claim land in Russia? To this one can answer: How could the Americans claim Indian land from the Atlantic to the Pacific? How could France claim Southern Flanders and Rousillon from Spain? And what of Britain, and what of so many other countries who have claimed, conquered and settled in other territories? Somehow at the time it was all right for all these countries to settle foreign lands but it was not for Germany. Personally, I have always vigorously defended the Russians, and I finally did succeed in convincing Hitler that Germans had to live with Russians as partners not as conquerors. Before achieving this partnership. there was first the matter of wiping out Communism. During the Soviet-German Pact, Hitler was trying to gain time but the Soviets were intensifying their acts of aggression from Estonia to Bukovina. I now read extracts from Soviet documents. They are most revealing. Let's read from Marshal Voroshilov himself:

We now have the time to prepare ourselves to be the executioner of the capitalist world while it is agonizing. We must, however, be cautious. The Germans must not have any inkling that we are preparing to stab them in the back while they are busy fighting the French. Otherwise, they could change their general plan, and attack us.

In the same record, Marshal Choponitov wrote: "The coexistence between Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union is only temporary. We will not make it last very long." Marshal Timoshenko, for his part, did not want to be so hasty: "Let us not forget that our war material from our Siberian factories will not be delivered until Fall." This was written at the beginning of 1941, and the material was only to be delivered in the Fall. The war industry Commisariat Report stated: We will not be in full production until 1942. Marshal Zhukov made this extraordinary admission: "Hitler is in a hurry to invade us; he has good reasons for it."

Indeed, Hitler had good reasons to invade Russia in a hurry because he realized he would be wiped out if he did not. Zhukov added: "We need a few more months to rectify many of our defects before the end of 1941. We need 18 months to complete the modernization of our forces."

The orders are quite precise. At the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet in 1939, it is decreed that Army officers will serve three years and the soldiers will serve four years, and the Navy personnel, five years. All these decisions were made less than a month after the Soviets signed the peace treaty with Germany.

Thus the Soviets, pledged to peace, were frantically preparing for war. More than 2,500 new concrete fortifications were built between 1939 and 1940. 160 divisions were made combat-ready. 60 tank divisions were on full alert. The Germans only had 10 panzer tank divisions. In 1941, the Soviets had 17,000 tanks, and by 1942 they had 32,000. They had 92,578 pieces of artillery. And their 17,545 combat planes in 1940 outnumbered the German air force.

It is easy to understand that with such war preparations going on, Hitler was left with only one option: Invade the Soviet Union

immediately, or face annihilation.

Hitler's Russian campaign was the "last chance" campaign. Hitler did not go into Russia with any great optimism. He told me later on: "When I entered Russia, I was like a man facing a shut door. I knew I had to crash through it, but without knowing what was behind it." Hitler was right. He knew the Soviets were strong, but above all he knew they were going to be a lot stronger. 1941 was the only time Hitler had some respite. The British had not succeeded yet in expanding the war. Hitler, who never wanted the war with Britain, still tried for peace. He invited me to spend a week at his home. He wanted to discuss the whole situation and hear what I had to say about it. He spoke very simply and clearly. The atmosphere was informal and relaxed. He made you feel at home because he really enjoyed being hospitable. He buttered pieces of toast in a leisurely fashion, and passed them around, and although he did not drink he went to get a bottle of champagne after each meal because he knew I enjoyed a glass at the end of it. All without fuss and with genuine friendliness. It was part of his genius that he was also a man of simple ways without the slightest affection and a man of great humility. We talked about England. I asked him bluntly: "Why on earth didn't you finish the British off in Dunkirk? Everyone knew you could have wiped them out." He answered: "Yes, I withheld my troops and let the British escape back to England. The humiliation of such a defeat would have made it difficult to try for peace with them afterwards."

At the same time, Hitler told me he did not want to dispell the Soviet belief that he was going to invade England. He mentioned that he even had small Anglo-German dictionaries distributed to his troops in Poland. The Soviet spies there duly reported to the Kremlin that Germany's presence in Poland was a bluff and that they were about to leave for the British Isles.

On 22 June 1941, it was Russia and not England that Germany invaded. The initial victories were swift but costly. I lived the epic struggle of the Russian Front. It was a tragic epic; it was also martyrdom. The endless thousands of miles of the Russian steppes were overwhelming. We had to reach the Caucasus by

foot, always under extreme conditions. In the summer we often walked knee-deep in mud, and in winter there were below-zero freezing temperatures. But for a matter of a few days Hitler would have won the war in Russia in 1941. Before the battle of Moscow, Hitler had succeeded in defeating the Soviet Army, and taking considerable numbers of prisoners.

General Guderian's tank division, which had all by itself encircled more than a million Soviet troops near Kiev, had reached Mescow right up to the city's tramway lines. It was then that suddenly an unbelievable freeze happened: 40, 42, 50 degrees celsius below zero! This meant that not only were men freezing, but the equipment was also freezing, on the spot. No tanks could move. Yesterday's mud had frozen to a solid block of ice, half a meter high, icing up the tank treads.

In 24 hours all of our tactical options had been reversed. It was at that time that masses of Siberian troops brought back from the Russian Far East were thrown against the Germans. These few fateful days of ice that made the difference between victory and defeat, Hitler owed to the Italian campaign in Greece during the fall of 1940.

Mussolini was envious of Hitler's successes. It was a deep and silent jealousy. I was a friend of Mussolini, I knew him well. He was a remarkable man, but Europe was not of great concern to him. He did not like to be a spectator, watching Hitler winning everywhere. He felt compelled to do something himself, fast. Impulsively, he launched a senseless offensive against Greece.

His troops were immediately defeated. But it gave the British the excuse to invade Greece, which up till now had been uninvolved in the war. From Greece the British could bomb the Rumanian oil wells, which were vital to Germany's war effort. Greece could also be used to cut off the German troops on their way to Russia. Hitler was forced to quash the threat pre-emptively. He had to waste five weeks in the Balkans. His victories there were an incredible logistical achievement, but they delayed the start of the Russian campaign for five critical weeks.

If Hitler had been able to start the campaign in time, as it was planned, he would have entered Moscow five weeks before, in the sun of early fall, when the earth was still dry. The war would have been over, and the Soviet Union would have been a thing of the past. The combination of the sudden freeze and the arrival of fresh Siberian troops spread panic among some ot the old Army generals. They wanted to retreat to 200 miles from Moscow. It is hard to imagine such inane strategy! The freeze affected Russia equally, from West to East, and to retreat 200 miles in the open steppes would only make things worse. I was commanding my troops in the Ukraine at the time and it was 42 degrees centigrade below zero.

Such a retreat meant abandoning all the heavy artillery, including assault tanks and panzers that were stuck in the ice. It also meant exposing half a million men to heavy Soviet sniping. In fact, it meant condemning them to certain death. One need only recall Napolean's retreat in October. He reached the Berzina River in November, and by December 6th all the French troops had left Russia. It was cold enough, but it was not a winter campaign.

Can you just imagine in 1941 half a million Germans fighting howling snowstorms, cut off from supplies, attacked from all sides by tens of thousands of Cossaks? I have faced charging Cossaks, and only the utmost superior firepower will stop them. In order to counter such an insane retreat, Hitler had to fire more

than 30 generals within a few days.

It was then that he called on the Waffen SS to fill in the gap and boost morale. Immediately the SS held fast on the Moscow front. Right through the war the Waffen SS never retreated. They would rather die than retreat. One cannot forget the figures. During the 1941 winter, the Waffen SS lost 43,000 men in front of Moscow. The regiment Der Fuehrer fought almost literally to the last man. Only 35 men survived out of the entire regiment. The Der Fuehrer men stood fast and no Soviet troops got through. They had to try to bypass the SS in the snow. This is how famous Russian General Vlasov was captured by the Totenkopf SS division. Without their heroism, Germany would have been annihilated by December 1941.

Hitler would never forget it: he gauged the willpower that the Waffen SS had displayed in front of Moscow. They had shown character and guts. And that is what Hitler admired most of all: guts. For him, it was not enough to have intelligent or clever associates. These people can often fall to pieces, as we will see during the following winter at the battle of Stalingrad with Gen-

eral Paulus.

Hitler knew that only sheer energy and guts, the refusal to surrender, the will to hang tough against all odds, would win the war.

The blizzards of the Russian steppes had shown how the best army in the world, the German Army, with thousands of highly trained officers and millions of highly disciplined men, was just not enough. Hitler realized they would be beaten, that something else was needed, and that only the unshakable faith in a high ideal could overcome the situation. The Waffen SS had this ideal, and Hitler used them from now on at full capacity.

From all parts of Europe volunteers rushed to help their German brothers. It was then that was born the third great Waffen SS. First there was the German, then the Germanic, and now there was the European Waffen SS. 125,000 would then volunteer

to save Western Culture and Civilization. The volunteers joined with full knowledge that the SS incurred the highest death tolls. More than 250,000 out of one million would die in action. For them, the Waffen SS was, despite all the deaths, the birth of Europe. Napolean said in St. Helena: "There will be no Europe until a leader arises."

The young European volunteers have observed two things: first, that Hitler was the only leader who was capable of building Europe and secondly that Hitler, and Hitler alone could defeat

the world threat of Communism.

For the European SS the Europe of petty jealousies, jingoism, border disputes, economic rivalries was of no interest. it was too petty and demeaning; that Europe was no longer valid for them. At the same time the European SS, as much as they admired Hitler and the German people, did not want to become Germans. They were men of their own people and Europe was the gathering of the various people of Europe. European unity was to be achieved through harmony, not domination of one over the others.

I discussed these issues at length with both Hitler and Himmler. Hitler like all men of genius had outgrown the national stage. Napoleon was first a Corsican, then a Frenchman, then a European and then a singularly universal man. Likewise Hitler had been an Austrian, then a German, then a greater German, then Germanic, then he had seen and grasped the magnitude of build-

ing Europe.

After the defeat of Communism the Waffen SS had a solemn duty to gather all their efforts and strength to build a united Europe, and there was no question that non-German Europe

should be dominated by Germany.

Before joining the Waffen SS we had known very difficult conflicts. We had gone to the Eastern front first as adjunct units to the German army but during the battle of Stalingrad we had seen that Europe was critically endangered. Great common effort was imperative. One night I had an 8 hour debate with Hitler and Himmler on the status of non-German Europeans within the new Europe.

For the present we expected to be treated as equals fighting for a common cause. Hitler understood fully and from then on we had our own flag, our own officers, our own language, our own

religion. We had total equal status.

I was the first one to have Catholic padres in the Waffen SS. Later padres of all demoninations were available to all those who wanted them. The Islamic SS division had their own mullahs and the French even had a bishop! We were satisfied that with Hitler, Europeans would be federated as equals. We felt that the best way to deserve our place as equals was in this critical hour to defend Europe equally well as our German comrades.

What mattered above all for Hitler was courage. He created a new chivalry. Those who earn the order of the Ritterkreuz, meaning the cross of the knights, were indeed the new knights. They earned this nobility of courage. Each of our units going home after the war would be the force that would protect the peoples' rights in our respective countries. All the SS understood that European unity meant the whole of Europe, even Russia.

There had been a great lack of knowledge among many Germans regarding the Russians. Many believed that the Russians were all Communists while in fact, Russian representation in the Communist hierarchy was less than insignificant. They also believed that the Russians were diametrically opposite from the Europeans. Yet they have similar familial structures, they have an old civilization, deep religious faith and traditions which are

not unlike those of other European countries.

The European SS saw the new Europe in the form of three great components; central Europe as the power house of Europe, western Europe as the cultural heart of Europe and eastern Europe as the potential of Europe. Thus the Europe the SS envisioned was alive and real. Its six hundred million inhabitants would live from the North Sea to Vladivostok. It was in this span of 8,000 miles that Europe could achieve its destiny. A space for young people to start new lives. This Europe would be the beacon of the world. A remarkable racial ensemble. An ancient civilization, a spirtitual force and the most advanced technological and scientific complex. The SS prepared for the high destiny of Europe.

Compare these aims, these ideals with the "Allies." The Roosevelts, the Churchills sold Europe out in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. They cravenly capitulated to the Soviets. They delivered half of the European continent to Communist slavery. They let the rest of Europe disintegrate morally, without any ideal to sustain it. The SS knew what they wanted: the Europe of ideals

was salvation for all.

This faith in higher ideals inspired four hundred thousand German SS, three hundred thousand *Volksdeutsche* or Germanic SS and three hundred thousand other European SS. Volunteers

all, one million builders of Europe.

The ranks of the SS grew proportionately with the growth of the war in Russia. The nearer Germany was to defeat the more volunteers arrived at the front. This was phenomenal; eight days before the final defeat I saw hundreds of young men join the SS on the front. Right to the end they knew they had to do the impossible to stop the enemy.

So from the one hundred and eighty-men strong Leibstandarte in 1933 to the SS regiments before 1939, to the three regiments in Poland, to the three divisions in France, to the six divisions at the beginning of the Russian war, to the 38 divisions in 1944, the

Waffen SS reached 50 divisions in 1945. The more SS died, the more others rushed to replace them. They had faith and stood firm to the extreme limit. The exact reverse happened in January 1943 at Stalingrad. The defeat there was decided by a man without courage. He was not capable of facing danger with determination, of saying unequivocally: I will not surrender, I will stand fast until I win. He was morally and physically gutless and he lost.

A year later the SS Viking and the SS Wallonia divisions were encircled in the same way at Cherkassy. With the disaster of Stalingrad fresh in the minds of our soldiers they could have been subject to demoralization. On top of it I was laid down with a deep sidewound and 102 degree temperature. As general in command of the SS Wallonia forces I knew that all this was not conducive to high morale. I got up and for 17 days I led charge after charge to break the blockade, engaged in numerous hand-to-hand combats, was wounded four times but never stopped fighting. All my men did just as much and more. The siege was broken by sheer SS guts and spirit.

After Stalingrad, when many thought that all was lost, when the Soviet forces poured across the Ukraine, the Waffen SS stopped the Soviets dead in their tracks. They re-took Charkov and inflicted a severe defeat on the Soviet army. This was a pattern; the SS would over and over turn reverses into victories.

The same fearless energy was also present in Normandy. Gen.

Patton called them "the proud SS divisions."

The SS was the backbone of resistance in Normandy. Eisenhower observed "the SS fought as usual to the last man."

If the Waffen SS had not existed, Europe would have been overrun entirely by the Soviets by 1944. They would have reached Paris long before the Americans. The Waffen SS heroism stopped the Soviet juggernaut at Moscow, Cherkov, Cherkassy, and Tarnopol. The Soviets lost more than 12 months. Without SS resistance the Soviets would have been in Normandy before Eisenhower. The people showed deep gratitude to the young men who sacrificed their lives. Not since the great religious orders of the middle ages had there been such selfless idealism and heroism. In this century of materialism, the SS stand out as a shining light of spirituality.

I have no doubt whatever that the sacrifices and incredible feats of the Waffen SS will have their own epic poets like Schiller.

Greatness in adversity is the distinction of the SS.

The curtain of silence fell on the Waffen SS after the war but now more and more young people somehow know of its existence, of its achievements. The fame is growing and the young demand to know more. In one hundred years almost everything will be forgotten but the greatness and the heroism of the Waffen SS will be remembered. It is the reward of an epic.

Book Review

A LEGACY OF HATE: ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA, by Ernest Volkman, Franklin Watts, 358pp, \$16.95, ISBN 0-531-09863X

"Some people go around smelling after anti-Semitism all the time," wrote George Orwell in a letter to a friend. Orwell then opined that, "More rubbish is written about this subject than any other I can think of." Ernest Volkman is a "prize-winning journalist" who has dedicated himself to proving the aptness of Orwell's remarks. For some time, he has gone around smelling after anti-Semitism, and he has written a load of rubbish about it.

This load of rubbish, titled A Legacy of Hate: Anti-Semitism in America, purports to be "a study of the more modern forms of anti-Semitism in this country, the one place in the world where this ancient disease should not have happened, and where it should not be happening." But what it is, primarily, is an exercise in fear-mongering, an attempt to conjure up the spectre of calamity for American Jews as a possible consequence of a supposed new outbreak of anti-Semitism. And, secondarily, the book is an exercise in smear-mongering, in which numerous individuals, groups, movements and institutions are tarred with Volkman's mile-wide brush of anti-Semitism.

Volkman's main theme, not exactly an original one, is that "there is a new anti-Semitism afoot." But this "new anti-Semitism" is a strange beast. As Volkman puts it, "There are expressions of anti-Semitism, but paradoxically, they are not expressed out of hatred, but because of something even more hateful: simple ignorance." But, as Volkman also says,

Anti-Semitism, then, is hatred of the Jews as a people. It should be distinguished from anti-Jewish feelings. People who do not like Jews for one reason or another are not necessarily anti-Semites; there is no compelling reason for Jews to be universally liked, any more than Americans, Chinese, Catholics or Buddhists are to be universally liked. Voltaire, that great humanist, plainly did not like Jews (he regarded them as odd and superstitious), but took pains to note that he thought burning Jews at the stake was uncalled for. Anti-Semites, however, progress over that critical step beyond dislike to pathology, hating Jews for being Jews. (p10)

If anti-Semitism is "hatred of the Jews as a people," then there can be no "expressions of anti-Semitism" that "are not expressed out of hatred." Thus, Volkman's "new anti-Semitism" is not anti-Semitism at all. Volkman attempts to pass his self-contradiction off as a "paradox." Rather, it is an example of his inability, or unwillingness, to think straight. (He has a similar problem with

getting his facts straight, but more on that anon.)

As I've said, Volkman's main theme is the rise of a "new anti-Semitism." There are two varieties of this "new anti-Semitism:" "indifferent anti-Semitism" and "casual anti-Semitism." The first of these is the subject of a chapter titled "A Callous Indifference." Volkman probably took this title from a phrase used in a 1974 book titled, coincidentally, The New Anti-Semitism, an opus perpetrated by Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, who Alfred Lilienthal has aptly dubbed the high priests of the "Anti-Defamation" League's cult of anti-anti-Semitism. Here is the context in which Forster and Epstein used the phrase:

This book represents an attempt to survey the American domestic and world scenes and properly indentify the current sources, modes and extent of anti-Jewish behavior. The task will involve, necessarily, some re-defining of traditional notions of anti-Semitism and serious reorientation of long-held convictions about the nature of its sources. But more important, we propose to examine as well behavior that can only be properly defined as an insensitivity to these problems rather than anti-Semitic either by the definitions that have existed or by new and more inclusive descriptions. It includes, often, a callous indifference to Jewish concerns expressed by respectable institutions and persons here and abroad—people who would be shocked to think themselves, or have others think them, anti-Semites. (p5)

Forster and Epstein did not go so far as to include "a callous indifference to Jewish concerns" within their new (and improved?) definition of "anti-Semitism." But, in a case of the student surpassing the teacher, Volkman has done just that. With Volkman, "a callous indifference to Jewish concerns" becomes one of the two varieties of "the new anti-Semitism." This is progress indeed. I can hardly wait for the day to arrive when this ever-expanding concept of "anti-Semitism" will have come to encompass everything under the sun.

In the meantime, Volkman has sniffed out numerous instances of "a callous indifference." The Reagan administration, it seems, was guilty of "a callous indifference" in nominating Warren Richardson to the post of assistant secretary for legislation of the Department of Health and Human Services, because Richardson, from 1969 to 1973, had been general counsel and chief lobbyist for Liberty Lobby, "one of the more notorious anti-Semitic organizations in the country." Volkman rhetorically asks, "[H]ow was it

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possible for an administration to nominate for a high-ranking domestic policy post, a man who at the very least had served an avowedly anti-Semitic organization?" But, elsewhere in the book, he mentions Liberty Lobby's "recent assertion that it is 'not anti-Semitic, only anti-Zionist." Thus, Liberty Lobby is not an avowedly anti-Semitic organization, and Volkman knows it.

In any case, it was Richardson who was nominated, not the Liberty Lobby. And, even assuming the Liberty Lobby is anti-Semitic, that does not necessarily mean that Richardson is anti-Semitic (unless, of course, one believes in guilt by association), and Volkman's evidence of Richardson's alleged anti-Semitism is tenuous at best. It consists of two items: (1) an article by Richardson critical of American Middle East policy which concluded, "Liberty Lobby will not tag along with the cowards who would rather countenance another national disaster than brave the screams of the pro-Zionist 'free press' in America," and (2) a joint interview Richardson gave with Curtis Dall, then head of the Libery Lobby. in 1970, during which Richardson referred to "the international money order." But, if this is enough to convict a man of anti-Semitism, then my name is Isadore Lipschitz. The article on Middle East policy, even assuming Richardson wrote the above-quoted conclusion, which he denies, is evidence only of anti-Zionism, not anti-Semitism. Volkman treats anti-Zionism as a manifestation of "the new anti-Semitism," but, as I've already pointed out, "the new anti-Semitism" is not anti-Semitism. As for Richardson's reference to "the international money order," taken out of context it is not proof of much of anything (what did Richardson say about "the international money order?"), let alone proof of anti-Semitism. Volkman claims that the phrase is "an old right-wing code word for Jews, by which is meant 'international Jewish money.' " Of course, one can convict a person of anything by putting the necessary incriminating words in their mouth. But Robert Anton Wilson, in an interview given to Conspiracy Digest and reprinted in his book The Illuminati Papers, makes some relevant comments about a similar matter:

... it has been impossible to talk about bankers' conspiracies since the 1930s without most of your audience thinking you are a Nazi or, or least, an anti-Semite. This is what is called a conditioned association, or uncritical inference, and, however illogical it is, it is very widespread. I've been attacking the bankers since about 1962, and I never stop getting mail from two groups of idiots: Jewish idiots who think I'm secretly an anti-Semite, and are angry at me for it; and anti-Semitic idiots who also think I'm a secret anti-Semite, and are glad to welcome me to their loathsome club.

I don't know if Volkman is a Jewish idiot, but he is, in any case, an anti-anti-Semitic idiot.

Most of Volkman's examples of "callous indifference" are episodes in which the U.S. government has failed to act as a running dog lackey of the Zionist State of Israel. He is willing to go to ridiculous lengths to condemn the Carter administration for insufficient zeal in defending Israel. During the Carter administration, says Volkman, "the Americans sat on their hands while a series of events took place that should have aroused the strongest U.S. protest." Such as? One such "incident took place at the June 1980 meeting of the Organization of African Unity, when Israel was referred to in the group's official documents merely as 'the Zionist entity.' "Oh, dear! How horrendous! But, pray tell, why should the U.S. government jump up and down, pull out its hair and scream "No! No! No!" because some other governments refer to Israel as "the Zionist entity?"

According to Volkman, the second variety of "the new anti-Semitism" is what he calls "casual anti-Semitism." Let's see how he derives this pseudo-concept. He begins by noting that the results of recent public opinion surveys suggest that anti-Semi-

tism is declining. But, he asks,

if anti-Semitism is supposedly disappearing, why are there so many instances of open expression of anti-Semitism? Because it is what we might call casual anti-Semitism, a new form that is most often expressed by people who claim no animosity toward Jews. For the most part they're telling the truth; whether they are making such statements in the name of "truth" or "objectivity" or "realism" or "historical fact," they very seldom have malicious intent. (pp82-83)

Thus spake Volkman. But, irony of ironies, Volkman's own words can be quoted to question the meaningfulness of this pseudoconcept of "casual anti-Semitism." In a chapter on the history of anti-Semitism in America, Volkman reports that historian Oscar Handlin "went so far as to claim that anti-Semitism in this country did not really begin until the early part of this century, and that any anti-Semitic incidents before then were 'without malicious intent,' (whatever that means)." But, if, as Volkman is snidely suggesting, it is meaningless for Handlin to write about anti-Semitic incidents "without malicious intent," then it is likewise meaningless for Volkman to write about expressions of anti-Semitism by people who "very seldom have malicious intent." Nevertheless, Volkman devotes an entire chapter of this book to doing just that.

Volkman says that "casual anti-Semitism is expressed out of ignorance or because there is simply no awareness that such a statement might be considered in the least anti-Semitic." So "casual anti-Semitism" is, in some cases, expressed out of ignorance. But Volkman's prime example of "casual anti-Semitism" is revi-

sionism regarding "the Holocaust," a subject about which his own ignorance is such that he is obviously incompetent to judge anyone else's knowledgeability about the subject. As for Volkman's statement that "casual anti-Semitism" is sometimes expressed "because there is simply no awareness that such a statement might be considered in the least anti-Semitic," this seems to imply that it is "casual anti-Semitism" to make any statement that "might be considered" anti-Semitic. But, with anti-anti-Semitic bloodhounds like Volkman on the prowl, any statement that is in the least critical of Israel, Zionism, Organized Jewry, the American Jewish Lobby, "Holocaust" historiography, individual Jews, etc., might be considered anti-Semitic whether or not it really is. In effect, Volkman is saying: Keep your mouth shut. Don't you dare criticize Israel, Zionism, Organized Jewry, the American Jewish Lobby, "Holocaust" historiography, individuals Jews, etc., or he'll accuse you of "casual anti-Semitism." What Volkman is trying to pull is a variation of what the late novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand called "The Argument from Intimidation," which, as she explained,

is not an argument, but a means of forestalling debate and extorting an opponent's agreement with one's undiscussed notions. It is a method of by-passing logic by means of psychological pressure.

... the psychological pressure method consists of threatening to impeach an opponent's character by means of his argument, thus

impeaching the argument without debate.

The essential characteristic of the Argument from Intimidation is its appeal to moral self-doubt and its reliance on the fear, guilt or ignorance of the victim. It is used in the form of an ultimatum demanding that the victim renounce a given idea without discussion, under threat of being considered morally unworthy. The pattern is always: "Only those who are evil (dishonest, heartless, insensitive, ignorant, etc.) can hold such an idea."

In Volkman's case, the "Argument from Intimidation" takes this form: Only those who are anti-Semitic, as least, "casually" so, can hold such an idea. Rand observed that, "The Argument from Intimidation is a confession of intellectual impotence." Volkman's

performance confirms that.

As I've said, Volkman's primary example of "casual anti-Semitism" is "Holocaust Revisionism," or, as he puts it, "the disturbing attempt to disprove one of the touchstones of modern Jewry, the Holocaust." True to the method of "the Argument from Intimidation," Volkman makes no attempt to come to grips with and rebut the arguments of the "Holocaust Revisionists." Instead, he labels (libels?) "Holocaust Revisionism" as "casual anti-Semitism" and then presents an incredibly distorted, error-ridden version of the history of "Holocaust Revisionism," throwing in

some choice invective along the way ("insanity," "hopelessly

muddleheaded," "this poison," "evil works," etc.).

According to Volkman, Paul Rassinier "had been imprisoned at Buchenwald, an experience which somehow led him to conclude that no atrocities went on in Nazi concentration camps, and if any Jews were killed, they were murdered by Jewish Kapos (camp trustees)." But, in fact, Rassinier, who was imprisoned at Buchenwald, never asserted that no atrocities went on in the Nazi concentration camps. And if one consults Lucy Dawidowicz's "Lies About the Holocaust," Commentary, December, 1980, which is Volkman's source of information about Rassinier. one finds a rather different, and more accurate, characterization of what Rassinier concluded. As Dawidowicz puts it, Rassinier concluded that "the atrocities committed in the Nazi camps had been greatly exaggerated by the survivors." Volkman has somehow managed to get the facts wrong, even though his source got them right. This is a prize-winning journalist? In any case, Volkman is also wrong in claiming Rassinier concluded that "if any Jews were killed, they were murdered by Jewish Kapos (camp trustees)." This is, in fact, a distortion of something Rassinier wrote about Buchenwald. (See Debunking the Genocide Myth, p127.)

The S.S. no longer had any need to hit men, since those to whom they delegated their power did the hitting better; nor to steal, since their minions stole better and the benefits were the same; nor to kill slowly to make order respected, because others did that for them, and order in the camp was all the more perfect for it.

As you can see, Rassinier did not specify Jewish prisoners or Jewish Kapos. Volkman, has once again managed to get the facts wrong. But this time he did so by accurately repeating an inac-

curate statement by Lucy Dawidowicz.

According to Volkman, Arthur Butz, in The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, "included what he considered to be incontrovertible evidence that all the Jews who were supposed to have died [during "the Holocaust"] were in fact still alive, carefully hidden from view." That Butz did not assert this can be verified by consulting page 239 of his book, where he states that, "The Jews of Europe suffered during the war by being deported to the East, by having had much of their property confiscated and, more importantly, by suffering cruelly in the circumstances surrounding Germany's defeat. They may even have lost a million dead." This is another instance in which Volkman got his facts wrong by parroting Lucy Dawidowicz. Of course, he might have avoided this error if he had taken the trouble to read the Butz book rather than relying on a second-hand description from a biased, hostile source. But no-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-! Not this prize-winning journalist.

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Not this self-righteous hypocrite, who even has the chutzpah to condemn Northwestern University for defending Butz's academic freedom, because—now get this—"it did not seem to occur to Northwestern that equally cherished standards of academia were being trampled in the process, including truth, research and facts." "Truth, research and facts?" Let's examine some further evidences of Volkman's concern for "truth, research and facts."

According to Volkman, "Anne Frank died in the Nazi gas chambers for the crime of being Jewish . . ." But Ernst Schnabel, who researched the fate of Anne Frank for his book, Anne Frank: A Portrait in Courage, found that she and her family were deported to Auschwitz, from which she and her sister were transferred to Belsen, where they both died of typus. Schnabel's findings about Anne Frank's fate are summarized in the commonly-available paperback editions of what purports to be her diary. Volkman says that the diary "remains one of the great documents of humanity." But has he actually read it?

Concluding a plea for more extensive treatment of Jewish history, and especially "the Holocaust," in high-school and college textbooks, in order to eradicate the "appalling ignorance" about such matters, Volkman invokes "the memory of the famous historian Simon Dubonow [sic] who, as the Nazis took him from the Riga ghetto in 1941 to be gassed at Buchenwald, called out: 'Brothers! Write down everything you see and hear. Keep a

record of it all!" "

Volkman cites The Holocaust and the Historians by Lucy Dawidowicz as his source of information about Dubnow. But here is Dawidowicz's version of this incident:

In December 1941, when the German police entered the Riga Ghetto to round up the old and sick Jews, Simon Dubnow, the venerable Jewish historian, was said to have called out as he was being taken away: "Brothers, write down everything you see and hear. Keep a record of it all. (p125)

Notice that Volkman took the liberty of adding two exclamation points to the Dubnow quotation. Notice also that in Dawidowicz's version Dubnow "was said to have called out," but in Volkman's version Dubnow "called out." But, most importantly, notice that Dawidowicz said nothing about Dubnow being taken "to be gassed at Buchenwald." So why, then, does Volkman say Dubnow was taken "to be gassed at Buchenwald," where there never was a gas chamber? The explanation undoubtedly lies in Volkman's dedication to "truth, research and facts."

Volkman's dedication to "truth, research and facts" also shows up in his handling of a speech made by Charles Lindbergh on 11 September 1941, in which Lindbergh, an opponent of American intervention in the war in Europe, said, "The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration." Volkman responds that "many influential Jews were in fact isolationists," even though Volkman's source, The Warhawks, by Mark Lincoln Chadwin, concedes that "many influential Jews were interventionists." (Italics in original.) Volkman is so concerned about "truth, research and facts," that he substitutes the word "isolationists" for "interventionists" to create a non-fact with which to rebut Lindbergh.

Volkman's concern for "truth, research and facis" is manifest throughout A Legacy of Hate, and there are many examples of that concern that I will not mention specifically. Suffice it to say that Volkman's dedication to "truth, research and facts" is such

that one should never take his word for anything.

In his search for anti-Semitism, Volkman covers a lot of ground, and the list of those he indicts on this charge is a long one. The culprits include: George Ball (the advocate of a tougher U.S. policy with respect to Israel and critic of the American Jewish lobby who, interestingly enough, works for the investment banking house of Lehman Brothers, Kuhn Loeb), Paul McCloskey, James Abourezk, both Time and Newsweek magazines, the Hilton hotel chain, the Sixty Minutes television program, David Irving, Truman Capote, Vanessa Redgrave, Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew, Jerry Falwell, the National Council of Churches, Daniel Berrigan, Mobil Oil and—hold onto your hats—the Anne Frank Foundation!

Volkman discusses anti-Zionism in a chapter titled "Anti-Zionism: The Easy Disguise." Here he dogmatically spouts the Zionist line and makes unsubstantiated, inaccurate generalizations about anti-Zionism and anti-Zionists. According to Volkman, "a reading of the vast literature produced by anti-Zionists is persuasive that anti-Zionism is certainly motivated by anti-Semitism, and there is not much point in trying to claim (as many do) that anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are two very different things." But if Volkman has actually read "the vast literature produced by anti-Zionists," then I'll eat my yarmulka. None of this literature is included in Volkman's bibliography and there is nothing in his text to indicate any familiarity with it. If Volkman had read the anti-Zionist literature, he might have known that the anti-Zionists include Alfred Lilienthal, Moshe Menuhin, Rabbi Elmer Berger, Murray Rothbard, Rabbi Moshe Schonfeld, and Uri Avneri, and he might have thought twice about equating anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism (while vehemently denouncing those who equate Zionism with racism).

At one point, Volkman writes that "it is possible to tell the history of Judaism by simply reciting one long dirge of anti-Semitism." Possible, yes. But, truthful? To tell the history of Judaism Book Review 477

as one long dirge of anti-Semitism is to practice what Salo W. Baron called the "lachrymose" presentation of Jewish history. In this version, Jewish history is a history of suffering, persecution and martyrdom at the hands of hate-ridden Gentiles. Or, in other words, the Jew is the eternal victim, and, furthermore, never a victimizer. Of course, there are problems with this view. On the one hand, it has to ignore or minimize the various "Golden Ages" that Jews have enjoyed during their history, for example, their five-century-long "Golden Age" in Moslem-ruled Spain. On the other hand, it has to ignore or minimize such things as the Hebrew conquest of Canaan, the forced conversion to Judaism of the Idumeans under John Hyrcanus, Jewish persecution of the early Christians (considered blasphemers for deifying a man), the prominent role of Jews in the slave trade during the early Middle Ages, etc. In line with this one-sided, lachrymose view of Jewish history. Volkman blithely dismisses the victimization of Palestinian Arabs at the hands of Zionist/Israeli Jews. "However much anyone wants to believe that the Palestinians' plight is cause for some concern, it obviously bears no resemblance to the very real plights of the Cambodian refugees, the Vietnamese boat people, the Soviet Jews and the many victims of the torture chambers of Latin America." Thus, while the Soviet Jews' plight is a very real plight, the plight of the Palestinians is no cause for concern. How's that for bias and insensitivity?

And this is not the only manifestation of Volkman's one-sided view of Jewish-Gentile relations. Another is Volkman's abrupt dismissal of the claim that "classical Jewish texts were violently anti-Christian" as a manifestation of "anti-Semitism" while he himself claims that classical Christian texts are anti-Semitic. Is Volkman's reference to "the scriptural anti-Semitism" of Gospel accounts of the trial of Jesus a manifestation of anti-Christian prejudice? If not, then why is the claim that classical Jewish texts were violently anti-Christian necessarily a manifestation of anti-Semitism? I suggest that Volkman open up Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (which he lists in his bibliography) and read the preface to Part One, "Anti-Semitism." There he can find Arendt writing that

it was Jewish historiography, with its strong polemical and apologetic bias, that undertook to trace the record of Jew-hatred in Christian history while it was left to the anti-Semites to trace an intellectually not too dissimilar record from ancient Jewish authorities. When this Jewish tradition of an often violent antagonism to Christians and Gentiles came to light, "the general Jewish public was not only outraged but genuinely astonished," so well had its spokesmen succeeded in convincing themselves and everybody else of the non-fact that Jewish separateness was due exclusively to Gentile hostility and lack of enlightenment.

In short, classical Jewish texts (some of them anyway) were violently anti-Christian, just as some classical Christian texts

were anti-Jewish.

Volkman seems almost oblivious to the reality that anti-Semitism is but one side of a coin, the other side of which is anti-Gentilism. But let him consider the following statement, made by a George Mysels of Hollywood in a letter printed in The Los Angeles Herald Examiner of 4 January 1982: "I am not lighting a candle for the Polish people because nobody ever lit candles for the millions of Jews who have been murdered by the Poles since Polish history began." Millions of Jews murdered by the Poles? How's that for a "blood libel"? That Mr. Mysels is not simply anti-Polish, but anti-Gentile, is confirmed by a letter printed in the same newspaper the very next day in which he wrote that, "The only friends of Jews are other Jews and a number of apparent Gentiles who are aware of the existence of a least one Jew in their lineage." And let Volkman consider this item from The Los Angeles Times of Monday, 11 October 1982:

TEL AVIV (AP)—Police investigating the fire that destroyed Jerusalem's Baptist church have detained two suspects, Israel radio said Sunday.

The radio said the suspects are Jews, one of them a foreigner. There was no immediate police comment on the radio report.

One can't help but wonder if this church-burning was the work of Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach ("Thus") movement. It was a member of Kahane's movement who was recently convicted of plotting to blow up the Dome of the Rock shrine, the mosque at Islam's third holiest site. And it was the Kach movement which, according to The Los Angeles Times of 25 October 1982, printed a poster "describing the massacre of Palestinians in Beirut as divine retribution for the past murders of Jews" and saying, "'What we ourselves should have done was done by others.' "Contrary to the image Volkman seeks to create, hatred in Gentile-Jewish relations is not a one-way street; it travels in both directions.

A Legacy of Hate is an awesomely bad book. Amusingly enough, one of Volkman's mentors, Lucy Dawidowicz, in the October, 1982 Commentary, calls it "a shoddy book" which "tries to exploit the ripple of anti-Semitic incidents by sounding a general alarm in a chapter called, of all things, 'Kristallnacht.' "And, says Dawidowicz, "Stretching evidence is only one of this book's flaws." True. It has lots of other flaws, including factual inaccuracies, unsupported assertions, incoherent arguments, specious reasoning, and internal contradictions. Shoddy indeed. But, then, what do you expect from a prize-winning journalist?

put all Jews of Transylvania in the same category and consider them altogether "Romanian." I will illustrate this situation with an example

taken from my personal research experience.

As the author of a book about American Romanians (published in 1976), I sent thousands of questionaires to Americans who were not only of Romanian descent, but also to many who were of Hungarian, Jewish or Russian descent but who once lived or were born in Romania (either before or after 1939). Some of them accepted to be listed in my book as Americans of Romanian descent, some others refused, and some did not even bother to answer my questionnaire. In this context it is instrumental to know the reasons of those who refused. They stated clearly their reasons: although born and educated in Romania, they did not consider themselves associated with Romanian culture or traditions.

The same view should be applied to the Jews who lived in Bessarabia and Bucovina in 1939 and became "Soviet" in 1940. These people remained "Soviet" all the way after 1940 even though Romania re-occupied those territories for a short while during the war. I don't see any reason to call them "Romanian" today and count them with the Jews who died in Romania. The situation is the same for the "Bulgarian" Jews

who were once "Romanian."

Serban C. Andronescu New York City

THE WATSON PHENOMENON

It was good to read Thomas Henry Irwin's excellent article on Tom

Watson in the Fall 1982 issue of The Journal.

It is ironic that Watson was the first important native White Southern leader to treat the Negro's aspirations with any degree of seriousness. Watson regarded Blacks as an integral part of Southern society. Senator Watson urged all to unite against the financial oligarchs, recognizing the money power as the real enemy of all races. Would that we could heed his message today!

Bezalel Chaim Brooklyn, NY

MIDDLE EAST REVISIONISM

I was especially pleased to see the "Memorandum to the President" in the Fall 1982 Journal. As a long time student of the Middle East conflict, I can assure you that this is fertile ground, long neglected by the historical revisionists in the western world with few exceptions. And yet this is a centuries' old conflict which is presently costing Americans billions of dollars each year, not to speak of the untold sufferings of hundreds of thousands of people directly affected by the Zionist interlopers. I am thus certain that the "Memorandum" piece won't be your last publication concerning this conflict because it is so intrinsically connected with other conflicts such as both world wars, major topics of revisionists.

Pitman Buck, Jr. Texas City, Texas

About the Contributors

RANJAN BORRA is the Senior Reference Librarian, India section, in the Asian Division of the Library of Congress. He was born in Howrah (near Calcutta), India, and was associated with the Indian nationalist movement inspired by Subhas Chandra Bose. He holds a B.A. degree from the American University and a M.A. degree from the University of Maryland. As a free-lance author, political analyst, and one-time editor/broadcaster with the Voice of America, Mr. Borra has become well-known as an articulate commentator on Indian affairs. He is the founder and president of The Subhas Society, which holds annual conferences in Washington, D.C. Currently Mr. Borra is engaged in preparing a bibliography of works by and about Subhas Chandra Bose.

DR. ARTHUR R. BUTZ was born and raised in New York City. He received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in Control Sciences from the University of Minnesota in 1965. In 1966 he joined the faculty at Northwestern University where he is now Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computor Sciences. Dr. Butz is the author of The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, the most thorough revisionist work on the Holocaust to date.

LEON DEGRELLE is the former leader of the Belgian Rexist movement, and one of the outstanding surviving veterans of the German-led European struggle on the Eastern Front in World War II. Born of French ancestry in 1906 in the town of Bouillon in the Belgian Ardennes, he studied at the University of Louvain where he acquired a doctorate in law. In the 1930s he became one of the principal political figures in Belgium and in Europe, as leader of the Rexist Party, author, publisher, and public speaker. At the age of 35, with no previous military experience, he joined the newly-formed Waffen SS as a private, to participate in the great campaign then underway against Russia. He received all the highest honors for bravery in combat, finally rising to the rank of General. One of the last to remain fighting in the East, he escaped unconditional surrender by flying some 1500 miles across Europe to Spain, where he has since resided, writing prolifically on politics and history.

DR. ANDREAS WESSERLE was born in Prague, Bohemia, and raised in Bavaria. He holds four academic degrees, with distinction, from three American universities in the areas of political sociology, and political science. He has taught at two large universities and two private colleges in this country. In 1965/66 he was a member of the Institute for German Affairs at Marguette University. Since then he has taken part in highlevel seminars on modern social-political philosophy, has conducted first-hand research on international politics, and has published both in America and in Europe.

L.A. ROLLINS, 34, received a B.A. degree in Philosophy from California State College at Los Angeles in 1970. He is a free-lance writer and has contributed to such publications as The Personalist, Outlook, Reason, New Libertarian, Critique and Grump. For several years, he has been researching "the Holocaust" and related matters.

We are living in an Orwellian world where "peace" means war preparation, where "defense strategy" consists of waging aggressive war, and where "our best national interest" somehow justifies perpetually failing global meddling, stifling middle-class taxation and massive debt-creating overseas financial aid—even to our enemies.

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Harry Elmer Barnes, brilliant American revisionist historian, criminologist, sociologist and economist, separated the facts from the fictions, predicting the consequent future.

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
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Also included in the book is Barnes' definitive statement on the growth of Orwellian tyranny in the United States, entitled, "How 'Nineteen-Eighty-Four' Trends Threaten American Peace, Freedom and Prosperity"—a chapter that Barnes intended to include in the original PERPETUAL WAR but which was prevented by the publisher from being a part of the book.

This is one book that deserves to be read by Americans of all ages. It is the other side of the story. And it could save us immeasurable future grief.




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


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